

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Monday, July 24, 1989

The House met at 12 noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

As the morning brings new light and opportunity, we earnestly pray, O God, that each day will bring renewal of our hearts in thought, word, and deed. As Your spirit breathes into us the life of hope, so may we continue confident of Your love to us. May no discouragement or fear or any anxiety about the tomorrows of life keep us from experiencing this day the blessings of Your bountiful world. This we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] will lead us in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Mr. BONIOR led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Hallen, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 681. An act to require the Secretary of the Treasury to mint and issue coins in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the statehood of Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming, and for other purposes.

OUR EXPENSIVE MILITARY PLANES BEING SHOT DOWN BY BIRDS

(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, we spend \$300 billion a year on defense. The B-1 bomber alone costs \$281 million. The B-2 now costs anywhere from \$530 million on up to \$1 billion, and after all this money the General

Accounting Office reported that our planes are being shot down at a record pace, literally a record pace by birds, no less.

The GAO study said that in the last 5 years there were 16,000 collisions involving military aircraft and birds. It resulted in totally destroying nine planes, 320 million dollars' worth of damage and six crewmen died.

Now, let us think about it. This was all prompted by a 1987 crash when a pelican shot down a B-1 bomber, and listen to what the Pentagon said: "My God, that pelican weighed 16 pounds."

Mr. Speaker, what does an enemy rocket weigh? We have a \$310 billion budget out of control.

Now, I agree we cannot protect America with the Neighborhood Crime Watch, but we do not need a nuclear weapon for every barroom brawl. Let us straighten this country out and cut this defense turkey.

THROUGH THE DRUG WAR MAZE IN 28 DAYS—DAY 5: HOUSE EDUCATION AND LABOR COMMITTEE

(Mr. SMITH of Mississippi asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call attention to the House Education and Labor Committee, as it relates to the war on drugs. Again, here is a committee that does not need jurisdiction over the Nation's drug control efforts, and the work of the President's drug czar. Yet this committee is part of the maze of more than 80 committees, subcommittees, and select committees that the drug czar must pass through to arrive at a drug control strategy.

Mr. Speaker, if Bill Bennett has to face this nightmare of congressional oversight for approval of his program, due out September 5, then he'd do just well to spend his days circling the Capital Beltway. It would take him well into 1990 to testify before all the panels he must answer to. This is no way to plan and implement a drug control strategy. This is no war on drugs.

The war on drugs will never be more than a public relations campaign, as long as Congress wages its war by choir and not by troop.

I urge my colleagues to support bills in the House and Senate to create a single oversight committee that could spearhead a true war on drugs.

CONGRATULATIONS TO GREG LEMOND, WINNER OF TOUR DE FRANCE BICYCLE MARATHON

(Mrs. VUCANOVICH asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call our attention today to the outstanding performance of Greg LeMond, who yesterday won the Tour de France bicycle marathon. Greg LeMond is a constituent from my district, who lives and trains in the Reno area.

There are a number of extraordinary qualities about Greg which make him a winner with uncommon courage and strength.

He is the only American ever to have won the Tour de France. More than that, he has won the Tour de France twice, and he triumphed over a number of serious injuries in order to win this year's grueling race.

Since his first victory in 1986, Greg has overcome almost insurmountable odds. In the past few years he has recovered from a broken collarbone, a broken wrist, appendicitis, leg problems, and an almost fatal shotgun wound that forced the removal of 40 shotgun pellets from his abdomen. During the ordeal of winning this race, Greg still carries shotgun pellets in the lining of his heart.

Greg LeMond is an example to all American athletes of the true grit which he showed in beating the odds to win the Tour de France. As his representative I am immensely proud of this young man, and I believe all Americans join me today in congratulating him in his moment of victory.

B-2 BOMBER A GOOD INVESTMENT FOR SECURITY OF UNITED STATES

(Mr. SKELTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. SKELTON. This week, Mr. Speaker, we are debating and voting on the Department of Defense authorization bill. Part of the debate will center on the new technology known as the Stealth or B-2 bomber.

I support the B-2 bomber. I think it is absolutely necessary that our Nation have as part of our defense the highest and best technology that we can have.

What leads me to conclude that the B-2 would be a very good investment for the security of the United States is

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

as follows: A very good case can be made for reasons of technology, arms control, and force structure. The technological argument is the most profound one. Much the way the advent of the submarine in the early part of this century fundamentally transformed naval warfare, the advent of the Stealth bomber will transform air warfare.

Ships visible on the water's surface become invisible under the water as submarines. Just as a handful of submarines in the early years of the Second World War almost won the fight against Britain. It was not until 1943 that the Battle of the Atlantic was finally won.

That is what this Stealth airplane does, the B-2 airplane does. It is invisible to radar screens, which, of course, is the battle of today and tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, I support the B-2 bomber. I urge others to do the same.

**REQUEST TO MAKE IN ORDER
DIVISION OF THE QUESTION
ON AMENDMENT NO. 25 AS
PRINTED IN PART 2 OF HOUSE
REPORT 101-168**

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, within a few moments we will be taking up the rule on the Armed Services authorization bill. It is a controversial rule. It will probably provide the lengthiest debate we will have considered this year, obviously with more than 200 amendments that were initially offered and requested for consideration.

It is my understanding that our friend, the distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, is rather distressed at several of the provisions of this rule that do not accord the gentleman the privilege as the ranking member to propound or to offer the kind of amendments that he thinks ought to be offered.

In keeping with that, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding adoption of House Resolution 211, it shall be in order in the Committee of the Whole to demand a division of the question on amendment No. 25 as printed in part 2 of House Report 101-168, so as to permit separate votes on section 126 and 127 of the amendment.

By way of quick observation this unanimous-consent request, of course, would provide for a separate vote on the F-14B and the V-22 Osprey. Currently the way the rule is constructed, those would be taken and voted together as a package. What my unanimous-consent request would do is to break that up to permit an individual vote on each weapon system.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

Mr. BONIOR. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, under my reservation if I might make just a few com-

ments to the distinguished minority leader.

□ 1210

We worked long and hard to try to be fair with this rule. We considered 217 different amendments. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] was given, I believe, ample opportunity to have his views represented. In fact, we in a number of instances bent over backward to take care of his concerns and his needs.

Mr. Speaker, on the issue at hand, the gentleman from Alabama will have three different occasions to strike the F-14 and V-22. The gentleman from Illinois is correct. He will not be able to do that individually, but in his original Dickinson amendment, he will be able to do it. He will be able to do it in a special amendment. We allowed him to do it in section 2 of the report, and he will also be able to do it in the motion to recommit in which we have expanded to 1 hour, a highly unusual procedure from the Committee on Rules in itself, in favor of the minority's right to recommit.

This alternative that we are providing, the Republican alternative we are providing, I think, is eminently fair. We do it in each of the major clusters. We give them an alternative on SDI, burden sharing, the B-2 bomber, chemical weapons, the budget issue. I think we have been very, very fair with this rule, Mr. Speaker.

As I mentioned, we allow an hour of debate on the motion to recommit. Thirty-eight Republicans asked for amendments to the Committee on Rules. We gave 22 Republicans, two-thirds roughly of those who requested, a chance to offer amendments, and so I would just say that I think we have bent over backwards to be fair.

Of course, we have needs on our side, too, that we have to take care of. I am really reluctant to do this, but I think in view of the fact that we have worked very well with the minority on this bill, and we have worked with the gentleman from New York (Mr. SOLOMON) and all the other Republican members on the committee, that I am going to be constrained to have to make an objection on this request.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman withhold his objection?

Mr. BONIOR. I will withhold it, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, let me say to the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee and also to the gentleman from Michigan who is carrying the rule here today that, first of all, the Committee on Rules, the majority members, were very decent to the minority. They allowed us to meet with them in caucus, in private and in public, and they certainly allowed us to get across the points of view of the minority. However, that is about

where it all ended. They listened very patiently, then they went about their own business, and there now is no consensus on this rule whatsoever.

Concerning the request of the gentleman, the ranking minority member, the majority did allow the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON], to offer the Cheney budget early in the bill; they provided that if that Cheney budget passed, then they would allow an amendment to be offered clustering the V-22 and the F-14 so that it would attract more votes to be successful. However, should the Cheney budget fail, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] was then deprived of his right to offer the kind of separate amendments that would attract the most votes, as was given to the proponents of the V-22 and the F-14. That was not fair and, of course, the point was argued.

The gentleman from Michigan has said that the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] will have ample opportunity to do what the ranking Republican is asking. That is not quite true. I do not say that the gentleman is not telling the truth, but there evidently is a misunderstanding, because at no point in this bill will the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] be able to offer individual strike motions on these two subjects—the F-14 and the V-22.

Mr. Speaker, there is a lot that is unfair about this rule which we are going to discuss unless we come to some other amicable arrangements between now and the end of the rule debate. But if the gentleman wants to be fair, he certainly would honor the ranking Republican's view.

I do not necessarily share the same views as the ranking Republican on this issue, but he is entitled to fairness, and the gentleman should not object to it.

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, I just want to emphasize the point here that we have a very particular place where the Secretary of Defense, trying to meet the bipartisan budget agreement, has made some very difficult decisions. They are very big decisions, and it seems to me only fair to give the House an opportunity to vote on a straight, clean manner, yes or no on two different weapons systems, and I think the country will not understand why, in an almost pork-barrel way, we would roll both of those together so that the House never had a chance to have a clean, straightforward, up-or-down vote, and I would really hope that the gentleman from Michigan would reconsider his objection from the standpoint that we would like to be able to support this rule. We would

certainly like to avoid engaging in procedural maneuvers and some concern on the part of some Members about having a whole series of votes on all of the various amendments and trying to express displeasure.

Mr. Speaker, all that the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] are asking for is the opportunity to allow Secretary Cheney's two major procurement decisions to be voted on in a clean and straightforward manner. I think that we are not asking the House to pass them, although we would obviously like the House to support the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense, but we are asking the House to be given a chance to record it in a straightforward way.

I would hope the gentleman from Michigan would reconsider in a spirit of bipartisanship and would allow for this one minor amendment, this one unanimous-consent request, to go through.

Mr. SOLOMON. Further reserving the right to object, if the gentleman from Michigan would bear with me just a few minutes, this rule on this defense authorization bill is the most closed rule that this body has considered in the 11 years I have been in Congress on an issue that is the most important issue to come before the Congress in any year, but especially in this year of fiscal restraint.

Let me just say to the gentleman from Michigan that I want to support this rule. I do appreciate the fact that the gentleman did listen, that he and the chairman, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MOAKLEY], listened to us. But let me tell the Members that when it comes to SDI and the cutting amendments, we, the Republican side, were allowed one amendment on the king-of-the-hill method, and the Republican amendment was placed first, which puts us in a bad position. If that is the way it has to be, at least we were given an amendment.

Then when it comes to the add-back amendments, the Republicans were denied all amendments, and yet there are three Democratic amendments, three Democrat amendments allowed. That is under SDI.

When it comes to ICBM, in spite of what the chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN], asked for in the way of just three amendments, the Committee on Rules made in order five amendments. All five are Democrat amendments, not one Republican, dealing with the most, or one of the most, important issues of the bill, ICBM's.

Under nuclear testing, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY] was allowed an amendment, and no Republican substitute, no Republican amendment, was allowed.

When it comes to Davis-Bacon, two Democrat amendments were allowed, but no Republicans.

When it comes to Small Business Administration set-asides, one Democratic amendment was allowed, and none of the Republican amendments were allowed.

When we come to plutonium development which should not be in the bill at all, we were not allowed a substitute. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD], the ranking Republican on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, is sitting over here, but he was denied his substitute on that major, major subject.

We do not even want to make an issue out of this providing they could at least oblige the ranking Republican leader's request, which at least deals with one of the important issues. Otherwise, those of us who even share the gentleman's view over there on the V-22's and the F-14's are going to be constrained to fight this rule.

Mr. Speaker, I would just implore the gentleman, and beg the gentleman even, out of fairness, to see to the minority leaders's wishes.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, again, we received no amendment from the Republicans on the ICBM. We received no amendment from my colleague and good friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD], on the plutonium issue. We granted the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] his amendment which he was concerned, very concerned, about with regard to arms negotiations. We gave 65 percent of the requests that were asked of us by the Republicans. We gave them some amendments to be offered. We were, I thought, very, very gracious in this bill.

Mr. Speaker, obviously we have concerns and needs of our own that we have to be concerned about on our side of the aisle.

□ 1220

I think, quite frankly, that this is a fair bill, a fair rule, and I am going to have to protect the concerns and the interests of our Members also on this, and I am going to object at this time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FRANK). Objection is heard.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

WASHINGTON, DC.

July 21, 1989.

HON. THOMAS S. FOLEY,
The Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the permission granted in Clause 5 of Rule III of the Rules of the House of Representatives, I

have the honor to transmit a sealed envelope received from the White House at 4:35 p.m. on Friday, July 21, 1989, and said to contain a message from the President whereby he transmits draft legislation entitled "The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989," a section-by-section analysis of the proposed legislation, and an errata sheet to the draft legislation.

With great respect, I am,
Sincerely yours,

DONALD K. ANDERSON,
Clerk, House of Representatives.

CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1989—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 101-87)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce and ordered to be printed:

(For message, see proceedings of the Senate of today, Monday, July 24, 1989.)

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair desires to announce that pursuant to clause 4 of rule I, the Speaker signed the following enrolled Senate joint resolutions on Friday, July 21, 1989:

S.J. Res. 85. Joint resolution to designate the week of July 24 to July 30, 1989, as the "National Week of Recognition and Remembrance for Those Who Served in the Korean War"; and

S.J. Res. 142. Joint resolution designating the week beginning July 23, 1989, as "Lyme Disease Awareness Week."

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2461, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1990

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 211 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 211

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2461) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for military functions of the Department of Defense and to prescribe military personnel levels for such Department for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and for other purposes, and the first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and which shall not exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chair-

man and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Armed Services now printed in the reported bill as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule, said substitute shall be considered as having been read and all points of order against said substitute for failure to comply with the provisions of section 302(f) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended (Public Law 93-344, as amended by Public Law 99-177), clause 7 of rule XVI and clause 5(a) of rule XXI are hereby waived. No amendment to said substitute shall be in order except the amendments designated in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution. Said amendments shall be considered only in the order and in the manner specified, and shall be considered as having been read when offered. Each amendment, except those in part two of the report of the Committee on Rules, may only be offered by the Member designated for such amendment in the report of the Committee on Rules, or this resolution, or his designee. Debate on each of said amendments shall not exceed the time designated in said report, to be equally divided and controlled between the proponent and an opponent unless specified otherwise by this resolution or in the report of the Committee on Rules. All points of order are waived against the amendments contained in the report of the Committee on Rules. No amendment shall be subject to amendment except as specified in this resolution or in the report of the Committee on Rules, or be subject to a demand for a division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. Any period of general debate specified by this resolution shall be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services.

SEC. 2. It shall be in order to consider the amendments contained in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution as follows:

(1) When the Committee of the Whole begins consideration of amendments to H.R. 2461 on Tuesday, July 25, 1989, it shall then be in order to debate the subject matter of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for not to exceed sixty minutes. It shall then be in order to consider the amendments relating to SDI printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules in the following order: (A) by Representative Kyl of Arizona; (B) by Representatives Dellums or Boxer of California; and (C) by Representative Bennett of Florida. If more than one of said amendments is adopted, only the last such amendment which is adopted shall be considered as finally adopted and reported back to the House. Following disposition of said amendments, it shall then be in order to consider the amendments relating to SDI add-backs printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules in the following order: (A) by Representative Bennett of Florida; (B) by Representative Spratt of South Carolina; and (C) by Representative Mavroules of Massachusetts. Following disposition of said amendments, it shall be in order to consider the amendments relating to burdensharing printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules in the following order: (A) by Representative Schroeder of Colorado; and (B) by Representative Ireland of Florida. Following disposition of

said amendments, it shall be in order to begin consideration of amendments printed in part two of the report of the Committee on Rules, in the order and in the manner provided for in said section and subject to the provisions of paragraphs (4) and (5) of this section. The chairman of the Committee of the Whole, at his discretion, may continue to recognize proponents of amendments printed in part two of the report of the Committee on Rules. After disposition of such amendments printed in part two, it shall be in order to consider the amendment relating to procurement alternatives printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules if offered by Representative Dickinson of Alabama. Only if the amendment offered by Representative Dickinson of Alabama is agreed to, shall it be in order to consider the amendment printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules by Representative Weldon of Pennsylvania.

(2) After the Committee of the Whole rises on the legislative day of Tuesday, July 25, 1989, and resumes its sitting on H.R. 2461 on Wednesday, July 26, 1989, it shall be in order to consider the amendments relating to the B-2 Bomber printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules: by Representative Aspin of Wisconsin or Representative Synar of Oklahoma, which shall be subject to an amendment offered by Representative Skelton of Missouri and to a substitute offered by Representative Kasich of Ohio, Representative Dellums of California, or Representative Rowland of Connecticut. Each of said amendments relating to the B-2 Bomber shall be debatable for not to exceed forty minutes, to be controlled by the proponent. All three amendments relating to the B-2 Bomber shall be pending prior to the beginning of debate on any of them. Following disposition of said amendments, it shall be in order to consider the amendments relating to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules in the following order: (A) by Representative Dellums of California; (B) by Representative Hertel of Michigan; (C) by Representative Frank of Massachusetts; (D) by Representative Spratt of South Carolina; and (E) by Representative Mavroules of Massachusetts. It shall then be in order to resume consideration of the amendments printed in part two of the report of the Committee on Rules, subject to the provisions of paragraphs (4) and (5) of this section.

(3) After the Committee of the Whole rises on the legislative day of Wednesday, July 26, 1989, and resumes its sitting on H.R. 2461 on Thursday, July 27, 1989, further consideration of the amendments printed in part two of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution shall be suspended. It shall then be in order to consider the amendment relating to plutonium production printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules by Representative Wyden of Oregon. Following disposition of said amendment, it shall be in order to consider the amendment relating to anti-satellite weapons printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules by Representative Brown of California. Following disposition of said amendment, it shall be in order to consider the amendment relating to nuclear test-ban printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules by Representative Markey of Massachusetts. Following disposition of said amendment, it shall then be in order to consider the amendments relating to chemical

weapons printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules in the following order: (A) by Representative Owens of Utah, Representative Aspin of Wisconsin, or Representative Fascell of Florida; and (B) by Representatives Porter of Illinois or Roukema of New Jersey. Following disposition of said amendments, it shall be in order to consider the amendments relating to small disadvantaged businesses printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules by Representative Mavroules of Massachusetts. Following disposition of said amendment, it shall then be in order to consider the amendment relating to the Davis-Bacon Act printed in part one of the report of the Committee on Rules if offered by Representative Stenholm of Texas, which may be subject to a substitute if offered by Representative Murphy of Pennsylvania. Debate on said amendment and substitute shall be equally divided and controlled by Representatives Stenholm and Murphy, and shall begin after both amendments relating to the Davis-Bacon Act are pending. Following disposition of said amendments, it shall be in order to debate the subject matter of outlay ceilings for not to exceed forty minutes. It shall then be in order to consider the amendments relating to outlay ceilings printed in part four of the report of the Committee on Rules in the following order: (A) the two amendments by Representative Aspin of Wisconsin; and (B) by Representative Frenzel of Minnesota. Notwithstanding any rule of the House, Representative Aspin of Wisconsin, after giving one hour notice and after consultation with the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, may offer a germane amendment to any of the amendments printed in part four of the report of the Committee on Rules, to be debatable for not to exceed fifteen minutes, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and a Member opposed thereto. Following disposition of said amendments, it shall then be in order to resume consideration of amendments printed in part two of the report of the Committee on Rules, subject to the provisions of paragraphs (4) and (5) of this section.

(4) Notwithstanding any provision of this resolution, it shall be in order for the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, or his designee, at any time to offer en bloc amendments, including modifications in the text of any amendment which are germane thereto, printed in parts two or three of the report of the Committee on Rules. Such amendments en bloc shall be considered as having been read and shall not be subject to amendment or to a demand for a division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. Such amendments en bloc shall be debatable for not to exceed sixty minutes, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services. The original proponents of the amendments offered en bloc shall have permission to insert statements in the Congressional Record immediately before disposition of the amendments en bloc.

(5) The chairman of the Committee of the Whole, at his discretion, may postpone recorded votes, if ordered, on any first degree amendment until a designated point later that legislative day or until the next legislative day. The Chair may reduce to a minimum of five minutes the period of time within which a recorded vote, if ordered, may be taken on all said amendments following the first vote in a series.

(6) If the Committee of the Whole does not complete consideration of any amendment printed in part one or two of the report of the Committee on Rules, it shall be in order on any subsequent legislative day for the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, after giving at least one hour notice, and after consultation with the ranking minority member of that committee, to request the Chair to recognize the proponent of such amendments and the Chair may recognize the proponents of such amendments in accordance with that notice notwithstanding the order of amendments otherwise specified in such report. If the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services does not give such notice or make such request, the amendments may be offered by their proponents following the disposition of all other amendments contained in part two of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution. The proponent of any amendment printed in part three of the report of the Committee on Rules not considered in the order specified by this resolution may offer that amendment at the conclusion of consideration of all other amendments printed in part two of the report of the Committee on Rules.

SEC. 3. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. It shall be in order to debate any motion to recommit with instructions for one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services.

□ 1230

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FRANK). The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. MARTIN] pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 211 is a modified closed rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 2461, a bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for the Department of Defense. H.R. 2461 directs our Nation's security policy, and includes compensation for our Armed Forces.

The rule provides for 2 hours of general debate, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, and makes in order the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Armed Services as original text for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule.

The rule waives section 302(f) of the Congressional Budget Act for the pay

raise, clause 7 of rule 16 prohibiting nongermane amendments, and clause 5(A) of rule 21 against consideration of the amendment in the nature of a substitute covering appropriations on a legislative bill.

No amendments to the substitute are to be in order except for amendments printed in the report of the Committee on Rules on the resolution. The amendments are to be considered only in the order and in the manner specified in the report and are to be considered as read when offered.

The rule waives all points of order against amendments printed in the report and provides that none of the amendments are subject to amendment except as otherwise specified. The amendments are not to be subject to a demand for a division of the question. It is in order for the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, or his designee, to offer en bloc amendments, including germane modifications, printed in parts 2 or 3 of the report accompanying this resolution. Each set of en bloc amendments is debatable for 1 hour, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services. The en bloc amendments are not subject to amendment or to a demand for a division of the question in the House or in Committee of the Whole.

The rule also provides that it is in order to postpone recorded votes, if ordered, on any first degree amendment until the conclusion of debate on all said amendments considered on a particular legislative day, or on a particular subject matter, or until the next legislative day. The votes may be reduced to 5 minutes, after the first 15-minute vote.

The rule also provides that if consideration of any amendment printed in parts 1, 2, or 3 of the report is not completed, the proponent of the amendment may be recognized by the Chair, after 1 hour's notification by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, to offer the amendment at a subsequent time.

The amendments are in order notwithstanding the order of amendments otherwise specified in the report. If the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services does not give notice to the Chair or make a request for recognition, the proponent of any such amendment may offer the amendment following the disposition of all other amendments contained in part 2 of the report.

Finally, the rule provides for one motion to recommit with instructions that is debatable for up to 1 hour with the time equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. Speaker, this may well be the most complex rule of any legislation

considered on the floor in this session. The rule has been structured to allow the maximum number of amendments to be considered in the most orderly manner possible; 218 amendments were filed with the Rules Committee; 90 have been made in order under this rule.

It was the leadership's desire that to the greatest degree possible the rule be structured in such a way that Members know in advance when amendments will be considered, and when votes can be expected. While the House will be in session from 9 a.m. to at least 9 p.m. Tuesday through Thursday, we have tried to reserve the dinner hour for debate only to provide some relief from the heavy workload.

Votes will be rolled together in suspension-like fashion in the evening when Members return.

Amendments to H.R. 2461 have been divided in importance. Consideration of major policy questions such as SDI, B-2, and arms control will be stretched out over each of the days set aside for the bill. The debate time and order of amendments is listed in the report of the Rules Committee. The amendments listed in section 2 will be debated every evening over the dinner hour, 5 minutes on each side. Remaining noncontroversial issues will be considered en bloc. Members are urged to place as many amendments as possible in the en bloc category. It is our firm goal to complete consideration of this bill Thursday evening according to schedule.

Mr. Speaker, we face a historic moment in considering our Nation's defense budget. The budget constraints we are under force us to make tough choices. This bill, like last year's, authorizes the same total dollars as the administration request, and will be consistent with the budget summit agreement. Tough choices have been made in committee; tougher choices will have to be made on the floor. We need a strong defense. But at this time we must redefine what national security means, and match this demand with competing domestic priorities.

Moreover, changes in the Soviet Union and its perceived threat are forcing us to reexamine our most basic strategic assumptions of the last 40 years.

Just last week the former chief of the Soviet Armed Forces made an unprecedented appearance at the House Armed Services Committee and will meet with the President this week. No one knows where these changes will lead, but they bear close examination.

Both the Reagan and Bush administrations have proposed spending billions for star wars, but have left unfunded the war against drugs. But Americans today are increasingly aware that the threat from drugs,

crime, and foreign competition can be as dangerous as any threat from the Soviet Union.

During debate on H.R. 2461, three amendments will be offered to add back funds cut from the star wars budget to fight the war against drugs, to clean up DOD nuclear facilities, and to beef up our conventional forces.

These amendments reflect America's priorities. Every day, 5 to 10 illegal drug smuggling flights invade our air space, and 30 to 50 illegal ships land on our shores.

Last year, Congress took the lead in establishing a new role for the military and the National Guard in the drug interdiction fight. Yet the President's budget contained no funds for this purpose. The Mavroules amendment will add \$450 million to the military's fight against drugs.

This legislation takes into account the fact that economic competitiveness is a critical ingredient in national security. Basic research breeds both civilian and military invention, and makes our Nation more competitive. Yet today we spend only half the dollars we invested in 1965 in basic military technology. H.R. 2461 adds \$400 million to our military technology base to put America ahead of our competitors.

Mr. Speaker, we must stop drug smugglers from invading our homes and our communities. We must clean up our environment, protect our families, and take care of our elderly. And we must ensure that the scarce dollars we spend for our Nation's defense give us the best equipment money can buy. H.R. 2461 helps us balance these competing priorities.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 211 is an eminently fair rule providing for open and full discussion of a bill essential to our Nation's security. To my knowledge, it has the support of the minority. I urge the adoption of House Resolution 211 so we may proceed to consideration of this legislation.

□ 1240

Mr. Speaker, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding, and I would like to simply say to him, I do not believe I have ever risen and taken the well of the House at any time in the last 18½ years to oppose a rule, but I would like to make a few observations here at this point.

I do not mind the gentleman being emotional about it. This is a very serious issue, and I feel equally as emotional. I do not suggest they are not good amendments that are being offered on the floor of this Congress. I am offering some of them, amendments to end the B-1, to stop star wars, but notwithstanding that, I make this observation: The Member

cannot say to me straight-faced that this rule is not designed on the basis of efficiency and not substantive, and that is clear. I think it is an insult to the American people that we are talking about a \$300 billion budget, where on a number of amendments, there are only 5 minutes to discuss it, 2 hours general debate. When we meet on Monday, the Members will probably be talking to themselves at a time when the world is changing, when we ought to be talking about the issues of peace and nuclear disarmament in a very substantive and profound way. We find ourselves with an efficient rule that will allow Members to take care of this matter very quickly, but not very substantively. Finally, if the gentleman will yield further, I have to compliment the Committee on Rules on this, Members have come to grips with the harsh reality, and that is why in my point I say to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], is not a criticism of the Committee on Rules, the Members have come to grips with the reality that the defense authorization bill is not written in the committee, it is not written on the floor of Congress, it is written in conference.

□ 1250

So what this rule simply recognizes is, let us bring it to the floor, let us get the debate ended as quickly as possible, because this bill is really going to be written when the House and Senate sit down in the secret room upstairs, and for the most part the majority of the Members of Congress will have nothing to do with shaping the defense policy of this country, because we, for 2 weeks after we efficiently move this bill through the floor, will be sitting down and wheeling and dealing over who buys what number of planes or what bombers and what weapons.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I reclaim my time at this point.

Mr. DELLUMS. The gentleman does not have to do that. I would yield to him.

Mr. BONIOR. The gentleman does not have the time to yield. It is my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FRANK). The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] has the time.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, we are now faced with this reality on the floor of the House: We have worked on the rule for a week. The rule came out of the Committee on Rules last Friday with the support of the minority. No one told this member or any other member of the Committee on Rules that the minority was going to oppose this rule or that certain members of the minority were going to oppose this rule.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BONIOR. I will not yield at this time. I will not yield.

I had no knowledge of that until I got to the floor.

The second reality is that we have taken care of the gentleman from California. We have provided the gentleman from California more opportunities in this rule than any other member of the majority or the minority, and now, without the courtesy of letting this Member from Michigan know he is opposed to the rule, he comes to the floor and objects. I would have appreciated knowing this before we got to the floor this afternoon.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BONIOR. Not at this point.

So we are in a dilemma.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BONIOR. I will not yield at this point.

Mr. SOLOMON. Will the gentleman yield at any point?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] has the time, and the gentleman does not yield.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, we are in the dilemma now of having factions on the right and the left oppose this rule. We have asked Members to come back to discuss this rule to proceed on this very important bill.

I would just say to my colleagues that I do not know what kind of a rule we are going to get out of the Rules Committee if this rule goes down. I do not know if the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] will be positioned as well as he is in the debate on the important amendment which he will offer and which I will support. I do not know if the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] will be able to offer his AHEP amendment and others he has suggested, but I would suggest to the Chair and I would suggest to my colleagues that it is important for them to be fair with us. When is people's word good around here? That is what I want to know. When we get to the floor, 5 minutes before we vote?

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman respectfully yield?

Mr. BONIOR. We have tried to be fair with the members on the minority side, and we have tried to be fair with the Members on our side of the aisle. We have put together a rule, and all of a sudden Members decide that if their little thing is not taken care of, they are going to blow the whole thing up.

We had 218 amendments, Mr. Speaker. We have taken care of 65 percent of the Republicans, and we have taken care of my friend, the gentleman from California, by giving him probably more amendments than any other Member of this House.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will my friend respectfully yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] has 12 minutes remaining.

Mr. BONIOR. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I appreciate my colleagues' impassioned speech. I simply say that these are not personal matters. This is not about RON DELLUMS or DAVE BONIOR. This is about the national security of this country. It is about our ability to provide this country's national security.

Mr. BONIOR. If it is about the national security of this country, why did the gentleman not call me this weekend and say he was disappointed with the rule?

Mr. DELLUMS. You did not bring the rule out until today.

Mr. BONIOR. If you were so interested in the rule and this debate, why were you not tracking the rule? You knew darned well what was in the rule this weekend. I did not get a call or a courtesy call from you on this. So do not tell me about the national security interests of this country or the gentleman's concern about this.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman please yield?

Mr. BONIOR. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, let me just say that we are going to try to calm down here. The gentleman from Michigan is one of the most respected and most able members of the Committee on Rules and of this body, and I do not want to take up his time, but let me just say that if he reads the transcript, he knows—and I would ask him to go back and recall the meeting of the Rules Committee—that when negotiations broke down at the very last minute on one of the most crucial issues, the B-2 bomber, those members present on the Republican side said to the gentleman, "We will not hold up the workings of this House; we will vote to put this rule on the floor so we can argue the rule there, but we will not be committed to supporting or arguing in favor of the rule."

That is in the transcript. Maybe the gentleman was not on the floor of the Rules Committee at the time, but that is what is contained in this transcript. I would not argue it further except to say that we are going to try to defeat the rule, as we said we might do in the Rules Committee, and I hope we have every Republican vote and a lot of Democratic votes so that this Congress can work its will on the bill. Otherwise I do respect the gentleman's right to make the statements he is making.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, first of all, if I might say this to the gentleman from Michigan just for a moment, the gentleman brought up the matter of courtesy, and I hope this Member would always be courteous to another Member. The gentleman will find that I flew in this morning, and when I got here, the gentleman will find there was a phone call made to his office and to Chairman MOAKLEY's office, trying to notify them of what this Member would be doing in leading the rule on the floor. I just wanted the gentleman to know this because he said no one talked to him before he reached the floor. I did try to reach the gentleman and Chairman MOAKLEY in case there would be any questions, and I just wanted him to know that as a courtesy, I would always do that.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I appreciate that, and I stand corrected, since the gentleman did initiate a call.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry we have not been able to work this out, too. There is no question about the hard work involved.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 211 is a modified closed rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 2461, the Department of Defense authorization bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991.

The rule provides for 2 hours of general debate to be controlled equally by the Armed Services Committee chairman and ranking Republican member. That debate is scheduled to take place today following the adoption of some rule. The House will then proceed on Tuesday through Thursday of this week to consider amendments to the bill. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is made in order as original text for the purpose of amendment.

The rule waives three points of order against the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute: First, section 302(f) of the Budget Act which prohibits amendments which exceed a committee's allocation under the Budget resolution; and second, clause 5(a) of rule XXI of the House which prohibits appropriations in an authorization bill.

These two waivers are necessary because of provisions in the bill.

Next, the rule waives the germaneness rule against the committee substitute. This is necessary because the substitute goes beyond the scope of the introduced bill by adding the military construction and Department of Energy national security titles to the bill.

Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned, this is a modified closed rule: Only amendments specifically made in order by

the Rules Committee, and published in the report on this rule shall be in order for consideration, in the order and manner specified in the report. The rule waives all points of order against the amendments, and they are not subject to further amendment unless specifically provided for in the rule. All told, Mr. Speaker, by my count some 87 amendments have been made in order by this rule out of some 218 that were submitted to the committee.

Mr. Speaker, by my count Republicans submitted 77 of those 218 amendments, or 35 percent of the total; and 24 of those Republican amendments were made in order under this rule—some 27 percent of the total amendments made in order. I make this point simply for the sake of pointing out that there was not a strong or heavily skewed partisan bias in determining the do's and don'ts, although there obviously were some and some political considerations at play in some of the selections.

It would be stretching things too far to say this is a perfectly balanced and fair rule because it is not. But it might be more realistic to observe that this is a finite Congress with only so much time in which to accomplish a great deal of work. And that more than anything is the reason it was found necessary to in some way limit the amendment process.

The chairman of the Armed Services Committee requested 10 amendments and is allowed to offer 9 under this rule. So don't let anybody tell you chairmen have lost their clout around here.

Our ranking Republican member, on the other hand [Mr. DICKINSON], had asked for eight amendments to be made in order and only got three. In fact, a fourth amendment was pulled out from under him during the final Rules Committee markup on this rule because there was a misunderstanding on the majority side as to what that amendment contained. I think that was most regrettable and unfair to our ranking member, and I understand and share his disappointment.

Nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, despite that disappointment and the unfairness that exists anytime we restrict our rules, I think the chairman and the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services are to be commended for doing a fairly good job in working with the Rules Committee in fashioning a rule under difficult and occasionally heated circumstances. I would especially commend the chairman of the Rules Committee, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MOAKLEY], on being fair to most concerned, and I commend my Rules Committee colleagues on working together on a bipartisan fashion on much of the rule.

□ 1300

I also want to commend the Rules Committee staff. They performed coolly and professionally under fire.

As a former member of the Armed Services Committee myself, I can attest to the complexity, controversy and confusion involved in trying to grapple with such a variety of major and minor issues. If you review the amendments, you can see they range from the MX, SDI, B-2, Davis-Bacon, military pay, uniforms, and military land transfers. And believe me, everything is a major issue if it involves you, your districts or your constituents.

Mr. Speaker, I do not want to take the time of the Members of describing this rule in detail, since it has already been read in full and explained once by the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR]; however, I do want to point out the rules establishes four classes of amendments. The first class, contained in part 1 reports and consists of the major issue areas and issue options on such matters as SDI, B-2 and MX.

The second class, found in part 2, consists of 33 amendments. These will be taken up each day after the part 1 amendments are disposed of.

The third class of amendments are less controversial and are 25 in number. They may be offered en bloc by the Armed Services Committee chairman as may any part 2 amendments.

Finally, there are 3 budget-related amendments in part 4 of the report.

A unique aspect of this rule is the discretion given to the chairman of the Committee of the Whole to delay and cluster votes on the first degree amendments.

One of the things the rule does not do is allow separate votes on the B-22 and F-14. It is the House at its usual worst.

We will all give speeches on why we must cut defense, but we will make sure we protect weapons systems in congressional districts by bundling them. Then enough people are protected to give these systems the Federal equivalent of eternal fire.

And how do we change it? Well, this time it is easy. Vote no on the previous question and then a new rule. It is complicated. It is probably not good campaign drama, but we should do it. Then we can create a rule that will, I believe, encompass what is best in the old rule and what is good for the new.

Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, this rule is not a work of art. This is not even quite politics as the are of compromise. You will not want to hang this on your wall at home, and it does not deserve to be hanging around the wall of the House in its present condition. Let us send it back to the artist for a little re-touching that will give us a better balanced picture.

Vote no on the previous question. Then we can create a true image for the Department of Defense.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Michigan yielding time at this moment.

I wish to discuss the rule and one part of its ramifications, if I may, and so that the gentleman from Michigan will not feel all alone today, I tell him at this juncture that I intend to support the rule. I wish to discuss in a moment a detail of a portion thereof.

Mr. Speaker, I refer to the portion that is scheduled for Wednesday, the first item of business, and that is the item dealing with the Stealth, that is the B-2 bomber. I understand and recall, the President by way of his Secretary of Defense made a request of this Congress for the B-2 bomber to be authorized at a level of \$4.7 billion, \$2 billion for research and development and \$2.7 for production.

The Armed Services Committee after a rather lengthy discussion and votes reduced that \$4.7 billion figure down to \$3.9 billion, an \$18 million cut, \$300 million coming from research and development and \$500 million coming from the procurement funds and, of course, the bill comes to the floor in this fashion, together with some restrictive language which I know during the debate will be discussed and mentioned at length.

There are 3 amendments to this section of the bill, the Aspin-Synar amendment which restructures the B-2 program and cuts it back significantly; the Skelton amendment, that is my amendment, which adopts the figures of \$3.9 billion of the committee, some of its restrictive language, plus additional restrictive language and certification.

I have attempted that the Skelton amendment be a compromise to this situation.

The third amendment is the Kasich-Dellums-Rowland substitute for Aspin. It in essence terminates the program.

Mr. Speaker, I would like at this point to inquire of the gentleman from Michigan as to the manner in which these amendments are to be handled and voted upon.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I thank my colleague for inquiring on this important decision that will be made on Wednesday.

Each of the amendments, I would tell my friend, the gentleman from Missouri, will be debated for 40 minutes.

The Aspin-Synar amendment is to be the base amendment and the amendment of the gentleman from Missouri would be debated for 40 minutes, after which if he prevailed would be the base. If he did not prevail, then

we would go in any event to the Kasich-Dellums-Rowland amendment, which would be debated for 40 minutes. If that prevailed, that would become the base amendment.

The upshot of my comments is that everyone will get a clean and a fair shake at restructuring or terminating or whatever the B-2 program.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, as I understand it, the first vote would be on the Skelton amendment, that is, my amendment.

Mr. BONIOR. If the gentleman will yield, that is correct.

Mr. SKELTON. Which would be an amendment to the Aspin-Synar amendment.

Mr. BONIOR. That is correct.

Mr. SKELTON. If that prevails, then there would be a substitute by the Kasich-Dellums-Rowland amendment, is that correct?

Mr. BONIOR. That is correct.

Mr. SKELTON. If that fails, then the Skelton amendment, which as I mentioned in my hypothetical question, prevailed, would in essence be the B-2 structure.

Mr. BONIOR. It would prevail, but at that point there would also be another motion to vote on.

Mr. SKELTON. So we would have to vote on it again.

Mr. BONIOR. It is possible.

Mr. SKELTON. Because it would then be the base.

Mr. BONIOR. That is correct.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Michigan.

I might say, this is a very difficult rule. Historically, we spent untold days, I think at one point some 2 weeks, the entire 2 weeks on this.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. There are some 218 amendments, some 70 being granted, and I know it is a very difficult task.

I speak in favor and I will speak in favor of the Skelton amendment which supports the B-2 program basically in the committee structure, with additional restrictions.

In its primary role, the B-2 renders obsolete approximately \$350 billion of Soviet investment in air defenses. The combination of the manned penetrating bombers that we have, including the B-2, will prevent the Soviet Union from concentrating all its defense efforts in a single threat. Stealth technology incorporated in the B-2 will force the Soviet defense establishment to devote more time of its military resources to air defense. It is better to have the Soviets spending their money on defense, rather than offense.

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding to me.

I simply would like to compliment the gentleman on the very balanced approach which he is taking in dealing with this issue.

I know from discussions that I have had with the gentleman that the B-2 program is not built in any way in the gentleman's district. It is in mine as a Californian, but it is very clear that over and above that concern, the triad has been without a doubt the major thrust of our deterrence. There is controversy surrounding the B-2, but it seems to me that the amendment which the gentleman from Missouri is planning to offer is a very balanced approach to dealing with this controversial issue, and I compliment him for that and I urge my colleagues to support that when it comes down; but I have to say that I will join my other Republican colleagues in opposing the rule.

□ 1310

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, there is one other item that I would like to mention very briefly, and there will be a great deal of discussion on this, and it is that the importance of the B-2 is in the arms control arena. Arms control provides a strong argument. The current arms control regime between the United States and the Soviet Union favors bombers. Under the START counting rules, the Reykjavik counting rules, the non-cruise-missile bomber counts as only one weapon regardless of the bomb load.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to a member of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON].

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this rule. I do so with a certain sense of disappointment because the proceedings that led to the preparation of this rule started out in a very promising manner. The point needs to be made right here at the outset that Chairman MOAKLEY of the Rules Committee made every effort to include Republicans in the consultations that were involved in writing this rule. I very much appreciate his efforts, and I want to commend him for them.

Unfortunately, however, in this instance, consultations did not translate into consensus. We are dealing today with a rule that is more closed than any other such rule on a Defense Department in my 11 years in Congress. On the one bill that deals most directly with the security and vital national interests of the Nation, the decision has evidently been made to play politics.

We can only speculate on why the mood in the Rules Committee shifted

so abruptly from consultation to confrontation. Not being privy to the inner workings of the Democrat high command, I can only try to imagine what the marching orders must have contained. But, in any event, we are stuck with an atrocious rule.

Mr. Speaker, the list goes on and on. Let me cite just a few of the more blatant examples of unfairness in this rule:

On funding for the SDI, the lone Republican amendment being permitted is the first of the king-of-the-hill procedure. No doubt about the outcome hoped for there.

Maybe we Republicans should at least be grateful for the minimum consideration being given on SDI funding, because we were not given anything under SDI add-backs. Three Democrat amendments, and no opportunity for Mr. DICKINSON, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee, to offer a substitute.

The B-2 bomber: Three Democrat amendments and no Dickinson substitute.

ICBM's: Five Democrat amendments and no Dickinson substitute. The Democrats on the Armed Services Committee requested only 3 amendments, but, as long as the rule is going to be so generous, another two cannot hurt.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, the reason I asked the gentleman to yield is because on the number of this ICBM, they are bipartisan amendments. The gentleman now in the chair, the Speaker pro tempore, has an amendment, but it is being worked together with two other Republicans in a very prominent and forthright fashion. We have done the same thing, and the same thing applies, to a number of other things, the Dellums-Kasich amendment, which is bipartisan, so I wish my colleague would be careful in terms of how he is labeling these amendments. They are, in many instances, very bipartisan in their nature.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the gentleman's opinion. He is entitled to it.

Small business set-asides: One Democrat amendment and no opportunity for Mr. IRELAND and Mr. DREIER to offer their Republican substitute.

Davis-Bacon: Two Democrat amendments and no opportunity for Mr. DELAY to offer his alternative which would have incorporated the recommendations of the Grace Commission.

We could be here all day, Mr. Speaker, there is no need to belabor the point.

But the thing that really bothers me is when the majority turns down Re-

publican amendments on the grounds that the amendment deals with a subject outside the jurisdiction of the committee managing the bill. But does this argument hold water when the Rules Committee turns around and makes in order an amendment on plutonium production? That is a foreign affairs issue, an arms control issue, not an Armed Services Committee issue.

This rule is so stacked that even the one good thing about it is mitigated later on, namely the Cheney budget. Mr. DICKINSON will be permitted to offer an amendment on establishing the Cheney budget, but if that amendment fails, his playing field for striking the F-14, V-22, and National Guard provisions in the bill will be reduced essentially to the sidelines. The rule keeps those three issues, unrelated though they may be, combined into one indivisible package, all the better to play politics with. A separate vote on the merits of each one individually is denied to every Member of this House in spite of pleas by Secretary Cheney and even President Bush.

I just cannot help thinking back to the day our new Speaker assumed his office. After being sworn in, he assured our Republican leader, Bob MICHEL, "I look forward to working with you in a spirit of cooperation and increased consultation as we address the problems facing this House and the Nation."

I hope this rule is not an example of what he meant.

And so, Mr. Speaker, I am constrained to oppose this rule. I regret that the process which had started out in such a positive manner eventually led to this result. That certainly is not the fault of Chairman MOAKLEY, and again I commend his willingness to work with Republicans in the interest of getting a fair rule.

But something has gone wrong somewhere, and it does not bode well for future cooperation in this House.

I urge defeat of this closed rule.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD], the Republican leader on the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I first would like to commend the chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN], as well as the vice chairman, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON], for putting into the DOD bill section 1218, my amendment, which concerns the stripping of naval vessels to be used for experimental purposes, which I believe will eliminate some of the incredibly needless Government waste.

Taxpayers want some evidence that Government is careful in spending the defense dollars they are already sending us before they open up their wallets and purses to send more.

Last week, I visited the National Defense Reserve Fleet on the James River in Virginia. Many of the ships in this fleet are used by the Navy for target practice or are sunk as part of the artificial reef program.

What I discovered astounded me. Perfectly good radar and communications equipment, drill presses, lathes, milling machines, kitchen equipment and a lot of other material is being sent to the ocean floor.

America's do-it-yourselfer who spends his Saturday mornings at the hardware store would not believe what is being thrown away. I found a milling machine that could easily be resold to a machine shop. It has an estimated replacement value of \$20,000 to \$25,000.

I found several steam kettles that are used for cooking soups and stews and boiling hot water. They have a replacement value of roughly \$3,000 apiece. I've got to believe that any soup kitchen manager in America would give his eye-teeth for such equipment.

An official report by the Inspector General's office of the Defense Department estimates that more than \$17 million worth of property that could have been salvaged is now at the bottom of the sea.

The report also estimates that another \$40 million will be lost if efforts are not made to salvage this expensive equipment.

Both the Navy and the Maritime Administration tell me that this equipment is obsolete. If they are thinking of using it on some of our modern naval vessels, they may be right.

But the fact is, the machinery and equipment and much of the steel and copper and brass material on board these ships have value to someone, somewhere.

I saw for myself. A marine contractor came along on the trip. Every time an official from the Navy or from the Maritime Administration assured me that a piece of equipment had no value, the marine contractor would shake his head in disbelief.

Both he and the special investigator from the Department of Defense agree that these ships are floating warehouses of valuable assets. These assets not only could, but should be sold before they are destroyed or sunk.

The whole fleet down there reminds me of an overstuffed attic. What this legislation says is that it's time to start having some-garage sales.

My language provides that before designating any vessel for such uses as target practice, the Navy shall make a good faith effort to strip the vessel of all equipment that will not harm the structural integrity of the ship. It also allows the Navy to employ outside contractors to do the work.

It became apparent to me on this trip that using an outside contractor is

the only sensible thing to do. The Navy's mission is to fight wars; a salvager's mission is to find value in second-hand material. No Navy officer, no matter how talented, is going to have the same practiced eye for turning used equipment into dollars.

The money realized by scrapping these ships will be paid into the general fund of the Treasury.

One important outcome of my trip to the James River Fleet was the finding that the biggest culprit here is not the Navy, but the Maritime Administration.

The Navy has agreed to study the feasibility of a pilot program to strip some ships. That's a good start.

But the Maritime Administration seems to be stonewalling. To me, their attitude was typified by the remarks of one of their officials to one of my aides. The official suggested that the reason this valuable equipment is sent to the bottom in the reef program is that some of the artificial reefs are actually underwater museums. The more equipment that goes down with the ships, the more realistic the museums are. I do not know whether his remark was intended seriously or as a bit of cynical humor. But we need specific legislation to overcome the attitudes that have given rise to this situation.

This piece of legislation addresses only those ships that are intended for use in Navy target practice. I plan to introduce legislation that would cover those ships held by the Maritime Administration for use in the artificial reef program.

In light of the numbers being discussed in this bill, tens of millions of dollars may not seem like such a large sum. But whatever the figure, the principle is the same: the Federal Government should be making the most efficient use of the money that the taxpayers are sending us.

America may be the most wealthy nation in the world, but we are not so wealthy that we can afford to dump millions of dollars' worth of sophisticated equipment to the bottom of the ocean.

□ 1320

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON], the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Illinois for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly am rising to oppose the rule. I have heard the statement of the very distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] as to what went on in making up the rule, and I have to confess I disagree with the impact and the significance of some of the things that have been done as he described them.

Let me go back a few years, I think it is four budget cycles ago when there were 144 amendments filed with the Rules Committee to be made in order against the defense bill, 144. Of those 144, 143 were made in order. One amendment, my own, as ranking member, was disallowed, because someone on high passed the word down that they did not want that particular amendment to come to the floor. It had to do with Davis-Bacon, and it would offend the interests of organized labor, as the word got to me. So one person in the administration, not on the basis of merit, not on the basis that it was not germane, said that they did not want it to come to the floor. Because the Rules Committee has a 2 to 1 plus 1 majority, they can do whatever they darn well please, and they did.

Until I was able to bring the whole bill to a halt and keep it from coming to the floor for 2 weeks, (we had an impasse, because we were toward the end of the legislative year) only the press of time compelled the majority to reconsider and to let my amendment be offered along with everybody else's.

I had hoped that we had ended that type of thing. This was 4 years ago. We now have a new Speaker, and the Speaker comes on, he takes office, and I am excited and pleased because he says we are going to have a different way of doing business. We are going to have a fairness here in the House, an openness; we are going to deal fairly with one another. I assumed that this would permeate the whole structure, including the Rules Committee. I was optimistic, and this is the first time at bat since this has come up.

So it is unfortunate that the Rules Committee is as inextricably intertwined with our defense bill as it is. It is not with other committee bills, but it has grown out of necessity because we have had so many amendments filed against the defense authorization bill; things that should be in here. Things that are really extraneous, foreign affairs matters that normally would come under another committee's jurisdiction. But because of the germaneness rule, it has been considered a part of defense, and this has been used as a sounding board for Members to espouse their political philosophies and ideologies on arms control and all of these other things that really have no place in our bill.

As a result, so many amendments have been filed that we have had to come up with some sort of mechanism to deal with them. As has been pointed out, 217 amendments were filed this year, even in light of the fact that the Rules Committee has required those who want to file amendments, (this is not true in other committees). If they want them to be considered they have

to be filed with the Rules Committee, so then they can sort through and sift through, and make amendments in order, or perhaps lump them according to subject matter, and do away with the proliferation of amendments that would have been offered.

It is for this reason that the Rules Committee has moved into the position of really fashioning the entire defense bill as it comes out of the Armed Services Committee; so they sit in a position of looking over what has been filed and what is being asked for, and then they are the arbiters of what may be offered by way of amendment. Then it gets into who may offer these amendments; this is a very bad situation. It has nothing to do with the merits of the amendments offered; it gets into the politics of it.

I had an amendment, for instance, that would restore \$300 million to research and development of the B-2 bomber. I got a message back, informally, that somebody on the committee did not like where the funding was coming from, and if I could come up with an alternative source, my amendment might be allowed in order. This is \$300 million for the B-2 bomber, but because someone did not like where the money was coming from, the committee did not make it in order.

This is micromanagement to the *n*th degree. I think the rule is bad.

When the gentleman said I am allowed to offer my amendment on Cheney, I am allowed 10 minutes under the rule for amendment No. 25, if we reach it. But someone who is opposing it is given 40 minutes right after the initial Cheney amendment.

If this is fair, then you have a different scale to measure fairness on from what I do. I think it is arbitrary, unevenhanded, certainly an injustice, and I am going to oppose the rule and I certainly hope it goes down.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DELAY].

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the rule. Year after year, the Rules Committee has failed to recognize many valuable and noteworthy amendments that are presented before them. I fully understand the dilemma the committee faces—so many amendments, so little time—but frankly, it seems to this Member that many smaller, yet extremely important, amendments are never getting their time in the spotlight thus tarnishing this unique legislative process.

As an example, for the second year in a row, the Rules Committee has passed over my amendment, an amendment that would greatly enhance the quality of life for our Nation's armed forces. The committee passed over my amendment that would enable the Department of Defense to build more decent housing for our military personnel and their fami-

lies—easing the current housing crisis. My amendment would enable DOD to build more chapels, child care centers, and recreational centers. My amendment would boost the morale and welfare of our fighting forces.

Yet, the committee passed it over. For the second year in a row, amendments that I, and many other Members, wanted to offer are simply forgotten with a strike of a pencil. Most have spent countless hours—if not years—developing and researching their idea. Yet, the committee just passes them over.

I urge all Members to vote against this rule so we can send it back and have included many of these small, yet extremely important, worthy amendments.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. IRELAND].

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding time to me. I rise in opposition to the rule.

Mr. Speaker, on Friday, the Rules Committee met to make a determination on a number of amendments under consideration to the Defense authorization bill. One amendment offered by Mr. MAVROULES would extend the DOD section 1207—5 percent minority set-aside program for 3 years. My colleague, DAVID DREIER, and I offered, between us, eight amendments to the Mavroules amendment that if approved would modify the 1207 program to protect all small business, both minority and nonminority owned. Our amendments, all eight of them, were disallowed. The Mavroules amendment was made in order.

Mr. Speaker, the 1207 program was enacted without benefit of hearings or oversight study in either the House Small Business Committee or the House Armed Services Committee. The Mavroules amendment is now allowed on the floor under the same circumstances without benefit of hearings or studies. The Mavroules amendment should not be in order and I intend to speak out against it during floor consideration. The 1207 program has hurt legitimate small business.

Mr. Speaker, our subcommittees and committees of jurisdiction are the appropriate forums to develop and expand upon legislation such as this. The floor of the House is not the place to consider such an amendment with such wide reaching adverse economic consequences. Mr. Speaker, a vote against the Mavroules amendment is a vote for American small business.

□ 1330

The Mavroules amendment is in order. None of our eight amendments is in order.

Section 1207 does great harm, as we will show in the debate, to all of small business.

A vote against the Mavroules amendment will be a vote on behalf of small business across this great country of ours.

Better yet, we should defeat the rule and not consider the Mavroules amendment. It should be considered in the normal process before our Committee on Armed Services and before our Committee on Small Business.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER].

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, we have heard a lot about fairness on this rule. Let me just go through some of the numbers for you. If you look on the back page of the materials distributed by the Committee on Rules, you find on one page four of eight amendments are offered by Democrats. That sounds reasonably fair, that is half.

On the next page 12 of 20 are offered by Democrats. That seems reasonably fair.

Go to the next page, however, you find that 10 of the 14 amendments on that page are offered by Democrats.

We go to the next page, you find 16 of the 19 amendments are offered by Democrats.

Then you go to the major amendments that are offered here and you find out that 22 of the 29 amendments are offered by Democrats.

I would suggest to the gentleman from Michigan who said earlier that the problem is that some of these are cosponsored, all I have done is add up the names of the people who are considered the chief sponsors. It comes out to an overwhelming margin being offered by the Democrats.

All we asked was one thing, to correct some of that imbalance. We asked that Mr. DICKINSON be able to split the vote on the B-22 and the F-14.

The minority leader of the House came to the floor with that request, and the gentleman from Michigan objected.

It seems to me that if we are going to work in fairness around here, we ought to work out some way that the minority at least gets some semblance of fairness when it comes to either the numbers or the procedure.

What we had here earlier today was the minority leader of the House being turned down in his request to do the one thing that we thought would help deal with the imbalance a little bit.

I would have preferred to see the situation worked out a little bit differently.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. BONIOR. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I am glad the gentleman pointed out, and correctly, that, you know, you can go over the names on the list that you have but I think it is only fair to point out to the gentleman and to our other colleagues on the floor and those listening that many of these amendments are sponsored jointly by Republicans and Democrats.

Mr. WALKER. If I may reclaim my time, all I said to the gentleman was that I counted those who are listed as the chief sponsors.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FRANK). The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER] has expired.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, may I respond? Do I have time left?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] has 1½ minutes remaining.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the other point is we reached an accommodation, just so my friend from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER] understands, in the committee with the Republicans. We are led to believe that they—well, they actually voted for the bill in committee—after negotiations, extensive negotiations and caucus—that they were satisfied with the number of amendments made in order on their side of the aisle.

Now with regard to the minority leader—may I have the attention of the gentleman for 1 second—Mr. MICHEL made a request of the Speaker during these negotiations with regard to making in order the Frenzel amendment and having it placed in a certain position.

The Speaker passed his concern down to us at that time and we took care of it.

We thought we had accommodated them at virtually every step of the way one or two exceptions because, quite frankly, we have concerns and we have to accommodate people on our side of the aisle.

We came to the floor—I will not have the time to yield, but the gentleman will have and I would be glad to listen to his response—we came to the floor with a clear understanding that we were going to have the support of the minority and clearly the majority. Obviously I was wrong, I miscalculated, and for that I apologize to the rest of my leadership.

But, you know, one of the things that we pledged and the Speaker pledged when he took the oath of office was fairness. But he also asked that we not be surprised, that we not be surprised. And we in fact are surprised today and somewhat disappointed.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BONIOR. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I just want to make the point that I understand from our member of the Committee on Rules, who is standing here, that there was a deal for awhile but it broke down over an amendment. You cannot expect the Republicans to then come to the floor supporting something where the negotiations broke down.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON].

Mr. SOLOMON. I would just say, Mr. Speaker, with all due respect to my good friend from Michigan, that there may have been a surprise from someone on his side of the aisle, but there was no surprise from this side of the aisle.

The gentleman knows that Mr. DICKINSON's amendment, which had been agreed to by all of us in the committee, both in caucus and out on the floor, was then withdrawn because of a problem we had with one member of the Committee on Rules; the whole deal fell through.

That is why I said I would not hold up the workings of the committee, we would let the rule go to the floor, but that we would not be guaranteeing that we would support it.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, we are urging defeat of the previous question so that we may offer a further amendment to this rule that will restore a sense of balance and fairness to the process. It will retain what is good in this rule which the gentleman from Michigan is showing such support for and understandable support. It will add to it in ways that I think the entire House will benefit, not in a partisan way but in a call for fairness. We would ask to go through a relatively complicated procedure of defeating the previous question so that that rule may be offered.

That is not a surprise, it is not meant to be a surprise for Members. It is meant so this House could function and so we could move on with listening to the very extraordinary debate that will occur this week on the Department of Defense bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, it is with real pleasure that I move the previous question on the resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous question.

The question was taken and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the "ayes" appeared to have it.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground

that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I, and also to the discussions that took place earlier today, further proceedings on this matter will be postponed until 4:30 p.m.

No further legislative business will transpire before approximately 4:30, pursuant to the discussion of the leadership.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The Chair will now take unanimous-consent requests or special orders.

Are there unanimous-consent requests?

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my special order, which will be requested in a few moments from now, be changed to follow the special order of the gentleman from Maryland [Mrs. BENTLEY].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

□ 1350

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FRANK). The Chair would remind Members the House will now proceed to special orders. At approximately 4:30 the House will resume proceedings at the point which they were interrupted. An objection of no quorum was raised to the vote on the previous question on the rule, and at 4:30 the House will resume on that question de novo.

We will now proceed to special orders.

THE SKELTON AMENDMENT COMPROMISE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I specially appreciate the courtesy of the gentleman from Washington and the others on my side of the aisle who were kind enough to allow my special order to precede theirs.

I speak today on an issue that will come before us Wednesday, and this deals with the all-important strategic decision that we will make in this Congress concerning the B-2 bomber program. I will have an amendment which is made germane and appropriate

under this rule, the Skelton amendment, which I have attempted to make as a compromise approach to this issue. The Skelton amendment is one that adopts the committee funding level, adopts the committee restrictive fencing language, and adds additional restrictive language requiring a full disclosure and report of unclassified test material be made available to this Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that the most important decision that this Congress will make this year, and probably for this decade, about the American strategic military posture, concerns the B-2 bomber program. I believe that the B-2 is the single most important new program in this Nation's strategic modernization plan. At this time, I urge support of my colleagues for this vital new initiative.

Two questions that must be considered: One is a technical question, and simply put, whether the airplane works as it has been made; and second, is to determine the military value of both the B-2 as a weapon for strategic nuclear deterrence, and as a flexible delivery vehicle of conventional delivery systems. There is no question that the aircraft works very well as an aerodynamic vehicle. We have seen it fly. This past Monday there was not an American that was not thrilled and encouraged by seeing the B-2 take off at Palmdale, CA, and land at Edwards Air Force Base. This plane will fulfill the promise of very low radar cross sections from most aspect angles. I am convinced that the new materials used to build this aircraft will meet the mechanical and reliability specifications that were set forth in the original design.

What about this airplane concerns military value? We will answer that question. The B-2 is a most important addition to our Air Force for two reasons. It would be a formidable strategic weapon if it were ever to be used in retaliatory nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, because there is no doubt that it can penetrate Soviet air defenses. Also, there is every reason to believe that the Soviets will not be able to develop anything against this aircraft concerning radar systems for many years to come. The B-2, I might point out, is also very useful as a conventional weapons system because of the excellent range payload characteristics. It can fly with one refueling in excess of 10,000 miles.

The question comes up as to whether it is affordable. I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that the value of this system, the B-2 system, far exceeds the cost. As long as we are talking about costs, we will look and discuss it, because it is an affordable system. The B-2 program is one that will cost 1.3 percent of the overall defense budget. However, we look in the past, the B-1 program cost 1.6 percent of the defense

budget, and when the B-52 was funded those many years ago, some of them over 30 years ago, it was 1.4 percent of the defense budget. That is a legitimate question, and one that is answered in the affirmative, that we should pay for this system.

I would like to also point out that this B-2 is not a first strike strategic weapon, and it does not increase the danger of nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, it serves as a strong deterrent. It has the advantage of military flexibility, which means that human beings fly it, the all-important element of human judgment and intelligence are brought to bear in this target area, to perform the mission of the airplane in a most effective manner.

I will, therefore, Mr. Speaker, on the day that this is taken up, urge my colleagues in the House to look at, study, consider, and vote for, as a compromise attempt to put the B-2 program where it should be, into our strategic defense, for our Nation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Kyl].

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding, and I would like to first of all compliment the gentleman for making the very best of arguments in the Committee on Armed Services, and I also see that those same good arguments are being made here in support of this B-2 program.

A lot of emotional arguments, but the gentleman from Missouri is making a technical and logical argument, and I wanted to point out if he had not seen it, an article in yesterday's Washington Post by George Will, "B-2: The Question of Soviet Intentions," and ask if the gentleman had seen that, and if he had, would he agree with me that this would be a good column to submit in the RECORD perhaps at this point or at the conclusion of the gentleman's remarks.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I certainly would agree that it is a very important article. I did see it, and I would certainly be pleased to have it inserted into the RECORD at this point:

B-2: THE QUESTION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS
(By George F. Will)

The costliest airplane is coming to decision time in Congress at the moment of maximum uncertainty about Soviet intentions. The Stealth bomber comes in a period of severe budget constraints that the president promises to continue (read his lips), constraints that have made Congress eager for a "détente dividend" of defense cuts to finance the pent-up demand for domestic spending.

The B-2 is the 150-ton flying wing, product of 900 new materials and processes, with a million parts and 200 on-board computers, with radar-nullifying technologies that give it a radar cross-section of a goose or (some say) a moth. B-2s cost about \$500 million apiece, \$70 billion for the proposed fleet of 132.

Can we afford it? About a third of the \$70 billion has already been spent on research

and development, so the "fly-away" cost would be under \$300 million per plane. A Boeing 747's base price is \$125 million, and it need not be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses, which include more than 300 surface-to-air missiles for every U.S. bomber and five fighters devoted to interception for every U.S. bomber. The S&L bailout will cost more than \$100 billion. The Air Force argues that the B-2 fleet would deliver 2,000 warheads at a cost-per-warhead comparable to ICBMs and SLBMs.

We can afford what we need, which is stable deterrence. That means retaliatory forces sufficient to survive a Soviet attack and inflict intolerable damage. It means an array of forces that complicates, to the point of paralysis, war planning by a Soviet leader.

The B-2 could contribute to that, but the cost might mean the cannibalizing of the defense budget to finance it (particularly because the commander in chief is willing to sacrifice national security on the altar of his antitax obsession). The argument for finding the money begins with the basic argument for bombers: they deliver a large variety of ordnance over long distances under close control. Cruise missiles fired from vulnerable stand-off aircraft cannot travel as far, recognize changed situations or report back.

Bombers are long-lived and improvable. The newest B-52 is 28 years old. Improved avionics have doubled the potency of some B-52s in the last six years. The B-2 has been designed to deliver conventional as well as nuclear weapons. One B-2 can deliver more conventional ordnance than all the cruise missiles carried by a 688 class submarine (or a battleship) and a submarine needs two weeks to re-arm and return to station. The B-2 performs with a crew of two.

It can be especially effective striking certain targets that must be held at risk if deterrence is to be strong. These include mobile ICBMs and some hardened sites, such as the deep shelters that the Soviet elite has built for itself with war-fighting in mind.

It is said that the B-2 could be used against terrorist targets. We have fewer overseas bases than before, and use of them for attacks against, say, Libya, can cause political problems in the host country. However, such a use of the B-2 seems like (in Sen. William Cohen's words) sending a Rolls Royce into a combat zone to pick up groceries. And U.S. reluctance to act against the likes of Libya suggests that improved capability would be pointless. However, one reason for the reluctance is fear of diplomatic and domestic political trouble from any U.S. losses. The B-2 could reduce that danger, and hence the reluctance.

Any decision about a strategic system is, fundamentally, a decision about this question: What are Soviet intentions? The plain truth is that we do not know what they are, and whatever they are, they are changeable. Soviet arms production rolls along unabated. It would be folly for the United States to rest its security on faith in the words of, and confidence in the long tenure of, one Soviet leader. Intensifying economic decline, ethnic violence, and now labor unrest, make Gorbachev's future highly uncertain.

This is no time to reduce the pressure. This is a good time to signal U.S. determination to regard the Soviet threat as unchanged until many things more substantial than Soviet rhetoric are changed.

The B-2 would vitiate more than \$200 billion of Soviet investment in air defenses.

The B-2 would be a dramatic demonstration of U.S. determination to use the leverage of technological superiority to conduct an arms race in which the unreformed Soviet economy cannot compete.

The fundamental hope behind U.S. policy is that economic reform will presuppose, and presage, political reforms that will reduce the Soviet urge for military competition. So Congress should consider this: if building the B-2 would help convince the Soviet Union of the ruinous futility of its militarism, the B-2 would be a spectacular bargain.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will further yield, I again compliment him on the strong arguments he makes in support of the B-2 program, the logical arguments he makes, including the fact that the Cheney budget, which has been worked out for 5 years, includes the funding for the B-2, so it is not a matter of trying to add something onto the budget that has already existed, but whether to be able to afford the kind of deterrent and continue the triad that provides the deterrent and our security, and I commend the gentleman for his strong statement in support of the B-2.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I also might point out to the gentleman from Arizona, there was an excellent article recently by Charles Krauthammer, concerning the B-2 bomber system, and I would recommend it to him for his reading. I found Mr. Krauthammer to be a very thoughtful, thorough individual, and I think he would enjoy reading the article.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield further, I, too, noticed the Krauthammer article, and his last comment was, "Besides that, it looks good."

We do not support the B-2 because it "looks good," but because it is a leap in technology. It is way beyond what either side has been able to come up with so far, to penetrate the other's airspace, and it will cause the Soviets to embark upon an entirely new program of defense if we are to stop the penetration of our air-breathing leg of the triad. It would vitiate between \$200 billion and upwards of \$300 billion in defenses that they have already invested, to stop the air-breathing weapons that we have, and therefore, would, I think, continue to put pressure on Secretary Gorbachev and his economy to make the same kinds of tough choices that our colleagues and Members do make, and that is, can we afford all of these new expensive military programs, and the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, does not have to answer that question because he simply writes out the check for some more tanks, or writes another check for some more air defense, or whatever it might be.

In this country, we have to make those tough choices because we care about our people and about our economy and about the kinds of things that

average families care about: having good housing and food and education and all the rest of it.

□ 1350

But in the Soviet Union it does not have to work that way. If they need more for defense, they simply take it away from the people. They need to have to make the same kind of tough choices we do, to be able to provide for their people and then ask the question whether they should be spending more for defense.

The B-2 bomber is the kind of program that puts them to that test and says, "Now, do you really want to spend another 2 or 3 or 4 or \$500 billion to try to stop this new technological weapon that we have, or would you like to call uncle and put a stop to this craziness and agree that we both have a deterrent against each other and not try to obtain a first strike capability?"

Finally, I commend the gentleman for supporting the B-2, because that is the point of the B-2. It is not a first strike weapon, like the monstrous ICBM's that the Soviets have developed and that we also have, but, rather, it is a second strike weapon which, therefore, provides great deterrence to a first strike by the Soviets but poses no complementary threat on our part, the threat of a first strike.

That is another reason we are trying to maintain that third leg of the triad, the bomber leg, because it is not a threatening leg like the land-based and sea-based missiles are.

Again, Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] for his strong support of this program.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. KYL]. I think it is clear that it is a reasonable approach, and that the production and deployment of the B-2 Stealth system will cause the Soviets to want to negotiate and get serious about arms control. They will see that they will have to do something to replace their \$350 billion radar system, because the B-2 can breach that system and make it obsolete.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I am a little out of breath. A little bit ago I saw that the gentleman was speaking. I was across the street in my office, and I rushed over here to join him on the question of support for the B-2.

I wish to compliment the gentleman for his leadership in the area of the manned bomber. Our defense has been based in part on always deploying a manned bomber, and it has been the plan and the understanding of our de-

fense planners to replace the aging B-52, which we depend upon for the air leg of our triad for the most part, with the B-1 and the B-2. The B-1 has been completed. It is now deployed and flying, and the second part of the plan is to provide the B-2.

The B-2, of course, is a penetrating bomber, whereas the B-1, while it can penetrate, is a standoff bomber which launches air-launched cruise missiles.

The argument is sometimes made that there is no plan to pay for the B-2. Well, that is not the way the system works around here. They build it, they buy it, and then they figure out a way to pay for it. That is the way all systems work. I remember talking to President Reagan about that issue when he ordered up the MX. I said, "There is no plan to pay for it."

There is never a plan to pay for these weapons systems until after we buy them. That is the way government works. There are a lot of people who would like to have it work differently, including myself, and I would support a plan in the future to change the system, but the system now is to order up a defense system and then figure out a way to pay for it. That is what we have done with the B-2.

The B-2 is a fine weapons system. It is on schedule. It has been flying. I have been in the airplane, as I am sure the gentleman from Missouri has, and I look forward to seeing it fly on the first occasion when we have the opportunity to go out to Palmdale and look at it.

I congratulate the gentleman from Missouri on his knowledge of the weapons system and on his leadership in offering the amendment which would complete the plan for our defense posture, and I look forward to supporting the gentleman this week when that amendment is offered.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, that is very kind of the gentleman from Arkansas, and I do appreciate his support and his encouragement.

This is truly a most important system for us. There is an old saying that the more emotion, the less reason, and when we are reasonable about looking at the defense of our Nation and seeing the importance of this system, I think not just the gentleman from Arkansas but the majority of the Members of this House will agree that the B-2 bomber is a necessity for the strategic defense of our Nation.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, I had a couple of questions I wanted to ask. If the gentleman has a couple more minutes, I would like to address a couple of questions to him.

Mr. SKELTON. Absolutely, I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, the first question for the gentleman from Missouri is this: It is asserted by the people who would like to eliminate the B-2 program that the \$23 billion which has been spent in all of the research and development for the program was appropriated for the B-2 before the program's cost figures were released, and that nobody knew about these figures and these program costs, and so forth. As far as the gentleman knows, is that a correct statement?

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, there were some Members—and I am included as one of them—approximately 100 Members of Congress who were briefed on this during its classified existence, part of which dealt with the cost thereof, and it was classified for a very good reason. It allowed us to take the extra steps and to test this technology without its being exposed to usurpation by a potential enemy.

Classified items are terribly important. This, along with its cost, is unclassified as of now, and, of course, most of this is on research and development. But this is next-century technology. We have made a scientific breakthrough that is magnificent. It is one that a great number of us in Congress knew about, had been briefed thereon, and were well aware of, and, frankly, we were encouraged on that point.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, the Committee on Armed Services approved this in each of the last several years. Were the members of the Armed Services Committee permitted to be briefed on the B-2, and as a matter of fact were they permitted to actually visit the site of construction and see the program itself?

Mr. SKELTON. I can say that I had that opportunity, and I saw that a number of other members of the Armed Services Committee had the opportunity. I am quite sure all of them were afforded that opportunity, and whether they all took advantage of it or not I do not know. But I do know a good number of them did. I actually received three such briefings on the B-2, and I had the opportunity, of course, to see it in its plant as well. So it was well known and well understood by many of us on the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I asked the same question at a time when I was being briefed out at Palm-dale last year. Of course, every Member of Congress had the opportunity to take the initiative to go to California and to receive the briefings. That was where you sign your life

away before you go in, and I guess they take your fingerprints and everything else in order to get through all the security and the clearances. But if a Member of Congress did not receive a briefing on the B-2, it was because they did not take the initiative. I know some effort was made at some considerable expense to the Northrop Corp. and the Air Force that developed the airplane.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I might point out at this juncture that the gentleman from Arkansas who is speaking is not a member of the Armed Services Committee, but he did avail himself of the opportunity to examine this system; is that not correct?

Mr. ALEXANDER. Of course, there were many Members of Congress who did that, and, of course, not all of us who are interested in the defense of our country are members of the Armed Services Committee. Frankly, I do not think I would have the patience to be a member of the Armed Services Committee. I will settle for the Appropriations Committee. But I am concerned about the systems and their development, and, of course, I am concerned about the defense of our great country.

□ 1400

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER] for his support.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, I have some information that confirms that 88 Members of the House of Representatives, representing 13 different committees, visited Northrop's facilities more than 220 times since the program's inception, and 60 percent of the current membership of the Committee on Armed Services has also visited Northrop in California.

So, Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] is correct that nobody was hoodwinked into supporting this program. We either in fact knew what was going on there, or at least we had the opportunity to know, and, for those who now express great surprise, all I can say is that they had the opportunity, should they have wanted to, to be briefed on the program.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] another question, if he has the time. It is said that the B-2 Stealth Program is a highly concurrent program. Of course, being on the Committee on Armed Services, I am aware of the fact that at the time it was planned to be a highly concurrent program, but based upon changes that have been made, including a change this year by Secretary Cheney, that is

not necessarily the case, and I wonder if the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] will comment for a moment about this and demonstrate to our colleagues why the B-2 Program is no longer the concurrent program that it is criticized as being.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, to begin with it was designed to be less concurrent than the B-1 system. There were some 24,000 hours of wind tunnel testing, and so many various tests went into this early on before any production actually began.

This is, as I mentioned, less concurrent than the B-1 was. The year's slippage, as requested by the Secretary of Defense when he appeared before our committee the first time, makes it even less concurrent, and I think that what has been said about the B-2 is coming to pass. They said it would fly, it would fly well, and I was thrilled, as I know so many were, when I met and talked with the two test pilots of the B-2 this past week who said that it flew exactly as the simulator did, and, if anything, a bit better. So, there is a great deal of testing that has gone on, and we are not buying, as they say, a pig in a poke. We are buying a system based upon a series of tests that have worked out and are working.

Mr. Speaker, the plane flies, it flies well, and it will meet those requirements, I am convinced.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. Am I not correct that the amendment of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] relating to the B-2 bomber has language in it which would further protect us from a decision too early to manufacture too many planes, that his language would guarantee us that the program will work properly before we actually spend this money to buy the equipment?

Mr. SKELTON. Absolutely. There are two aspects of this restrictive language in my amendment. One adopts the restrictive language that is already in the bill; and, second, it requires a performance matrix report. Now that is a fancy phraseology, but it requires the unclassified items and information from the various tests dealing with performance, such as range, speed, and all the technological aspects of the testing, to be made public and sent to Congress so that we may see and have firsthand knowledge of how the testing is going and what is going on each year before we approve additional funds, as we must every year for this system, as well as other systems.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield on this point?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to encourage the Air Force and Northrop, who may be observing this debate today, to encourage Members of Congress to be present during some of these test flights. I realize that we do not have the time, nor do they have the time, for all of us to be present all the time, but for people who may be skeptical or for those who may not be aware of the properties of this new airplane, it will be useful for them, as persons who vote on future budgets, to go through a learning curve process about the various qualities of this fabulous airplane.

I would point out one other thing, and that is I was just reading an article a minute ago about how the United States has fallen behind some of our European trading partners in many, many industrial fields, but not aerospace, and every time we develop a new airplane it pushes us further and further ahead of the race for superiority in the field of aerospace. Those persons who see this machine, this B-2, for the first time, they will be proud that we are still No. 1 in aerospace.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] for yielding to me, and I appreciate again his leadership.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER] for his comments.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important to point out that we in this country are so blessed with our technological achievements that this is the one area that, more than anything, together without national resolve, keeps the peace in this world.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I want to compliment the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON], my colleague, for the leadership that he has given to the House on the important question of modernizing our strategic bomber force.

I must add that a lot of people have forgotten a lot of history over this last 10-year period. We certainly had a debate early on regarding the B-1 and the B-2. But for the last decade we basically had a two-bomber program. One was to go forward with the B-1 technology, which was basically better understood, and then to work on the development of the important Stealth bomber which has such tremendous radar-evading capabilities, and what we have seen is we have got the 100 B-1's deployed.

A lot of people say to me, "What ever happened to the B-1 program?" Well, we paid for it. We bought the planes. They are out there. Now we have got a problem on defensive countermeasures, a problem that is going to cost us about \$1.5 billion to fix.

Many people criticize the B-1 program because it had too much concurrency, but all but the major problem with it can be addressed with a half a billion dollars.

Mr. Speaker, this is important to understand because the amendments that are being offered, the Kasich amendment, will basically kill the B-2 program, and the Aspin amendment, both will result, if they were carried through to fruition, and let us say after killing the program we say we come back to it, or after slowing it down dramatically, what we find out is the cost per airplane will rise dramatically. So, there is no free lunch here.

The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] on the other hand offers an amendment that basically is the Cheney budget with some reporting requirements.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, let me correct the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] there. It is the committee figure.

Mr. DICKS. Excuse me.

Mr. SKELTON. It is not the Cheney budget. It is less than the Cheney budget. It is a compromise figure.

Mr. DICKS. It is a compromise figure, but what it does not do is slow the program down so much that it increases the unit cost of the aircraft to such an unreasonable level that we create a self-fulfilling prophecy, and that is the problem with the Kasich amendment, and that is the problem with the Aspin amendment.

Mr. Speaker, it is one thing to try to cure the problem, but we make it a lot worse if we say the problem here is cost, and yet by slowing it down further than the committee has slowed it down, we make the per-unit cost even greater. Then all we have done is make a bad situation worse, and that is the bottom-line difficulty with Kasich, and that is the bottom-line difficulty with Aspin.

Mr. Speaker, let me also mention something that came up late last week. For the last 5 years I have served as an observer to the arms control talks in Geneva, and the whole philosophy of the START talk has been to reduce dramatically the number of ICBM's that the Soviets have and the number of ICBM's that the United States has because these are the weapons that will be either used or lost. It is the use-them-or-lose-them thing which causes such crisis in stability, and our country is fearful of the very potent Soviet SS-18's. We have developed the MX as a response to that.

The philosophy of the arms control talks was to go ahead with bombers to give favorable accounting rules for bombers, and President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed at Reykjavik to have these favorable accounting rules so that a bomber with internal weapons, which could be

up to 20 bombs and SRAM's, will only count, only count as one weapon.

□ 1410

These are slow flying—not slow flying, but they are not fast fliers like the ICBM. They fly over there. It takes about 8 hours. They are recallable. With one refueling they can get there.

But the point is they do not create instability. They are clearly second strike systems.

People say, well, yes, that is important, but why do we need them? Well, the reason we need them is that there are a number of targets in the Soviet Union that are not time urgent, and under the strategic integrated operational plan somewhere between 40 and 50 percent of the targets within the Soviet Union's are not time urgent, and therefore can be addressed by the manned penetrating bomber. Many of those targets will move around, like ships, like tanks, like railroads. Therefore, the bomber is uniquely qualified to go after those mobile targets.

Now, much has been made about can they find the SS-24's and the SS-25's? Well, the answer to that, quite candidly, is that there is work under way at the Pentagon to develop the radars and sensors to do that very mission, but that has not yet been completely accomplished. Therefore, they do have a problem in identifying with current systems the SS-24 and the SS-25; but the best hope for being able to go after those Soviet missiles is the B-2 bomber with these new sensing devices. That is another reason why we should go forward.

But clearly, on the arms control side of the equation, the mission side of the equation, this is a very important weapons system which I think we should go ahead and complete.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, let me interrupt my friend at that point.

Mr. DICKS. Yes.

Mr. SKELTON. The comments made by the President and the Secretary of Defense indicate that should it come to pass that this not be funded, that they would have to rethink the START formula.

Mr. DICKS. The START talks.

Mr. SKELTON. And their attitude and their negotiating positions on the START talks, which would be an arms control disaster.

We would be shooting ourselves in the foot and moving further away from arms control by not funding this.

Mr. DICKS. Well, because the B-2 is so fundamental to our negotiating position, we have always in these arms control talks, whether it be START or SALT, we have always tried to protect the right to build these bombers and to have the best technology, because

bombers have always been an area of U.S. advantage.

Now we would be faced with the extraordinary situation where we have carved out this exception, this rule that favors bombers, and then we do not take advantage of it.

And why do we have to do this? It is not because we want to do it. It is because the Soviets have spent probably \$200 billion to \$400 billion on air defenses that make it mandatory that we have this very high technology radar-evading Stealth bomber that can get through those heavy enemy air defenses in order to assure deterrence, and that is the fundamental point of arms control, of modernization and everything else.

Mr. SKELTON. And it will cause them to get more serious about arms negotiating.

Mr. DICKS. That is right; but the key here is trying to preserve the credibility of our deterrent force.

Today, as the gentleman knows, there is a big question mark about our ICBM force, because those ICBM's in silos are vulnerable to a Soviet SS-18 attack. We know that, that is why we are considering going mobile with Midgetman or the rail garrison is to cure that problem in order to restore survivability to that leg of the triad.

We also know that we have a major problem with the B-52 not being able to penetrate, with the B-1 having limited penetration capabilities, as the Soviets refine their air defenses; so that would call into question two of the three legs of the triad.

In a post-START environment, we are going to be limited to somewhere between 15 and 20 Trident submarines, so we are going to place the entire deterrent on one-third of the triad, and if the Soviets should have a technological breakthrough there, then our whole deterrent posture would be called into question.

It has always been our policy to modernize and to cure deficiencies. The B-2 cures the deficiency of not having a bomber that can penetrate those very massive Soviet air defenses into the year 2000 and beyond.

Therefore, when you look at it from the position of avoiding war, remember this is what General Welch said so effectively before the other body last week. He said that the whole idea here is to have a credible deterrent.

So my hope is that we can maintain the B-2 program, because it will help us get a START agreement. It will give us this advanced technology. It will give us assured penetration capability; but most importantly, it will give us the most effective weapon for deterrence.

Remember, people talk about these systems. ICBM's can only be used for that deterrent war. SLBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, can only be used for that deterrent role,

but a manned penetrating bomber can be used across the entire spectrum of warfare, either strategic or conventional, and at a time when we are seeing a post-NATO era, when we are not assured of base rights around the world, having that bomber that can with one refueling go anywhere in the world from three different locations gives us enormous flexibility, and when it gets there it can avoid those enemy radars, and because of that avoidance capability it could have been used, for example, in the Libyan raid without having to risk two aircraft carriers and all the aircraft that were associated with that event.

So the B-2 gives us enormous flexibility, like our aircraft carriers give us in the Navy, that is the flexibility and the availability to deal with contingencies that I think will be even more important in a post-START post-NATO era.

I wish that we did not have to face these hard choices, but clearly, this is one system that I believe very fundamentally is essential to preserving deterrence and peace as we move down the road.

Now, there is another benefit. This airplane will have more spin-off to the private sector than any other weapons system that we have developed. It will give us the use of composites, the use of computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacture. This particular airplane will give very positive benefits to the commercial aviation industry for years and years to come, so it also has that.

I do not think you can ever justify a weapons system on that, but clearly, this is one of the spinoffs from the B-2 program, this technology that will be there for years and years to come.

So I want to commend the gentleman. I think his amendment is on target. It will not unreasonably increase the cost of this program. It will take some of the concurrency out. It will provide information to the public that is essential to better understanding this program.

I would like to go back to one point that was made by the gentleman from Arizona. He asked, did anybody know about this? Well, if anybody was paying attention, 3 years ago the cost numbers were made available to the Congress and opened up in an unclassified way on the B-2 program. So if anybody here can say they did not know what was going on, it is simply because they did not avail themselves of the information that was available.

Many of us went out there and have seen the program and been involved in it. I serve on the Defense Subcommittee. I have been involved in this program for the last 10 years. It is exciting technology.

I just would say that people today who say, "Oh, I never even knew what was going on," especially people who

serve on the Armed Services Committee, I might add, some of the leaders of that committee, I find that rather remarkable, because these people were invited to go out, see the program firsthand. Some of them simply did not avail themselves of that opportunity.

So I compliment the gentleman here for taking this important time today. This is a very important national security subject and I think his amendment certainly is the preferable one over Kasich and over Aspin on Wednesday.

I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I certainly appreciate the gentleman's support. I am convinced that this is a most necessary step for the national security of our country, and I thank the gentleman for his assistance.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Missouri for yielding to me.

I have listened to some of the things that have been discussed here today. I think as most of us are aware, those of us supporting the program have been trying to let the general public and our fellow colleagues know how important this program is.

I just want to make a couple points. Perhaps they have already been covered; but the procedure that we are going through, and we are going to be voting on this issue Wednesday morning as the first order of business on the Defense Authorization bill.

The problem is what amendments are being perceived. As we all know, the bill as it stands now came out of the committee and does, of course, allow for continued production and R&D of the B-2 program. We did cut \$500 million out of the procurement side, \$300 million out of the R&D side.

We probably in the future if we continue with the program, and I am sure we will, are going to need to restore that \$300 million; but the scenario now, I think, that needs to be explained to our colleagues is that the proper way to go from here is to adopt the Skelton amendment. The reason for that is if you are in favor of the B-2, if you think we ought to continue the program, it is dollar-wise the same thing that the committee did. The only thing that the gentleman has done in the Skelton amendment is to put some more language in there, tighten up some of the parameters, some of the things that perhaps we need to know.

□ 1420

The Aspin-Synar amendment, I think, leads us down the road to even-

tual defeat and nullification of the B-2 program. It is proposed as perhaps middle ground, but it is really not middle ground. The middle-ground proposal is the Skelton amendment, which is very close to the committee amendment.

Mr. SKELTON. Let me point out at this juncture, and I appreciate the gentleman saying that, but let me point out that the Secretary of Defense and the President recommended some \$4.7 billion for the program, and the committee cut this down to \$3.9 billion. My amendment adopts that same figure and, of course, it has some very restrictive language therein.

I think this is a very reasonable approach to this whole issue.

Mr. DAVIS. It is. But what I am afraid is that some of the Members are going to look at the Dellums-Kasich-Rowland amendment which is an amendment that does, in fact, kill the program, builds 13 planes, and they are going to look at this and say, "Well, this is somewhere between what the committee did or what the Skelton amendment does and those people who want to preserve the program."

In fact, I think that the Aspin amendment goes too far and leads us down the road that we are not going to have a B-2 airplane, and so the only alternative, the only right way to go, which is very similar to what the committee did, which I might remind our colleagues was adopted by a substantial margin, is to accept the gentleman's amendment, and that is what we need to convince our colleagues, because that is the proper way to go.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, we have to remember that when Secretary Cheney came in, he expressed some personal reservations about the cost of the B-2 program. He went out there and he took a look at it. He then came back in with a restructured program of three planes in 1990, five planes in 1991.

The problem is that if we go much below that, and I do not think the gentleman's amendment does that, but if we get Aspin or Kasich, and Kasich is a killer, but let us just say Aspin for a moment, what we do is it looks like we are making a short-term saving, but driving up the cost of the overall program.

I have asked the Air Force for an estimate. I will predict that it will increase the cost of the program between \$2 billion and \$10 billion.

If we say, "I am shocked by this bigger shock," and then turn around and do something that makes the cost even greater, we are not solving the problem.

Mr. SKELTON. Let me point this out: The technology that has gone into this system, and it is new, brand new, technology, and it is American know-how at its very best, but this Stealth technology is what all future bombers will be, all future fighters will be, and they will all be expensive. It is so terribly good. It does what it is supposed to do.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, let me finish this point. When we start looking at this \$23 billion that we have invested, we cannot just put that against the B-2. The advanced-technology aircraft, the advanced-technology fighter, every new missile will use the benefits of that program.

I want to come back and drive home this one point. If the program is slowed down too much and the unit cost is driven up, then we create a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes this program more expensive than it needs to be.

We did the B-1 differently, and some people criticized that. We said, "Here is what we are going to do. We have the design." We went forward and did it rapidly, and we paid off the program in a few short years. That kept the program on cost. Yes, we are paying an extra price now to fix some of the mistakes of the B-1 program, but the total of that is about one-half of a billion dollars spread over 97 aircraft.

One has to say that if we are going to do the Aspin approach, slow this thing down but increase the cost by \$2 to \$4 billion, that is a big premium to pay to take concurrency out.

What I would argue is that the Cheney Air Force budget already slowed this thing down to the lowest level that makes much sense.

The gentleman's amendment, I think, is still in the ball park, but if we go below that, then we are going to drive up the cost per aircraft. We are going to drive up the cost of the entire program. They then will turn around 2 years from now and say, "My God, it is more expensive, so we have to kill it." That is why some people worry that the Aspin amendment turns out to be another kill amendment, and we have to think through this as a body.

Mr. Speaker, I would just hope that we would be very careful in making certain that in the name of compromise we do not come up with something that is another killer amendment, and I am afraid that is what the Aspin amendment is.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman from Washington, and I thank the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. DAVIS. I want to expand on what the gentleman from Washington said. He is absolutely correct.

When one looks at the money we have spent on this airplane in R&D, and we have spent a tremendous amount of the total \$70.2 billion in research and development, so that is charged against the B-2 bomber, but the benefits from that research and development, as has been discussed here, will be able to be used in future airplanes, and the spinoff is going to be fantastic.

We also have to put this cost in proper perspective. If we look at what we paid in the total costs of our procurement defense budget as an example of the B-47, the B-52, and B-1 and now the B-2, when we were building the B-52 many years ago, as a total percentage of the procurement budget, it was 1.6 percent, and then when we built the B-1, it was 1.5 percent. The fact is that even with \$70.2 billion and an airplane that is expensive, the B-2 costs 1.3 percent of our total procurement budget, which is less than the total procurement money percentage-wise we spent on either the B-1 or the B-52.

Mr. SKELTON. I think that is very important to point out.

Let me also add that airplanes are expensive. Were we to buy a 747, a Boeing 747 off the shelf, we would pay from \$130 million to \$150 million for it with no accessories. Were we to buy another 747, Air Force One for the President, with all the technology and avionics that go with it, that is a \$300 million airplane. These are very expensive.

Every future system such as this in the future is going to be expensive. How much should we spend? We should spend enough to keep our country safe and free.

Trident submarines are expensive, aircraft carriers, destroyers are expensive.

This is so terribly important, and the most important decision that we will make strategically, I am convinced, this decade.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, the gentleman mentioned the Trident Submarine Program. I am a gentleman from Washington, and the Trident base is very near my district. I follow the program rather closely.

When we look at the submarines we built and the D-5 missile and put it all together, \$79 billion.

Mr. SKELTON. Which is more expensive, as we know, than this program.

Mr. DICKS. It is more expensive than the B-2 program, and yet it is a critical part of our triad, and the most survivable part of our triad.

It is a prudent investment. We have made it over a long period of time.

Let us go back to 1981 when this debate started. They came in, and this is now the most complicated techno-

logical step forward maybe that we have ever made in the defense area, and they predicted at that time that the cost of the B-2 would be \$36.6 billion. Today if we go back and look at still in 1981 dollars with the inflation and everything else we have had, the cost is \$44.2 or \$44.3 billion. It has gone up about 20 percent.

That is pretty good for an R&D program with this kind of technological step forward, and the breakthroughs that were associated with it and, yes, there were some problems. There was a redesign of the aircraft so that it could do both low and high, and that was done for very solid reasons. That added a lot of cost.

They underestimated how much it was going to cost for security to keep this thing secret for these many years that this plane has been under development. That added enormously to the cost, plus there were some difficulties. Any time we try to make that next step forward, we are always going to have some difficulties. We have had it with every single program, and so that has been part of the reason why they underestimated what the cost of this was.

□ 1430

So in those terms, it is pretty solid. If we spread that R&D cost across these other weapons, and then look at the cost to complete, we are talking about something like \$260 to \$300 million per aircraft. I think that is reasonable for the capability we are going to get from this airplane, the fact that it keeps us with a manned penetrating bomber into the foreseeable future, and renders obsolete the hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars that the Soviets have invested in their massive air defense system.

This is something where people say will the Soviets develop stealth? They do not need stealth. We do not have an air defense system that is comparable to the one they have. That is why we have to do something extra here, because they have made the problem much more challenging than we have made the problem of penetrating U.S. airspace for them.

So in order for us to preserve the triad, which has given us peace for the longest period of time, 40 years without any major war in Europe or with the Soviets or whatever, we have to continue to deal with the problems of modernization and survivability of the triad.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman from Washington. I think it is very important to point out that the value of the B-2 bomber is far in excess of its cost.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and I yield back the balance of my time.

TRIBUTE TO DR. JAMES B. WYNGAARDEN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALGREN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. WALGREN. Mr. Speaker, I join together today with a number of other Members of Congress to express appreciation and respect for the service of Dr. Jim Wyngaarden who is retiring in August of this year after 8 very fruitful years for the Nation as Director of the National Institutes of Health.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. JOHN DINGELL, chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, could not be on the floor at this time today, and he has asked me to submit his statement in this special order for the RECORD.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased today to add my voice to those who have joined in appreciation of the efforts and achievements of Dr. James Wyngaarden as Director of the National Institutes of Health over the past 8 years.

The National Institutes of Health complex is the flagship of biomedical research for the United States and possibly the world. Dr. Wyngaarden has had the task of steering the NIH through some uncharted and often stormy seas. He is to be congratulated on a job well done.

During Dr. Wyngaarden's tenure we have looked to the NIH to provide the lead in research against AIDS and other health problems such as Alzheimer's disease, cancer, and Lyme disease. These increased expectations have come at a time when we in the Congress have had to battle each year for increased NIH funding. The NIH has faced new dilemmas of how to oversee some of the uses of biotechnology, and how to confront the ethical questions posed by certain aspects of research. Dr. Wyngaarden's leadership on these issues has been thoughtful and responsive, and has led to progress and not stagnation.

Dr. Wyngaarden has led the NIH to an important role in the development, organization, and coordination of the project to map and sequence the human genome. This is a bold new initiative for biomedical research, and one from which we all stand to benefit.

I know that my wife Deborah would want me to make special note of the role that Dr. Wyngaarden has played in helping to set up the Children's Inn for the families of children receiving treatment at the NIH Clinical Center. The ability of the NIH authorities, through Dr. Wyngaarden, to respond to this important need, has provided a very human and compassionate face to the top-class science and medicine of the Institutes.

I thank Dr. Wyngaarden for his service to science and to the community at large during his tenure at NIH. I join with my colleagues in wishing him well in all his future endeavors.

Mr. WALGREN. Mr. Speaker, the Nation has always taken pride in the National Institutes of Health. The NIH is often described as the jewel in the crown of the Federal research ef-

forts. It is the premiere biomedical research institution in the world. NIH scientists have led the fight against AIDS, against cancer, against heart disease, against stroke, and against so many devastating disorders that destroy individuals.

The NIH has a special place in the heart of so many Americans because it is the one Federal institution that is directly responsible for trying to deliver the kind of help that we reach out to the medical profession and the scientific research in medicine specifically to help when everything else seems so helpless.

Leading a scientific enterprise of this magnitude and assuring that the best, and particularly the most promising science is the project that is funded in the face of needs that are compelling by themselves, and so compelling because they are presented by individuals who are often even in desperate need, a need that always outstrips resources, assuring that the most promising science research is done under those circumstances is a demanding task, a task that calls for the largest measure of personal diplomacy and scientific discipline. For 8 years this Nation has enjoyed those qualities in full measure under the leadership of the National Institutes of Health by Dr. Wyngaarden.

As a member of the Health and the Environment Subcommittee, I have come to have a special respect for the personal qualities that Dr. Wyngaarden has brought to administering what is certainly a large and significant bureaucracy. I know of no other administrator in my years in the House of Representatives who has been as open, not just to Members of Congress, but to individuals who are reaching out to the NIH, in no matter what capacity. I know of no other Federal administrator who had every reason to be inaccessible or to be inflexible or to be unresponsive, and I know of no other Federal administrator who has been so responsive under those circumstances, and responsive with a quality of decisionmaking that is marked by its straightforwardness, by its honesty, by its integrity, and by its discipline to the scientific state of knowledge in the area that is under question. He has been exemplary and a great resource for all of us.

Under his leadership the NIH budget has grown from \$3.5 billion in 1981 to over \$7 billion in 1989. During those 8 years taken together, Dr. Wyngaarden has been responsible for administering something in the range of \$40 billion of Federal money, Federal efforts and in the most compelling area that we as a society come together to address. His administration in those years has been marked by a substantial emphasis on individual investigator-initiated research. The increase

in the number of research project grants from about 16,000 in 1982 to a proposed 20,000 in 1990 has been significant, and at the same time Dr. Wyngaarden has emphasized the importance of grants of multiyear duration, so that now when we look at the competing research project grants in the NIH in 1989 we see that where only 1 in 5 was a competing research grant lasting for more than 5 years, now 1 out of 2 of the grants that are multiyear grants in this dimension are allocated on a competitive, peer-reviewed basis.

This kind of individual, investigator-initiated research is really the lifeblood of moving science forward, and the large steps that have been taken at the NIH in the understanding of biomedical science in these years is largely attributable to Dr. Wyngaarden's recognition of the importance of this kind of program and the priority that he has given it.

When Dr. Wyngaarden came to NIH in 1980 there had been little new construction of research facilities for a number of years, and certainly the budgets that faced any director of a major Federal facility starting in 1980 were not encouraging of new construction. Yet, he had the foresight to initiate a strong intramural program of research, and knowing that that needed the facilities, the physical facilities to support it, he initiated this construction of a new research building to house scientists in child health and neurosciences in particular. So we have seen a strong physical addition to the NIH plant during this period of time as well.

I especially want to salute Dr. Wyngaarden for his creativity in arranging for the construction, and playing a significant role in the construction of what will be known as the Children's Inn at NIH, a program where we will be building a facility to house 36 families who will stay with their children while their children are being treated for cancer and related diseases at Bethesda, families and children who are coming from across the United States, from California, to Maine, to Florida who will now, because of the encouragement that Dr. Wyngaarden gave a group of private sector people who wanted to pursue and help finance this kind of a project, because of the encouragement Dr. Wyngaarden gave them, that facility will be a reality and is presently under construction at the NIH campus in Bethesda.

□ 1440

Dr. Wyngaarden knew that if he would allocate the land—and he committed 2½ acres of ground on the NIH campus—that the private sector, large corporations such as Merck Pharmaceutical, down to small donors, individual families working through Lions Clubs and individual families making

personal contributions, would be able to do the rest.

As a result, some \$4 million has been raised at this point in the ongoing project to build a Children's Inn at NIH which will be a home away from home for children that are in very real need of the comfort that home can provide.

In his period at National Institutes of Health, Dr. Wyngaarden has led the fight against AIDS, building up the Federal program that has at least positioned us at a point where we can see how the solutions to AIDS will be found. Imagine what it would be like were we confronted with essentially a fatal social disease if we had not the slightest understanding of the mechanism that lies behind it.

But the basic research done on the genetics of the AIDS virus gives all of us real reason to hope and real reason for confidence that we will be able to scientifically find the solution to that disease which is so threatening not just to the individuals that may be caught up in it but to all innocent individuals in society as a whole.

Also during his period of time at NIH, the human genome research project which will document and essentially diagram the genetic structure of human beings has been initiated at the NIH in response to the new scientific opportunities that our understanding now give us the ability to reach out and develop.

Dr. Wyngaarden was responsible for creating the NIH Human Genome Research Program and for recruiting Nobel Laureate Dr. James Watson, who was the original researcher who understood the double helix that has led to an understanding of genetic engineering, recruiting Dr. James Watson to head that program.

There are so many individuals across this country who suffer—limited in number but terribly devastating—diseases, or conditions would be a better word, that are based in genetic disorders, diseases like neurofibromatosis that, because of a genetic disorder, causes fibrous tumors to develop almost at random in the body and creates terrible life-threatening problems for those who suffer from it.

Juvenile diabetes, and diabetes in general, and a whole range of diseases that we know will be understood once we understand the complexity of the human genetic map, will be able to be saved, and lead to the lessening of human suffering immeasurably when that understanding is in place.

As a nation we owe Dr. Wyngaarden a deep and heartfelt thank you. He has led the NIH with vision and integrity.

Under his stewardship the agency has grown and the people of this country, our children and generations yet to come will be so much better off because of the scientific base that Dr.

Wyngaarden has moved forward that will now be able to be built on in future years.

The country will realize the benefit of his efforts in the long run in the form of improved health which both we and our children will enjoy for years to come.

Mr. Speaker, I invite other members who might like to make submissions for the record during this special order. I recognize the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. MORELLA], who has had such a close involvement with the Bethesda campus of the National Institutes of Health and has been a full supporter of the developments in science and health that are doing so much good through the research done at the NIH facility.

Mrs. MORELLA. I thank the gentleman for those very kind words, and I want to commend him very highly on the special order he has taken on out on behalf of the retirement of Dr. Jim Wyngaarden.

The gentleman indeed has been a supporter of everything that the National Institutes of Health has been promoting, and we are very grateful to him, to have him in Congress as a supporter of NIH.

I am very honored to represent the Bethesda campus of the National Institutes of Health.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor Dr. James Barnes Wyngaarden on the occasion of his retirement as Director of the National Institutes of Health.

Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked:

The best service we can do for our country and for ourselves is to see as far as we may and to feel the great forces that are behind every detail.

I feel that Mr. Holmes' statement accurately describes the contributions Dr. Wyngaarden has made to the National Institutes of Health and to the field of biomedical research.

Dr. Wyngaarden's 8-year tenure as Director of NIH has been characterized by a creativity, flexibility, and thoughtfulness that has kept NIH at the forefront of scientific developments and progress, including significant advances in the study of cancer, AIDS, and Alzheimer's disease. Dr. Wyngaarden has been committed to keeping scientists active in the management of their own research and to reducing the bureaucracy surrounding scientific research to ensure maximum progress. One of his greatest successes has been in coordinating efforts between scientists at private research centers and NIH. As a result of these efforts, the number of research project grants increased by 25 percent from 1982 to 1990 and the proportion of the NIH budget devoted to research project grants increased from 50 percent to 58 percent during his administration.

Under Dr. Wyngaarden's directorship, NIH saw unparalleled fiscal expansion; the overall appropriation doubled from \$3.57 billion in fiscal year 1981 to \$7.3 billion in fiscal year 1989. Dr. Wyngaarden also strengthened the NIH intramural research program, expanding the intramural budget from \$455 million in fiscal year 1982 to \$849 million in 1990. He began the construction of the Child Health and Neuroscience Facility.

His efforts in the battle against AIDS were both timely and thorough. Dr. Wyngaarden recognized early the deadly potential of the AIDS virus and devoted significant resources to its combat in the crucial and early years of its discovery.

Dr. Wyngaarden's support of the Children's Inn at NIH was vital to its realization. This facility, which will soon be completed, will provide accommodations for families and their children who are being treated for cancer or related illnesses at NIH. The Children's Inn will serve as home to as many as 36 chronically ill children and their families during their treatment. Not only can the families stay together, but they will be housed with other families in similar circumstances, thereby providing a more supportive environment.

The accomplishments of NIH under the tenure of Dr. James Wyngaarden make me truly proud to represent him and the National Institutes of Health in Congress. I have enjoyed working with him, and I wish him great success in his future endeavors. He will be missed, and he will be remembered.

Again I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALGREEN] for the courtesy he extended me in joining with him in this tribute.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, on July 30, Dr. James Wyngaarden, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, will step down from his post after 8 years of distinguished service.

As a member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services and Education for the past 6 years, I have had the pleasure and honor of working with Dr. Wyngaarden.

Each 1 of those 6 years, Jim Wyngaarden has come before the subcommittee not only to testify regarding the administration's budget request for the National Institutes of Health, but also to act as an advocate for biomedical research.

I do not believe that any member of the Labor/HHS Appropriations Subcommittee believes that we, as a nation, are devoting sufficient resources to medical and biomedical research. Dr. Wyngaarden has led NIH at a difficult time, and his leadership has been especially important to our efforts in Congress to increase the national commitment to biomedical research.

In this decade, NIH has required enormous energy and skill of its Director as it has struggled to cope with the demands of the necessary additional research on the HIV infection and other chronic and infectious diseases.

Dr. Wyngaarden has provided strong leadership on this and other major issues confronting NIH during a time of explosive developments in biomedical research. He has not, however, neglected the ostensibly mundane, but critically important elements of the NIH research mission.

In fact, Jim Wyngaarden has been an effective proponent of efforts to strengthen the Intramural Research Program, the construction of the Child Health Neuroscience Facility, and the Dental-Scientist Research Program. The Director has also been attentive to the concerns of the people who do the real work of the Institutes, the researchers themselves. He has, for example, attempted to reduce the procedural burdens that can hinder an investigator's progress.

I want to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Wyngaarden for his important contributions as Director of the NIH. Along with many of my colleagues, I have appreciated his professionalism, his energy, and his commitment to a worthy mission. The people of our Nation owe Jim Wyngaarden a debt of gratitude for his exemplary record of public service. We wish him Godspeed and congratulate him on a job well done.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania, the Honorable DOUG WALGREEN, for taking out this special order and enabling each of us to pay tribute to Dr. James Wyngaarden, who is leaving the National Institutes of Health [NIH] after 8 years as its distinguished Director.

I came to know Dr. Wyngaarden through my service as a member on the House Appropriations Committee's Labor-Health and Human Services-Education Subcommittee. On many occasions, Dr. Wyngaarden has come before our subcommittee during the annual budget process to testify on behalf of the many programs and institutes which make up the NIH. During Dr. Wyngaarden's tenure at the NIH, existing programs have flourished and new ones have been developed and initiated in response to new challenges and demands. Due to Dr. Wyngaarden's leadership, the NIH has continued to develop in its role as a leader in many areas of research for the scientific community.

Dr. Wyngaarden's tenure at the NIH has been highlighted by substantial increases in overall appropriations for the NIH, research project grants, an increase in the length of project grants, and the budget for research in the NIH laboratories. Funding for these activities has doubled since Dr. Wyngaarden became Director of the NIH. It was Dr. Wyngaarden's leadership which enabled the NIH to mobilize its research resources to combat the onset of the AIDS epidemic. And, the enormous task of mapping the human genome was initiated by Dr. Wyngaarden as well as the recruitment of Dr. James Watson, Nobel Prize winner and codiscoverer of the structure of DNA, to head the NIH Human Genome Research Program.

Mr. Speaker, Dr. Wyngaarden considers his greatest success at the NIH to be the cultivation of the relationship between scientists at research centers and at the NIH. On both national and international levels, Dr. Wyngaarden became a spokesman for biomedical re-

search, especially during the NIH Centennial. In addition, Dr. Wyngaarden represented the NIH on the national and international scenes by playing a key role in shaping the emergence of biotechnology.

Mr. Speaker, I also am proud to note Dr. Wyngaarden's efforts in increasing minority participation in biomedical research careers and in developing programs to assist predominantly minority colleges and universities in strengthening their research programs. Under Dr. Wyngaarden's leadership, the NIH was supportive of minority programs, such as the Research Centers in Minority Institution [RCMI] and the Minority Biomedical Research Support Program [MBRS]—two major NIH research grant programs which are targeted to minority researchers. I had the opportunity to work with Dr. Wyngaarden in 1985 to establish the RCMI program. This program provides institutional development awards to enhance the infrastructure of predominantly minority institutions so that such institutions are able to develop their biomedical research programs.

Other minority programs that continued to flourish during Dr. Wyngaarden's tenure include the MBRS program began in 1971. This program awards grants to predominantly minority institutions for the recruitment of faculty and students at minority institutions into biomedical research, to increase the research capabilities of such institutions, and to improve the faculty capabilities to conduct biomedical research. Both the Minority Access to Research Careers [MARC] and the Minority High School Science Apprentice Program are two other programs that encourage minorities to pursue careers in biomedical research.

In addition to promoting access to biomedical research programs and careers, the NIH has made efforts to initiate research of diseases which significantly affect the life expectancy and health of minorities, such as cancer, AIDS, diabetes, heart disease and stroke, sickle cell anemia, and infant mortality. The NIH began to include more minorities in clinical trials. Further initiatives aimed at minorities are expected to be developed by a new Office of Minority Health at the NIH for which 1990 funds have been earmarked.

Mr. Speaker, Dr. Wyngaarden leaves the NIH at the end of July. I am sure that my colleagues will agree that the major advancements made at the NIH over the past 8 years are a result of Dr. Wyngaarden's commitment to the scientific community and his leadership. I am pleased to join my colleagues in saluting the outstanding works he has done for the research community at large and the legacy he leaves at the NIH.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to add my voice to those recognizing Dr. James Wyngaarden's achievements during his 7 years as Director of the National Institutes of Health.

NIH is a very special Federal agency. Quite simply, the 13 national research institutes represent the crown jewels of our Nation's Government. During Dr. Wyngaarden's tenure, the NIH budget has increased from \$3.57 billion in fiscal year 1981 to \$7.3 billion in fiscal year 1989. New institutes, the National Institute of Arthritis, and Musculoskeletal and Skin Disease, and the National Institute of Deafness

and Communication Disorders, have been established to continue NIH's noble mission.

No institution, private or governmental, has done more than the NIH to improve health through understanding the nature of human disease.

Dr. Wyngaarden shepherded the agency through the difficult budget period of the Reagan years. Tremendous pressure was placed on domestic spending. We will probably never know of the intense bureaucratic battles Dr. Wyngaarden waged to preserve America's preeminence in biomedical research. He did not apologize for advocating increased levels of support for the health sciences. With the Congress' help, the interests of bettering human knowledge and maintaining U.S. leadership in the health sciences was achieved.

I am disappointed at Dr. Wyngaarden's departure. His will be large shoes to fill. His vision was great and the tasks facing his successor will be truly challenging.

We are only now coming to the realization of the sacrifices—personal and financial—of public service. To James Wyngaarden—physician and scientist—it is a special pleasure to thank him for a job well done.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in tribute to Dr. Jim Wyngaarden as he leaves the National Institutes of Health after 7 years of outstanding service as its Director. Dr. Wyngaarden has served his country with distinction and with dedication. As a physician and a scientist, he fully devoted himself to the ultimate mission of the NIH—saving people's lives.

Biomedical research is an excellent investment in the health of America. The knowledge we learn from these programs helps our doctors to find new treatments. People across America and, indeed, around the world have benefited from our research programs at Bethesda. Everyone owes Dr. Wyngaarden a deep measure of gratitude for the progress he has forged at NIH in these past 7 years.

Mr. Speaker, as ranking member of the Appropriations Subcommittee responsible for NIH, I was most impressed with the good doctor's intelligence, sincerity, and thoroughness during his testimony before our committee. Every year, I looked forward to learning about the exciting progress that his scientists have been making. We on Appropriations will deeply miss his presence at our hearings.

Dr. Wyngaarden was committed to attracting the ablest minds in the country and to building the finest medical research program in the world. In spite of misguided efforts to slow biomedical spending, Dr. Wyngaarden, Chairman NATCHER of the subcommittee and I worked together to double NIH's appropriation to nearly \$7.1 billion in fiscal year 1989. We all worked together to make sure this new money went to funding additional research grants, hiring the best scientists and doctors, and providing the highest standards of clinical care at the Institutes.

We in the House and our colleagues in the Senate have sent to the President for his signature a proclamation declaring the 1990's as the Decade of the Brain. This bold initiative will bring together our finest scientists and doctors to find cures for the most debilitating neurological diseases known to man, including Alzheimer's Disease, Muscular Dystrophy, and

Huntington's Disease. Dr. Wyngaarden vigorously supported this initiative and he was instrumental in bringing this exciting new program to fruition.

Mr. Speaker, one of the proudest days of my life is when I attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the new child health neuroscience facility. This project means a lot to me because child health means a lot to me. After years of planning, Dr. Wyngaarden worked with me to make this project come true.

As everyone knows, AIDS has become the public health threat of the eighties. From the beginning, the good doctor confronted the AIDS challenge with fresh initiatives to fight this terrible disease. With his leadership and foresight, we quickly initiated and expanded funds for AIDS research at NIH to over \$600 million last year with excellent prospects for continued growth in this vital research mission.

Tireless in his efforts, unwavering in his devotion to duty and forthright in his compassion for people in need, Dr. Wyngaarden has left his indelible mark as the finest Director of the National Institutes of Health. We all wish the good doctor well in his new endeavors. Dr. Wyngaarden, it is your energy and foresight that has made the NIH the undisputed world leader in biomedical research, and America is forever proud of you for your extraordinary efforts.

Mr. ROE. Mr. Speaker, today, we pay tribute to Dr. James Wyngaarden as he leaves the position of NIH Director after 8 years of distinguished service.

The past century has seen the National Institutes of Health [NIH] grow from a one-room laboratory in the attic of the Marine Health Service Hospital on Staten Island, NY, into a renowned biomedical research institution in Bethesda, MD. Throughout this century, NIH has achieved significant progress across all frontiers of science for health. The NIH Directors, past and present, are to be congratulated for the course they charted for biomedical research and the contributions the results have made to health promotion, the treatment and prevention of disease, and both the economic and physical health of the world.

As we all know, the mission of NIH is to improve the health of the Nation by increasing the understanding of process underlying human health, disability, and disease; advancing knowledge concerning the health effects of interactions between man and the environment; and developing and improving methods of preventing, detecting, diagnosing, and treating disease. Dr. Wyngaarden deserves, and has received, high marks for his effective stewardship in carrying out this mission. In doing so, he has demonstrated a unique ability to focus NIH resources on the biomedical research priorities which have the greatest opportunity to enhance the near-term and the longer term health of our citizens.

Dr. Wyngaarden has given special attention to the most important aspects of advancing scientific knowledge in a cost-effective manner—cooperation and collaboration. Under his guidance, NIH has become an exemplary model of cooperation and collaboration, not only with other Federal organizations, but with academia, the private sector, and with investigators in other countries in devel-

oping and implementing research programs of mutual interest.

At the same time, Dr. Wyngaarden gave high priority to the implementation of sound principles of science policy. For example, in response to the 1986 Federal Technology Transfer Act, which was initiated by the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, he established the Office of Invention Development to facilitate the transfer of technology from NIH laboratories to the private sector for further development and commercialization. This program, designed to encourage NIH scientists to enter into cooperative research and development agreements with industry to benefit public health while protecting each organizations' primary goals, is one of the most productive in the Federal Government.

While establishing prudent biomedical research priorities for NIH, Dr. Wyngaarden did not lose sight of the importance of balancing research with the availability of scientific manpower, public understanding of science, flexibility for scientific creativity and innovation, consideration of social and ethical concerns, and the influences of political interests. During his tenure at NIH, he generously shared his expertise and insight with the Congress.

Dr. Wyngaarden has been extremely helpful to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Although the committee does not have direct responsibility for the authorization of biomedical research, we are responsible for assuring that Federal funds expended for science and technology are in the best public interest and that potential disadvantages of science and technology are minimized. In this regard, Dr. Wyngaarden has assisted the committee on a broad range of issues such as: The appropriate use of animal in research; coordination of biotechnology research; effective approaches to science education; motivating government/industry/university partnerships; mechanisms for setting priorities for science; incentives for enhancing technology transfer; and approaches to monitoring scientific misconduct. Through his testimony before our committee, he has demonstrated considerable expertise, not only in the understanding of these complex science policies, but in creatively developing administrative techniques which ensure that science and health policies will achieve the maximum benefit for society.

On behalf of the members of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, I wish to extend our sincere appreciation and gratitude to Dr. Wyngaarden for his outstanding contributions to science and the health of our Nation. Management of the world's most renowned biomedical enterprise is an enormous task—Dr. Wyngaarden is a master the Congress and the public shall long remember.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. WALGREN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my special order today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BERMAN). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

□ 1450

OPPOSE RULE ON DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BERMAN). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. KYL] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to discuss for a few minutes the rule on the Department of Defense authorization bill, and then specifically get in a little bit to the subject of SDI.

Mr. Speaker, this rule, I think requires some clarification because of the debate that occurred about an hour ago, and we will be voting on this rule in about 2 more hours, at 4:30.

I think our Members need to know exactly what this rule provides for. The rule should be opposed because, in effect, what it does is to deny the minority, many Members on the Republican side of the aisle, the opportunity to present their alternative ideas. In many cases, substitutes from our ranking Member were denied, and a variety of amendments, by Republican Members were deemed to be not in order when subjects similarly dealt with by Members of the Democratic Party were permitted. So it is not a fair vote, and it ought to be opposed for that reason.

There is another reason, Mr. Speaker, that the rule ought to be opposed, and that is because it does not permit Members time to debate the various subjects that are very important to the defense and to the establishment of defense policy in this country.

Our colleague from California [Mr. DELLUMS], with whom I rarely have any kind of substantive agreement, made a point with which I agree, that there are very important issues that will not get the time and debate they deserve. He has a couple of issues on SRAM T and Follow on to Lance [FOTL]. Those programs ought to be supported. We supported them in full committee. I expect the House will support them. He would like to eliminate the funding for them. He is wrong. However, the debate that he would encourage is an important debate, and we ought to have more than 5 minutes to discuss that.

The rule ought to be opposed. Now I would like to get into more detail with respect to SDI.

Historically, on the funding level for SDI, the committee has made in order a rule which would take the high and the low funding proposals and end up voting last on a level of funding closest to the committee mark. That has been done under the king-of-the-hill type of rule. This year, however, that is not the way it is done.

The amendment which has funding closest to the committee mark is my

amendment, to fund it at zero growth \$3.8 billion, last year funding level plus inflation. That is closest to the committee mark of \$3.5 billion. However, instead of making the rule in order to permit the king of the hill to operate in a fashion where my amendment would be the last one considered, my amendment is the very first one to be considered, then the gentleman from California, Mr. DELLUMS' amendment, and then the gentleman from Florida, Mr. BENNETT's amendment. Mr. BENNETT's amendment is only for \$2.8 billion.

Mr. Speaker, let me explain what the SDI votes are. They are basically 3 amendments: The first one is mine, which would establish funding at \$3.8 billion. That is zero growth, representing last year's funding of \$3.7 plus \$126 million, representing the 3.4 inflation we had this year. The second amendment is the Dellums-Boxer amendment at \$1.3 billion; and essentially that amendment would kill the SDI Program. It would not even permit the United States to keep up with the technological basic research, to know what the Soviet Union might be doing. The third amendment is the Bennett amendment at \$2.8 billion, plus \$245 million in the Department of Energy programs. Now, the Bennett amendment, likewise, would permit the United States to have very, very little more than a basic research program, would not let the United States decide in 4 years whether or not to go forward with SDI, would not permit that decision that the President has asked for, and it would not permit the United States to fund both short-term and long-term programs. We would either have to choose between short-term and long-term programs, or we would have to compromise both, in a way the Department of Defense says we would accomplish nothing. Those are the three levels of funding.

If all three amendments fail, then we will end up with \$3.5 billion level determined by the Committee on Armed Services.

I might, for the purpose of the body, review the funding level that the Senate and the administration have provided.

The administration, the Reagan-Bush original budget, asked for \$5.6 billion for SDI for fiscal 1990. Secretary Cheney, on the orders of the President, cut a billion dollars out of that funding request when he submitted the budget to Congress for \$4.6 billion. However, the Committee on Armed Services cut \$1.1 billion more from SDI funding, and took it down to \$3.5 billion. Fortunately, the Senate has acted on this; the Senate Armed Services Committee, and in their wisdom, funded the SDI program at \$4.3 billion, which is a very responsible and reasonable level of funding. It would be entirely appropriate, of

course, for this body to bring the funding level up somewhere near the Senate, but obviously, we are not going to do that. I urge my colleagues, when the time comes, to at least support my amendment which calls for funding at \$3.8 billion.

Now, there is another thing that is not fair about the rule, and that is that immediately after the vote on the SDI funding level, we vote on the three add-backs that it will be argued are only possible to achieve if we vote for the Bennett amendment, which would cut the funding down to \$2.8 billion as I indicated.

It would be argued that only by doing that can we support the war on drugs, can we clean up the environment, and support the addition of additional conventional weapons that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] wants to add. That is not true at all. Mr. Speaker, we can vote for the drug interdiction money, we can vote for the environmental cleanup money, we can vote for additional conventional spending that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] proposes, if we desire; and we do not have to support the Bennett amendment on SDI in order to do that. This is not a reconciliation bill. This bill is too complex, with so many amendments to spend money, and to add back, and to take away, that it is not going to balance; we will not have balanced the books at the end of the process, and we do not have that obligation in voting for the very first set of amendments on SDI.

So it is not necessary in order to support the war on drugs and to support the environmental cleanup, to support the Bennett amendment. We can still support either the committee level or the Kyl amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I will conclude this point on the subject of SDI, unless the gentleman from Alabama would like to intercede here. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I was not going to speak specifically, but in most general terms. I would like to support what the gentleman is saying. As I pointed out, and I will point out again when we get into the bill itself, I am very distressed over the rule that was given the Members, and I am surprised that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] was surprised as he said that he was, because at no time did I, as a ranking member, agree that this was fair, that this was equitable, that the interests of either the minority or the administration had adequately been addressed, or that we would be given an equal opportunity to advance our point.

As I mentioned earlier when we were discussing the rule, I think it was about four budget cycles ago, there were 144 Members that prefilled with

the Committee on Rules. Under the rules that had been propounded or promulgated at that time, we had to do that, in order, hopefully, to cut down on the number of amendments that were continually filed to the Defense bill, so that we could at least terminate the number of amendments and reach a final conclusion on the Defense bill. Of 144 amendments that were filed, 143 were made in order, and one was not made in order. That was because word came down from on high, to the Committee on Rules, that they did not want my amendment, the 1 amendment out of 144 that was not allowed, to be offered on the floor, was because it had to deal with Davis-Bacon and organized labor did not like it, so the Committee on Rules at someone's behest, disallowed the 1 amendment out of 144.

Well, this was some 3 or 4 years later, today, and I took comfort in a statement of our new Speaker when he said, "I will do what I can every day that I serve in this office to ensure the rights and the privileges of each Member of the House are respected and to ensure that the procedure is fair to all." This is a quote of our Speaker. I said, "Hey, we have turned the corner, this is a new day, and maybe in the minority are going to get a fair shake after all," and when we go to the Committee on Rules, they will take this up on the merits, and we will be treated fairly, even though they have 2 to 1 plus 1 vote on the Committee on Rules, maybe now is a new day and we will be treated differently, and things will be voted on on the merits, and we will be given a chance to vote up and down on issues, and we will see the cessation of the practice, if there is something that the majority wants, they waive the rules and do not enforce them, but if they want to enforce the rules and do not like something, they insist on the rules, but waiver of the budget, waiver of points of order, waiver of everything if they want. Well, they have the votes to do it, so nothing much we can do. So I am looking with anticipation and pleasure to the time and to the words of our new Speaker saying, "We are going to do everything to ensure that the procedure is fair to all."

□ 1500

So then we come to the Rules Committee with this bill, with 217 amendments that have been prefilled and that the Rules Committee was being asked to make in order. So the gentleman is talking about one amendment, and that is coming up on Tuesday.

The way the thing is structured, today being Monday, we will have the rule, with a vote on the rule up or down, and general debate on the bill. Normally we would have 4 hours of general debate, but by agreement between the chairman of the committee

and myself, we said that 2 hours is enough. There is hardly a corporal of the guard anyway here to hear the debate, but we put it in the Record.

So we start on Tuesday with the amending process, and as the gentleman has pointed out, SDI is supposed to be the first thing out of the box. We had in committee said, "Well, we have a committee position, and that is \$3.5 billion for SDI." There will be one amendment that will be offered. This was offered in our committee to at least fund it at last year's level, plus inflation, and that will be the Kyl amendment. There will be one to take it down below \$2 billion, and then there will be another one will be at \$3.1 billion, as I recall. That would be Mr. BENNETT's. And then finally we will vote on that as King of the Mountain, and even though the gentleman in the well is disadvantaged by having to offer his first, something has got to be first, so we can live with that.

Then immediately, and almost as an adjunct or part of it, though, they make in order these three amendments to say, "Hey, if you cut this by this amount of money, these three things will follow immediately." This talks about drugs, it talks of cleanup and conventional weaponry, and if we do not think that tilts it in that direction, if we do not think that skews it toward a vote to cut, then we are not being very practical, because, of course, everybody knows these three things are tacked on to follow immediately, just on the heels of the motion to cut, so then you can add back the things you want in your favorite program—drug enforcement, conventional weaponry, and toxic waste cleanup.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, if I might interrupt the gentleman right there, does the gentleman know why this was not done in the Armed Services Committee? I know we talked about it there, but why did we not go ahead and cut this money out of SDI in the Armed Services Committee for drug enforcement and for the environment?

Mr. DICKINSON. As I recall, there was money in the bill for drugs. There also was unexpended money last year in the Department of Defense for drug interdiction and the so-called drug wars, and the administration did not ask for this. This was an add-on.

Assuming all this is good, even the handling of it, though, makes it look as though it is tacked on. It is in effect tacked on, and it skews it in one direction. We cannot put any other spin on it; it is just there.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, if I can just make this point, in fact, it was announced in the full Armed Services Committee that that was the intention all along.

Mr. DICKINSON. Exactly.

Mr. KYL. To save the money.

Mr. DICKINSON. So that we would not cut it there because we are going

to the floor with it so then it can be taken out and plugged into these favorite programs. And who is going to vote against drug enforcement? Who is going to vote against conventional weaponry when we need it? Who is going to vote against toxic waste cleanup? That is like voting against motherhood. Of course, we all understand the pragmatics of these things. So we are going to prejudice the funding of it because we know as a part of it that this follows.

Then we come to burden-sharing. I do not know why that is in here. It is certainly not a major amendment. Why it is No. 2 on the list, I do not know. They gave it 30 minutes.

Then we get into the procurement, which is my amendment to put in place of the Cheney budget. This is an amendment that was offered in committee, and it failed on a 26-26 tie. It simply says that the budget as it came over from the Department of Defense would be put back in place, which eliminates three things which have been added. The V-22 was added, the F-14-D was added, and at one point \$1 billion for the Guard and the Reserve was added. Then if this should prevail, if my amendment for the Cheney budget should prevail, then the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] was immediately stepping on the heels of that. They give 40 minutes to put these things back in. There is no space in between. The Rules Committee says, "OK, if he wins on that, immediately on the next amendment, you are up. You have 40 minutes to put it back in."

I have failed an amendment to strike each of these three things, which is a part of the package. What happens to it? Does it come up next? No. Does it come up the next day? No. It comes up the third day as amendment No. 25 if we get to it. That is given 5 minutes a side. And then it is a package that you cannot even attack on each individual element on it, that is, the V-22 or the F-14-D. You have got to vote for the whole package. This is an example, they say, that the procedure is free and fair to call.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, is the gentleman saying that you cannot vote independently? If you are trying to strike one of these programs, you cannot do it, that it is either all or nothing, the V-22 and the F-14-D?

Mr. DICKINSON. That is exactly right. The Rules Committee is bending over backward to be fair, as I heard this morning. They say you cannot vote for just one of these. If you want to vote for the V-22 because you have an interest in that but you are really not supportive of the F-14-D, you just have one vote.

Mr. KYL. You cannot separate them out?

Mr. DICKINSON. You cannot separate them out; you have got to vote for both of them. So we have a lot of general support for it in that way. That is what they call being fair. So you can go through the entire rule setting these things out, as to how they have structured it.

I had an amendment that was in order and that was germane to restore \$300 million to the research and development budget of the B-2. What happened to it? In the Rules Committee they tentatively accepted it, and I am told by my members that they got up and were walking out of the room when one of the members came back in the room and said, "Wait a minute, I don't like where the money is coming from. It is coming out of the NASA space money, and I don't like that."

Even though it was add-on money and it was not in the budget as it came over, they went back in and said, "Well, we will disallow the amendment unless the author can think of something as an alternative."

This was 2 minutes before they voted. I was not there. This was Friday afternoon. I think I had gone. They said they would disallow it unless an alternative source of funding comes forward.

So I am not even allowed to offer the amendment now. That illustrates how fair everything is around here from the Rules Committee. So this is a travesty when we start to talk about fairness.

Mr. Speaker, I hope we will vote down this rule and try to send a message and see if we can get a little bit more level playing field.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, I think this illustrates why so many of us are going to vote against this rule. When the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee cannot get his amendments in order and bring them to the floor and debate them, not guaranteeing that we are going to win, but at least to debate them, when that is not permitted by the rule, it does not suggest fairness.

Mr. Speaker, let me take my remaining time to talk a little bit about this SDI Program, because there has been some confusion about just exactly why we should have an SDI Program. I commend to my colleagues the fact that even with a \$3.8 billion funding level, which is zero growth, the program is going to be cutback drastically. The administration supports that level of funding only because there is no amendment to fund it at the \$4.6 billion level that was recommended by Secretary Cheney.

Why do we need SDI? Let me quickly go through six reasons why it is important to have this program. The first reason that we need SDI goes to the very point that President Bush

made when he came into office and asked for a comprehensive review of our defense posture and our policy. He told the Department of Defense and others in the administration to challenge the assumptions, to ask the tough questions, including those about SDI, and when all of the work was done and the report came back, Mr. Speaker, the resounding recommendation to the President was that it was critical that this Nation continue our SDI Program to enhance deterrence. That is the No. 1 reason why we need the SDI Program, to enhance deterrence and place it on a more stable basis, a basis that relies upon defense in addition to the offense that we already have.

□ 1510

The idea, we all are aware, is that, if the enemy knows that he cannot succeed in an attack, then he will be deterred from attacking, and SDI will inject just enough doubt into that equation and complicate the plans of the enemy to an extent that we are confident that no attack would occur. That is what we mean by deterrence.

The second reason is that SDI will provide, at robust funding levels, a hedge against Soviet breakout of the ABM treaty. The Soviets have been spending much more than we have, 8 to 10 times as much as the United States has, on strategic defenses, and in fact has a partial defense, strategic defense, system in place. As a matter of fact, they have the components in place for a major breakout from the ABM treaty. So, it is critical that we have the ability to quickly put into place the same thing that the Soviets would be able to deploy. And whatever else is happening, Mr. Speaker, in the Soviet Union, whatever may be happening with respect to perestroika and glasnost, and whatever may be happening with the talk of reducing their conventional forces (so far it is only talk, no action, but they say that they will reduce them eventually) there is no suggestion in the Soviet Union that they are curtailing their scientific and technological research. As a matter of fact, Secretary Cheney has pointed out that in the area of high technology the Soviets are proceeding apace; so the second reason for SDI is simply to be able to match the Soviets in what they may do.

Third, as the Soviets evolve more mobile systems, we cannot hold them at risk with offensive weapons. Mr. Speaker, this gets into the B-2 debate we have already begun here. It is agreed by all of us that the B-2 is not currently capable of relocating targets that move around. We are talking now about the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25 missiles. Those are the missiles that are on railroad cars and are on trucks that travel throughout the Soviet Union. We could not find those weapons, and

even a B-2 is not going to be able to find those weapons. As a result, the mobile systems of the Soviet Union are really immune from an attack by the United States, and we cannot hold them at risk. As a result, they have the capability of launching a first strike against us with these weapons. We must, therefore, be able to defend against those weapons, and that is what SDI does.

Mr. Speaker, The United States must evolve to a mix of both offense and defense in order to have the most credible deterrent. That is what SDI does.

I might note, Mr. Speaker, that the Soviets have always followed this policy.

The fourth reason for SDI is that it provides an insurance policy with respect to our START negotiations. Think of this, my colleagues, that, as the number of warheads is reduced under the strategic arms limitation talks, where we get down to 50 percent of the number of warheads we currently have, and maybe much, much below that, then cheating places a much higher risk on the United States.

It's a lot like two people that have six guns facing off, and there are five or six bullets in the chamber. Say five bullets, and the other one cheats and puts one more bullet in. That does not make a difference. But, if each side only has one bullet, and the other side cheats and puts in another one or two bullets, he obtains the maximum advantage, an order of magnitude advantage.

Mr. Speaker, with SDI there is an insurance policy against cheating because it does not make any difference how much the Soviets cheat, how many additional warheads they have. We have an insurance policy to protect us from those warheads coming onto the United States, and, Mr. Speaker, I would note in that respect that the American people overwhelmingly believe that we should have this kind of protection.

Mr. Speaker, that gets me into the next reason, the fifth reason, for SDI, and that is to protect us against an accidental launch or a launch by a Third World country. According to a recent statement by the CIA Director, William Webster, there are going to be 15 countries within the next 10 years that have ballistic missile capabilities. If any of those countries decide to put a chemical warhead on any of these missiles, and they are very easy to manufacture, then they can hold at risk the population of the United States, and we have absolutely no capability of defending against that whatsoever. We cannot stop that kind of a missile, nor could we stop an accidental launch by the Soviets or some other power.

As a result, Mr. Speaker, we need SDI which could provide us with that kind of protection; and again, the American people wonder why we do not have that kind of protection. With all of the money that we are spending, why have we not seen fit to protect our people against this kind of attack?

Finally, Mr. Speaker, SDI would promote the United States' negotiating position in both the START and D and S talks. Ambassador Rowny has recently confirmed this. He said that the SDI would tell the Soviets that the United States has the will to protect its people. We will not be deterred by the Soviets from engaging in this kind of a research program and ultimately deploying it because it is a nonthreatening way of providing protection for us and, therefore, deterrence. It increases our leverage in these START talks and conversely, Mr. Speaker, a unilateral reduction in SDI funding, where we get no quid pro quo from the Soviets whatsoever (where we just reduce the funding down to the Dellums or Bennett level, for example)—this simply tempts the Soviets to sit back and wait for us to make additional concessions. The Soviets would say, "Let us agree to nothing at the bargaining table, because, after all, that compliant U.S. Congress may give us something more next year, so why should we negotiate with them at the bargaining table?"

Mr. Speaker, these are all reasons why we need SDI.

Let me close with the subject briefly of whether we can afford SDI. Obviously the first question is, "What price freedom?"

At the Cheney request, SDI is just a little bit over 1 percent of our defense budget, 1 percent, and it represents about four-tenths of 1 percent of the entire U.S. Federal budget. We spend more money going to the movies than we are talking about spending on SDI. We spend almost as much money buying panty hose in this country each year than we are talking about funding for SDI.

Mr. Speaker, where are our priorities if we cannot provide this level of funding simply to find out the answers to the questions that our scientists have been asking? Can we build a deterrent? Can we build a system that will protect the United States against a strategic attack?

Over the next 5 years SDI will spend not much more than the V-22 Program, or then the small ICBM Program, and less than the B-2 Program. So it is not the major spending program of the defense budget.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, we know the cost of this program has gone down as technology has progressed through miniaturization, and mass production and so on. We have reduced many of the component parts of this program to a fraction of their

original cost. SDI is a cost-efficient program. We can find out the answers to the questions that we have been asking, and all we ask, those of us who ask for a robust funding level—at least last year's level of funding—is that the funding go forward and allow us to do the tests to answer the questions of whether it will work so that we can make a deployment decision within the 4 years that President Bush has requested.

Is that too much to ask, Mr. Speaker? I think not, and that is why I will urge my colleagues to support the Kyl amendment which has the modest funding level of zero growth, last year's funding level plus inflation. I will ask my colleagues to defeat the Dellums amendment and to defeat the Bennett amendment and support SDI at a level that at least permits us to maintain the same kind of program that we had last year.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to vote against the rule, which denies us a fair opportunity to present these issues, and then to support my amendment funding SDI which is before the body.

STRENGTHENING THE CLEAN AIR ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. SWIFT] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SWIFT. Mr. Speaker, this is an important day in a 10-year struggle to amend, and improve and strengthen the Clean Air Act. It is important because today is the day that President Bush has sent his proposal, legislative language, to the Hill, and the EPA Administrator Reilly has testified all day long at a hearing held by the Health Subcommittee of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the gentleman from California [Mr. WAXMAN] on that legislation.

□ 1520

It is an important day, because with the President joining this issue in good faith, it may provide the impetus necessary to at last move in this important area of legislation. There has been a 10-year stalemate, and very frankly some of the reasons for the stalemate have been an unnecessarily strong pride of authorship by all parties, a kind of certitude by everyone who comes from all the various angles to this issue, that they were the only ones with the answers, a real difficulty in admitting that any other proposal other than one's own might have merit.

If we are going to finally pass improvements to clean air legislation on the books in this country, we need to stop the turf battle and instead do some careful an objective analysis of the issues that are involved in an

effort to get a package of legislation that will address the ozone areas, the nonattainment areas, acid rain, and air toxics.

Because a number of Members believe that it is important to provide that kind of objective analysis, today a number of us wish to take a look at President Bush's proposal as it comes to Congress. We want to evaluate specifically in this special order the ozone section. We want to point out where we think the President is on the right track and we want to point out where we think his proposal can stand considerable improvement; but it is important to note that we do not reject the proposal out of hand, but believe that it is heading in the right direction in a number of areas and we will make our criticisms in the most positive sense, criticisms not of his intent or sincerity, but rather areas from which our perspective there could be significant improvements in the proposal.

First let me give you just a little background on who those of us who wish to participate in this special order are. We are a group of kind of middling seniority members of the Democratic side of the Energy and Commerce Committee. There are nine of us. We began in the last Congress to try to see what we could do to bring about at last some agreement so that we could settle upon a clean air bill that could pass this Congress and go to the President for signature. In the process of doing that, we found that while we had started out essentially with an intent to move the process, we found we could only do that by becoming deeply involved in the substance.

Someone dubbed us the group of nine, which got shortened to G-9 and a so-called G-9 proposal has been kicking around for almost 2 years and is currently in legislation here in the House this year as H.R. 99.

Our purpose was to try to use the substance to demonstrate where reasonable and rational compromises could be made and still have a bill that was a strong improvement over current law.

We are gratified that a great many of our ideas have been included in bills that have been introduced subsequent to the development of the G-9 proposal. Great pieces of our proposal are included in the bill of the gentleman from California [Mr. WAXMAN]. Great portions of our proposal are included in the President's bill. There are still differences, and that is natural.

We believe that those need objectives analysis, rather than just some kind of turf protecting criticism, and that is what we propose to try to do today.

Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. COOPER], a gentleman who has put a

great deal of work into the efforts of the group of nine.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I think the gentleman from Washington [Mr. SWIFT] who has been a de facto leader of the group of nine, who has kept us at our work, kept us doing our jobs in private sessions over many hours, many weeks, many months, I think it might be useful to describe the philosophy behind the group of nine, not only our interest in moving the process along, not only our willingness to get deeply involved in the technical substance of a lot of these provisions, but also our willingness to really come up with new proposals that have not perhaps been thought of before, new ways of looking at old problems, instead of just refighting the old battles. So much, as the gentleman knows, of what we have been here on the House floor and other places is the continuation of old struggles, rather than trying to take a simple, fresh look at the problem, and deciding as we think probably the average American would decide it if the average American had the time and the interest to look into some of the details, rather than just take say the industry approach or the environmentalist approach, trying to take a commonsense approach to that we can strike some sort of balance between interests, because we all have an interest, of course, in clean air and breathing clean air as quickly as possible, and that should come first, and yet in all the old struggles and old battles, as most Americans know now, we have waited for amendments on the Clean Air Act for what—over a decade now. It has been a process of tremendous stalemate.

I felt another important aspect of the work of the group of nine was the willingness to be realistic, to be honest with the American people; not to set up false deadlines that we would all like to meet, but set up realistic deadlines and allow enough time for planning so that our mayors, our county executives, our governments, all those in responsibility in the chain of command could have time, not to dilly-dally around, but time to carefully plan so that we could achieve the least cost solutions to these problems, time so that they would feel the Federal Government was treating them fairly, not making them jump through hoops, but taking a careful step-by-step process to actually achieve the reductions that we claim we are going to achieve.

I think the gentleman and I both share the feeling that in past legislation a lot of false deadlines have been set up, a lot of deadlines that no one intended to meet, and therefore it has created a lot of cynicism and disillusionment about our Government. It has created a lot of false expectations

on the part of the American people; but nonetheless, even realizing all this, it is still hard, and I think our group has been somewhat brave in trying to be realistic about these deadlines and to tell the American people the truth, to be honest with you, that some cities probably cannot be cleaned up by the year 2000 no matter what we do, even if we did everything we know how to do, even if we were willing to pay all of our money to do it, the pollution problems in some areas are so bad that not even an effort by the year 2000 could do the job; but nonetheless, we want to try to do our level best by the year 2000 to go ahead and do the best we can, because as I said earlier, all Americans want to breathe clean air and want to breathe it now.

I would like, with the gentleman's permission to look at a particular aspect of President Bush's new proposal, a proposal that was just publicly disclosed last Friday, a proposal that just received its first committee hearing today in the subcommittee of the gentleman from California [Mr. WAXMAN] of the Energy and Commerce Committee. I would like, consistent with the spirit of the gentleman, to describe and give very positive criticism, and I would like to point out a feature that I like and a feature that I do not like of the President's approach.

The features of the President's clean air proposal that I will comment on are the result of the invisible fumes that naturally rise from gasoline whenever it is exposed to the open air and evaporates. These fumes are a type of volatile organic compound or "VOC."

These are deadly fumes. The smell is not very offensive when you refuel your car or whenever you unscrew the cap on a gasoline can, but it is still deadly when inhaled in large quantities. I had a childhood friend who nearly died as a result of smelling too much of these fumes.

Some gasoline evaporates faster than other types. A measure of how quickly gasoline fumes are released has been formulated; it's called Reid vapor pressure or "RVP." The higher the RVP, the faster the gasoline evaporates; the lower the RVP, the slower the gasoline evaporates. Of course, all gasoline evaporates faster when temperatures rise. This means that gas fumes are particularly bad in the summer.

It is almost impossible for the average American to detect differences in RVP between different types of gasoline because these fumes are invisible. Few Americans realize that our gasoline has become much more evaporative in recent years, that the RVP has gone up.

This increase in RVP fumes seems to suit the needs of gasoline refiners and of the oil industry in general rather

than the automobile industry. Cars seem to be able to work just as well at lower RVP levels.

The EPA finally realized several years ago that with the billions of automobile refuelings and mileage traveled every year in America that something needed to be done about the tremendous volume of fumes released in the air. EPA set an upper RVP limit of 10.5 pounds per square inch for gasoline so that gasoline would not be allowed to be more evaporative than that. Some States have gone further than EPA by lowering the RVP even further.

The Bush clean air plan deals with this issue in a way that I, and the group of nine, like, and a way that we dislike.

The "like" is the way the Bush bill continues the downward trend in RVP to 9 pounds per square inch by the year 1992. This reduction will not only reduce the amount of gasoline fumes in our air, but will also do it in the most cost effective manner.

The recent report released by the Office of Technology Assessment [OTA] just last week indicated that RVP reductions are probably the cheapest way, not only to reduce gasoline vapors, but all types of VOC's. The OTA estimates that it will cost only \$120 to \$750 per ton of VOC's removed for gasoline refiners to change their practices. This is in contrast to the \$2,000 to \$3,500 per ton cost for most other pollution reduction strategies.

OTA-2 REFERENCES—RUNNING LOSSES, EXHAUST-HEAD OF STEAM

The group of nine likes this Bush proposal not only because we have had a very similar approach for over a year now, but also because we feel that the average American wants the most cost-effective way to reduce urban smog. We feel that no American wants to throw money at a problem, not even if it is a pollution problem. It's against the interests of everyone, including environmentalists, to waste our money on inefficient cleanup.

My "dislike" of the Bush plan stems from the fact that even with lower RVP, many, many tons of gasoline vapors will be released with car refuelings and other gasoline vapors releases.

The debate on how to minimize car refueling evaporations has become very specific and polarized.

One camp maintains that every new automobile should be built with an "onboard canister" to collect the fumes that accompany each refueling. This argument maintains that it may be as cheap as \$14 per car to go ahead and admit that each refueling creates pollution problems and build in a solution on each car.

The opponents of this approach argue that onboard canisters may be

dangerous in an automobile collision. The National Transportation Safety Board and the EPA has had a running feud on this issue with no clear conclusion.

The other approach involves, not an automobile-based solution but a filling-station-based solution: a vacuum hose connected to the gasoline nozzle at the pump in order to collect refueling vapors. This double-hose contraption goes by the name of "stage II vapor recovery" and costs about \$30,000 per station for installation and more for annual maintenance.

The opponents of "stage II vapor recovery"—stage II—say that the double hoses are heavy, cumbersome, and expensive, and therefore anger consumers. Several areas around the country such as Washington, DC, already have installed stage II and it has received a mixed reaction.

Comparing and contrasting "on-board canisters" and "stage II vapor recovery" has taken years of EPA time. Sometimes the debate turns on whether the automobile industry or the gasoline retail industry can do a better job of absorbing or passing along the costs of change.

Other criteria for decision include the speed and completeness of cleanup resulting from each technique. On-board canisters would affect every car in every area, urban and rural, nationwide, but only as quickly as the Nation's auto fleet turned over, which takes a decade or more. In contrast stage II begins pollution reduction in the key urban areas almost immediately, as soon as the service stations can install the equipment. Of course, stage II equipment wears out after a decade or so and would have to be replaced or substituted.

My "dislike" of the Bush plan is that it chooses stage II vapor recovery and drops the onboard canister approach. The group of nine feels that the Bush plan therefore ignores what may be the safest, most convenient, lowest cost option of onboard canisters, in favor of an expensive, cumbersome burden on retail gasoline station, many of whom may be unable to pass along the cost of the stage II equipment.

The group of nine has a different and, I think, better solution. First, we require EPA to choose within a year between stage II and onboard. Since most people feel that onboard is cheaper, presumably only a significant safety problem would prevent onboard from being chosen. Even if stage II is chosen by EPA, we pay for the capital cost of it by placing fees on automobile sales since car companies are better able to pass along costs to consumers than mom and pop filling stations are. We felt that this would not only protect more small businesses, but minimize the incentive for car companies to attack onboard canisters

if they are going to have to pay for cleanup regardless.

We in the group of nine feel that we have allowed the onboard/stage II debate to be decided on the merits, once the EPA has finally collected adequate information. To us this is the fairest, cheapest way to solve the refueling vapor problem. Of course, in severe urban smog areas, cities may still choose both stage II and onboard. It would be a mistake, as the Bush bill does, to give up on the onboard canister option before we know enough about it.

□ 1540

Mr. SWIFT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Tennessee for not only his contribution here, but his enormous contribution to the deliberations of the group of nine over the last 2 years.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. BRUCE], another member of the group.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

It is interesting that today as we start the whole process of enacting another clean air bill with the President's proposal before our committee today in a hearing in which we had the Administrator of the EPA come and testify some 5½ hours, to reflect back on where the group of nine got started, and why it is we are taking out a special order to talk about clean air, and how we contrast, compare, and compare favorably I think with the President's proposal. There were nine members of the Energy and Commerce Committee, what we could probably classify I think as nine moderates. It is interesting that they are scattered throughout the United States. Mr. SWIFT, who has been sort of the de facto leader of our group is from Washington State; Mr. COOPER, who just spoke, is from Tennessee and brought a perspective from that part of the country; myself from the State of Illinois, JIM SLATTERY from the State of Kansas, who obviously was an active player, BILLY TAUZIN from Louisiana, MIKE SYNAR from Oklahoma, Mr. BOUCHER from Virginia, PHIL SHARP from Indiana, and Mr. ECKART from Ohio.

Those nine Members sat down for a long time, more than a year, and indicated that they wanted something to happen in the area of clean air. It appeared to us that we had passed the Clean Air Act in 1970, that we had made a good deal of progress, but had seen some slippage. Major amendments to that bill came in 1977. From 1977 to 1988, when we first started this process, there has not been any substantial agreement on the direction this country ought to take in clean air legislation.

So we started having meetings, we started getting together almost daily,

but certainly weekly. I think we had well over 100 meetings in which our staffs got together, we were together, and we met with every kind of organization, trade association, manufacturers, consumers, environmental groups, health groups, the EPA itself and others to come up with some sort of legislative enactment. That effort ended up with the production of H.R. 99, which dealt with ozone nonattainment, and we thought put into effect some reasonable guidelines, and started to move the debate in the committee from not doing anything or opposing all legislation to drafting a piece of legislation that we could support with a majority of the members of the subcommittee, and on into the full committee.

It is a costly process, and it is very difficult to get agreement. The President's proposal, which we are starting to debate today in our subcommittee, costs between \$14 billion and \$19 billion. There are many people who are concerned about the approaches taken, and the different ideas that can be utilized to clean up the area which may affect different industries in different ways. For the last 8 years we have not had administration involvement in this whole debate that has been raging both in the House and the Senate on clean air legislation. So when the clean air legislation was sent up by the President last Friday, that was the first serious and most comprehensive environmental proposal that we have seen come from the White House in this decade. In fact, the administration really made that point, that in this decade it is the first time that the EPA has in fact put before this body their views. We have been basically operating in a black box. The legislative branch here has been working trying to figure out what it is we ought to pass, and what we could send, to the White House and have signed into law. At this time we now have the White House's proposal, and it is somewhat like a lightning rod. It is going to be struck by lightning a couple of times as we bounce it around. It is a very comprehensive proposal, and when we have anything that is wide-ranging it has many good aspects and it will have many problems.

So what we thought we might do today in the group of nine is compare some of the things that we have done in our proposal and take a look at the President's proposal and outline it for the Members of this body. There are two areas that I would like to talk about, autos and alternative fuels provisions of the President's proposal. They are two areas that are often interconnected by the President in his proposal, but we get very different reactions from the group of nine.

When we start talking about tailpipe standards, the mobile source emissions standards, the group of nine is very pleased with the tailpipe standards set in the Bush bill and what he has said in testimony through his EPA Administrator to date, because they are very similar in many respects to the standards set by the group of nine after our 12 months of research, hearings, testimony and working within ourselves and with different organizations. We recognize that tailpipe emission standards are an important part of any environmental cleanup. Even though clean air legislation has already reduced emissions of nonmethane hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide from mobile sources, from cars, by some 96 percent, and nitrogen oxide by 76 percent, there is more to be done, and we have worked with the producers of automobiles in this country, with the producers of light trucks and heavy-duty and off-road vehicles trying to figure out what those standards should be. Even though we have gotten down by 96 percent and 76 percent, we have to do more.

Why do we have to do that? We found out that even though we have reduced the amount of emissions, the total number of miles has increased. There has been a fairly rapid increase in vehicle miles traveled over the last 20 years. The group of nine and I think the President realized that tighter auto emission controls were essential for many cities to reach attainment.

□ 1550

At the present time we have 76 cities that are not in attainment under the standards set forth by the 1970 Clean Air Act and the 1977 amendments thereto.

In 1977 we thought we ought to improve the clean air standards. We have done that. The problem is that during that time we have now found a number of cities across this country that are not in attainment.

Both H.R. 99, the proposal of the group of nine, and the President's proposal tighten tailpipe standards on nonmethane hydrocarbons from 0.4 grams per mile to 0.25 grams per mile. These figures may get very confusing, but the major point or thrust of both proposals, the President's and the group of nine, is that we want to take out additional hydrocarbons that are the problems and precursors for ozone creation.

On nitrogen oxide, the President set a level of 0.7 grams per mile.

You know, both of these ideas from the group of nine and the President are phased in over a period of time and they eventually go to the in-use certification of automobiles.

We have a very elaborate testing facility at the EPA, and also at every automobile manufacturer in this coun-

try. Once we set these standards, it is not a question of setting a standard and not watching it; not only do they have to meet certification in the very beginning but after we have certified the automobile as meeting the standard, there is what they call an in-use standard.

We have worked with the President's proposal and taken a look at his in-use standard. When the automobile is produced, it is perfect, no one has ever gotten in it, the young lady or young man in the home has not driven it around the neighborhood and let it get clogged up or anything. It is an absolutely perfect automobile.

With in-use, we do a test and then we try to find out the standards it needs to meet several miles down the road.

The group of nine allows EPA to change the standards for purposes of in-use compliance. In other words, after it has been used by the family, if they have to have some standards to be changed, they could do that, but only if the EPA found that the in-use standards were not technically feasible.

In other words, if you put in the wrong kind of fuel, if you do not keep the car maintenance program up, if it is not inspected at the appropriate times, then the in-use standards would not be met and the EPA could, in fact, say we have to have tougher inspection and maintenance programs.

The administration in their proposal moves to an in-use standard quicker than we do. We think that is an admirable goal. We think they may be able to do that.

But in our hearing today it became quite clear that they had waivers that are very successful where they could waive standards for whole engine groups of automobiles for a few years, and because of that we are certain that the standards that the administration set on in use are any more stringent than those proposed by the group of nine without the discretion.

Also the administration proposal allows for averaging. At the present time each vehicle that rolls off the assembly line must meet the standards, must be certified to that standard.

Under the proposal of the Bush administration, although they have moved the standard down, the difficulty is that they have averaged that. So some cars will be above the average and some cars will be below the average.

We have done that and allowed that for averaging of fuel economy, in other words, CAFE, corporate average fuel economy; they are concerned about what that means when you are talking about a health-based standard. Are you going to allow some cars to go above the requirements in the law and some below? The problem is we do not know. If we stand on a local street

corner as we go to our schools and we go to our homes every day, we do not have the choice of averaging what we breathe, we just have to breathe what is at the corner where we are standing as we wait for the traffic light to change.

The President's bill also takes the group of nine's cold-start standard but tightens it to apply at 20 degrees.

Automobiles that emit a great deal of poor-quality air right when they are first started, when they are cold started, is one of those areas where we have been debating. We have met with a lot of industry representatives and a lot of environmental representatives to find out exactly where we ought to put the point of approval. There is no CO cold-start standard right now. We are going to implement one. The President wants to put it at 20 degrees. We think that further tightening is made completely discretionary by EPA, and we expressed some concern about that as a group. We can make the standard and there ought to be a point at which we say this is the cold-start standard that we want, and then allow the automobile manufacturers to know that that standard is there and they are going to have to produce that.

Under the group of nine proposal the EPA must set a tougher long-term standard unless they find it is technically unfeasible.

So we put the shoe on the other foot by saying, "Meet this standard unless you can prove to us and to the EPA, that you cannot make the standard."

Then we change the whole question of what to do with urban buses, how we are going to handle the intercity transportation system. And the President's proposal which he brought forward to us on Friday requires a phase-in of all urban buses to use alternative fuels, beginning with 10 percent of all buses purchased in 1991 and increasing to 100 percent of the new buses purchased by 1994. We think that that is an excellent proposal but we must also realize that urban buses are only about 3 percent of the problem. So even though you go to 100-percent alternative fuel buses by the year 1994 on new buses, some of the old buses are going to be maintained far beyond the 1994 level. They will not replace every bus with alternative fuel buses by 1994, just the new ones.

There is also a concern with discretion, again, given to the administrator to delay the program for any number of reasons.

Switching to the alternative fuels vehicle programs for the cities farthest from attainment of the ozone standard requires clean fuel vehicles to be produced, distributed and sold. We began with one-half of a million vehicles in 1995, on up to 1 million vehicles from 1997 through 2004.

The bill requires whatever fuel is chosen in each area to be available at service stations selling 50,000 gallons of fuel each month. But, you know, we still have no guarantee that anyone is going to buy these cars, and again the administrator can delay the program for 2 years for a variety of reasons.

We are concerned about how the manufacturers of automobiles are going to know which vehicle they should be producing up to 1 million vehicles a year, and whether it's going to run on methane, ethanol, MBTE or EBTE, two derivative fuels, or a compressed natural gas or LP. We certainly applaud the President's desire to increase the use of alternative fuels because the environmental benefits of these fuels are very substantial. But there is some disappointment with the previous position of the White House toward methanol fuel, which has its own problems.

Speaking only for myself, the ethanol portion ought to be more strongly considered by the President's proposal.

The Bush legislation bases a choice on what fuels to mandate on automobile manufacturers' projections of what they can sell in consultation with State and local governments.

But since the automobile industry has already expressed a preference for methanol, we have to wonder whether it is really fair to the other fuels to have that kind of predisposition toward methanol and whether they are going to give fair consideration in reality to the other fuels. It does not give us any comfort to know that important people in the White House are leading cheers for the use of methanol. Our approach is different from the President on alternative fuels.

We prefer our proposal, our approach of focusing on fleets which own their own refueling facilities, as the best way to ensure fuel availability and a level playing field.

There are many utility companies, cities, phone companies, others who have their own fleets. People who can get their own fuel have the availability of it and the manufacturers can build to that demand of fleets.

□ 1600

Given that these areas are small portions of the cleaner air problem, it is obvious that over the next several months, the debate will be filled with technical and complex debates, and we ask the Membership to be alert to that.

Overall, we are quite pleased with the direction of the President, on tailpipe standards, but we have serious concerns with his alternative fuel programs. As we go through these debates, I will be working with my colleagues in the group of nine, to be sure we reduce ozone and carbon monoxide in a reasonable and effective manner. I will be working with the Subcommit-

tee on Health and the Environment, and its chairman the gentleman from California [Mr. WAXMAN] to make sure that, in fact, we get a majority vote to move environmental legislation to clean up the air this year. I will also work with the chairman of the full committee to make sure we can bring a proposal to the floor, this year.

However, I think the major thing is that the group of nine has moved that indicator from not doing anything, to doing something very much closer this year, and certainly with the introduction last Friday of the President's proposal, we have seen the group of nine actually have an effect. Much of the President's proposal is within the group of nine relating to ozone nonattainment. We are pleased with his proposal, and welcome him to the debate, and hope we can formulate our policies jointly to get clean air legislation to his desk.

Mr. SWIFT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois not only for his comments here today but also for the hours and hours and hours of work that he has put in as the group of nine fleshed out this proposal.

As anyone listening to this debate might understand, this is a pretty technical business, and it is not just a case of sitting down and flipping a coin and making some easy compromises, and having a bill. We all learned more about clean air than any of the members wanted to, when we went into the process.

As the remarks of the gentleman from Tennessee, and as the gentleman from Illinois' remarks and the remarks coming up of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. ECKART] will indicate, this is highly technical and needs to be approached in a calm and analytical way, if the compromises are to be made, that will get Americans an improvement of the bill on the books in this Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield to my good friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. ECKART].

Mr. ECKART. Mr. Speaker, the transmittal to Congress this past Friday of President Bush's Clean Air Act reauthorization proposal was a long-awaited and welcome development in the effort to move this important legislative process forward.

As members of the so-called group of nine—nine energy and commerce Democrats who have authored their own proposal and spent a good year and a half deeply involved in the clean air debate, we would like to comment on the President's legislative initiative.

I am pleased that certain of the ozone and carbon monoxide nonattainment provisions of the President's bill closely resemble in many ways those of H.R. 99, the group of nine bill. Like H.R. 99, the President's proposal recognizes the importance of comprehensive, accurate emissions monitoring

and planning for attainment as something we absolutely must ensure if we are to avoid repeating the failures of the past. The President's bill also recognizes that the development of improved emissions inventories and air quality models may require significantly more State and local financial resources than have previously been committed to such activities.

The higher costs associated with improved inventories and modeling, however, are still minimal when compared with the billions of dollars in control costs associated with ozone and carbon monoxide. Furthermore, by increasing spending to develop a better data base, as well as a more refined and adaptable plan, several billion dollars of control costs may be saved. It is an extremely cost-effective action to increase the resources devoted to emissions inventories and modeling.

Nevertheless, as the President has recognized, few State and local governments have the resources within their annual budgets to pay for these tools, regardless of their cost effectiveness. For this reason, the President's proposal, like H.R. 99, establishes a small user fee applied to emission sources, the proceeds of which would go toward funding planning and monitoring activities. I am pleased to note the President's bill, inclusion of this user fee, it is especially appropriate, in my view, to finance attainment planning functions this way since it is the emission sources themselves who will eventually reap the economic benefit of more cost-effective attainment strategies.

In the area of suggested improvements to the President's bill, I'd like especially to note my concern with the amount of discretion the proposal leaves to EPA in running the attainment program. As many will remember from the Superfund reauthorization debate of a few years ago, I am a proponent of the EPA Administrator being left an appropriate measure of flexibility and discretion in regulatory policy—especially in technical matters.

However, in his proposal for bringing our Nation's urban areas into attainment of the ozone and carbon monoxide air quality standards, the President has tipped the scales too far. The EPA Administrator has been left with so many questions to decide for himself that not only is Congress' policymaking role infringed upon, but it is difficult to see how the program will not bog down in endless policy debates and protracted litigation. Too much discretion may result in nothing being done, both with regulations and sanctions.

For example, under the President's proposal, a State's failure to submit a plan providing for an area's attainment of the standard, or failure to implement the plan, does not result in an

automatic sanction, as is the case with our bill. Rather, the Administrator is first required to publish in the Federal Register a determination as to whether the State is making reasonable efforts to cure the failure before he can impose a sanction. This determination unnecessarily interjects a very subjective standard into an otherwise objective situation, only inviting litigation and delay. The same is true when the Administrator wants to lift a sanction.

This problem persists in another key aspect of the President's bill—the proposal for controlling emissions from consumer and commercial solvents. Unlike H.R. 99, which gives the EPA Administrator specific direction as to the amount of emissions reductions he must achieve from consumer and commercial solvents, but leaves to his discretion the proper technical means of achieving the reductions, the President's bill leaves it entirely to the Administrator's discretion whether to issue the regulations at all. This seems inappropriate given the significant contribution that emissions from consumer and commercial solvents make to the ozone nonattainment problem, and whether EPA decides to issue the regulations or not, the Administrator's decision is certain to be litigated.

Other provisions of the President's bill present this problem as well—adjustable deadlines and emissions offsets requirements spring to mind. Nevertheless, though I do not agree with many aspects of it, I am greatly encouraged by the seriousness of the President's Clean Air Act reauthorization proposal, and look forward to an open and constructive debate on these very important issues.

Mr. SWIFT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio, whose contribution to this particular matter was enhanced by the expertise he developed and the leadership he provided in the last Congress, with the very difficult issue of renewal of the Superfund legislation.

Let me conclude this special order by talking about one of the most underlying similarities between what the President has proposed and what the group of nine have proposed, and taking issue with one other aspect of the President's proposal.

In the past, those in the initial authorizing legislation of clean air and in a general renewal, arbitrary deadlines were set for the States to get started on cleanup. The deadlines were set earlier than anyone believed could be met. There was a purpose for that. The purpose was to drive technology, by establishing very rigid and very early deadlines. The idea was Members would force States, industries, to develop the technology necessary to meet those standards. The fact is, that that may well have worked. However, we have arrived at a point at which

most States have failed now, twice, to meet the deadlines established in the law.

It was the judgment of the group of nine that States can cry wolf so many times. First of all, most of the technology that was in the pipeline, that could be forced out, by this technique, has been forced out.

□ 1610

The pipelines are not full with nearly developed technology that can simply be accelerated and pumped out to help us deal with the clean air problem. And, second, if we repeatedly establish deadlines that we do not expect to be met, we are inviting people to simply no longer take the deadlines seriously.

The group of nine took a different approach. They said that what we are going to do is give the States a realistic amount of time to do two things—to carefully evaluate, source by source, the sources of pollution in their States. That is by smokestack and by business, a very detailed analysis of exactly from whence came the pollution. In fact, we mandated a much higher standard of computerized technology to make those assessments. And then once we had this more detailed analysis of the sources of pollution, we then wanted the States to have sufficient time to develop their battle plan for dealing with them. In short, we gave the States more time to analyze and prepare, to identify and plan, than has ever been allowed before.

We have been criticized, as a matter of fact, for doing that. In the terms of one of the critics, we have—I believe the term was this—committed the American public to breathing dirty air for years longer. I suppose we can take that view, but the fact is that we have not achieved the standards with the earlier and unrealistic deadlines, and we believe that we will make haste faster if we take the time to do the job right the first time rather than dedicating ourselves to unrealistic goals in which we run higgledy piggledy in an effort to meet the deadlines and in the process we are not doing the job of meeting the sources of pollution or developing the plan adequately.

We are pleased that the President has included in his approach this fundamental new and, I think, innovative and useful approach to dealing with this. In the group of nine proposal, however, we said that while we are waiting for that identification process to be complete and the plan to be developed, we need to do some things right away. There are any number of techniques which are already proven and which we already know about and which can already be implemented that are sitting on the shelf, and it is our proposal that we require that those techniques be used immediately so that while we allow additional time

for planning and an additional plan for identification of pollution sources, we also say that while we are doing that, we should move in with these other techniques and begin the process of cleaning up the air.

The President essentially accepts the first concept from the group of nine but has not followed through with the second concept which, in our judgment, is the balancing concept. We would hope that as we continue through the legislative process, we can make that improvement in the administration's proposal, keeping the sound idea that we need to be careful and workmanlike in the identification of pollution sources and careful and workmanlike in the development of the plan to deal with those pollution sources, but while that is going on, we also implement immediately those techniques which are already identified and already proven out so that we do both things, deal with some immediate impact on the air pollution problem while we are working on the long-term effect.

There are several other members of the group of nine who are not able to participate in the special order this afternoon but who are submitting, under the general leave request that has already been granted, statements that will deal with other aspects of the clean air issue that will point other strengths to the administration's proposal and other areas in which we hope that proposal can be improved. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. SHARP], the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. SYNAR], the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. TAUZIN], the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SLATTERY], and the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BOUCHER] all will be submitting statements which we would commend to our colleagues for their consideration as we begin at last to move toward the floor and move toward final passage legislation that will at last clean up the air of this country.

Mr. SCHAEFER. Mr. Speaker, as the sole Republican cosponsor of H.R. 99, I would especially like to commend the administration for its leadership on clean air legislation. The continued commitment of the President to this important issue is critical to achieving the goal all of us support—expeditious reauthorization of the Clean Air Act.

Like H.R. 99, the administration bill is not perfect. Even its sponsors recognize that changes will be necessary and undoubtedly made. But its introduction nevertheless serves an important purposes—to reestablish the framework for clean air legislation already put forth by the group of nine. That amendments to the Clean Air Act should be tough but reasonable, aggressive yet attainable. Only within these guidelines can effective legislation be written.

It is now the role of our committee and other Members of Congress to build on this important foundation. In doing so, we must

recognize that acid rain, ozone and air toxics are only parts of this Nation's air quality dilemma. Although often overlooked, millions of Americans currently reside in areas which significantly exceed health-based standards for carbon monoxide and particulate matter. They, too, must be protected through the passage of amendments specifically focused to their individual situations.

In this regard, the administration should be commended for its inclusion of cold start, oxygenated fuels and enhanced inspection and maintenance provisions in its proposal. But from my perspective and that of my constituents, it is important to note that the Denver metro area—one of the worst violators of the carbon monoxide [CO] standard—already have the latter two programs in place. To expect the Denver area to reach attainment with such limited Federal assistance in a short timeframe is simply not realistic.

I therefore look forward to working with the administration and the Group of Nine in crafting legislation that better addresses the problems faced in CO and particulate nonattainment areas. Our starting point is a good one—let us make certain that the final product is equally worthy of commendation.

Mr. SHARP. Mr. Speaker, the President has now sent to the Congress a comprehensive clean air proposal. The import of this event should not be underestimated. It makes more likely passage of long overdue amendments to the Clean Air Act.

The bill itself is lengthy and controversial.

In the case of the ozone and carbon monoxide non-attainment titles there is much to comment on. Today I join my colleagues who worked to draft H.R. 99 in a special order on the Bush proposal. We are proud of our joint effort and of our product. We feel that we can make a further contribution to the debate by pointing out features of the administration bill that we can support and those we have concern about.

We like the fact that the administration has included a Federal permit system in the legislation. While we are likely to suggest some modifications to this title of the bill, we believe that a Federal permit system, which is also included in H.R. 99, is an essential component of an effective, cost-effective clean air program.

We are disappointed that the administration did not include a specific market-incentive program, but rather says, in general terms, that one will be developed. H.R. 99 includes a specific, market based ozone control program in areas unlikely to attain the ambient air standards this century. It requires that all sources in those areas most severely affected make a choice—they can either achieve a 3-percent reduction each year, add control technology that obtains the lowest achievable emission rate, or pay \$2,000 per ton of pollution emitted. We believe that this approach is the engine that will drive innovation in pollution control in severely polluted areas. The administration has no comparable provision.

We are also disappointed that the bill does not require EPA to set standards for nonroad engines and vehicles. H.R. 99 tells EPA it must set these standards, the administration's bill gives EPA discretion to set them or not to set them. Many nonroad vehicles, such as

construction equipment, use engines comparable to those used in heavy duty trucks and have the potential to meet similar emissions standards. In addition, the location of heavy machinery is often in non-attainment areas and the gross emitters among them should certainly be cost effective, important reductions helping areas reach attainment. While we believe EPA should have discretion to set the level of the standard, and that standards should continue to be set using the criteria of technical feasibility and adequate lead time, among others, we do change their practices. This is contrast to the \$2,000 to \$3,500 per ton cost for most other pollution reduction strategies.

The group of nine likes this Bush proposal not only because we have had a very similar approach for over a year now, but also because we feel that the average American wants the most cost-effective way to reduce urban smog. We feel that no American wants to throw money at a problem, not even if it is a pollution problem. It's against the interests of everyone, including environmentalists, to waste our money on inefficient cleanup.

My dislike of the Bush plan stems from the fact that even with lower RVP, many, many tons of gasoline vapors will be released with car refuelings and other gasoline vapors releases.

The debate on how to minimize car refueling evaporations has become very specific and polarized.

One camp maintains that every new automobile should be built with an onboard canister to collect the fumes that accompany each refueling. This argument maintains that it may be as cheap as \$14 per car to go ahead and admit that each refueling creates pollution problems and build in a solution on each car.

The opponents of this approach argue that onboard canisters may be dangerous in an automobile collision. The National Transportation Safety Board and the EPA has had a running feud on this issue with no clear conclusion.

The other approach involves, not an automobile-based solution but a filling-station-based solution: A vacuum hose connected to the gasoline nozzle at the pump in order to collect refueling vapors. This double hose contraption goes by the name of stage II vapor recovery and costs about \$30,000 per station for installation and more for annual maintenance.

The opponents of stage II vapor recovery [stage II] say that the double hoses are heavy, cumbersome, and expensive and anger consumers. Several areas around the country such as Washington, DC, already have installed stage II and it has received a mixed reaction.

Comparing and contrasting onboard canisters and stage II vapor recovery has taken years of EPA time. Sometimes the debate turns on whether the automobile industry or the gasoline retail industry can do a better job of absorbing or passing along the costs of change.

Other criteria for decision includes the speed and completeness of cleanup resulting from each technique. Onboard canisters would affect every car in every area, urban and rural, nationwide, but only as quickly as

the Nation's auto fleet turned over, which takes a decade or more. In contrast stage II begins pollution reduction in the key urban areas almost immediately, as soon as the service stations can install the equipment. Of course, stage II equipment wears out after a decade or so and would have to be replaced or substituted.

My dislike of the Bush plan is that it chooses stage II vapor recovery and drops the onboard canister approach. The group of nine feels that the Bush plan, therefore, ignores what may be the safest, most-convenient, lowest-cost option of onboard canisters, in favor of an expensive, cumbersome burden on retail gasoline stations, many of whom may be unable to pass along the cost of the stage II equipment.

The group of nine has a different and, I think, better solution. First, we require EPA to choose within a year between stage II and onboard. Since most people feel that onboard is cheaper, presumably only a significant safety problem would prevent onboard from being chosen. Even if stage II is chosen by EPA, we pay for the capital cost of it by placing fees on automobile sales since car companies are better able to pass along costs to consumers than mom-and-pop filling stations are. We felt that this would not only protect more small businesses, but minimize the incentive for car companies to attack onboard canisters if they are going to have to pay for cleanup regardless.

We in the group of nine feel that we have allowed the onboard/stage II debate to be decided on the merits, once the EPA has finally collected adequate information. To us this is the fairest, cheapest way to solve the refueling vapor problem. Of course, in severe urban smog areas, cities may well choose both stage II and onboard. It would be a mistake, as the Bush bill does, to give up on the onboard canister option before we know enough about it.

Mr. SYNAR. Mr. Speaker, what role is left for the Group of 9 now that the President has submitted his own bill? Should we fold up our tents and go home? No way.

When we introduced our ozone bill last year we said it was the moderate alternative. It featured the cheapest and the most certain reductions, and it could pass.

Nothing has changed. We are still the bill in the middle, and we still make sense.

The President's proposal has both sensible and unworkable provisions.

One positive feature is the inclusion of a PM-10 particulate matter standard. This standard is one that the group of nine would have included in our own bill last year if we had enough time to study what was then just an emerging issue.

The standard governs those particles of soot which are 10 micrometers or smaller, just the right size for breathing into our lungs, causing health damage. And these same particles are important for another reason. They affect visibility in the West, where our grandest views are often obliterated by air pollution.

Regulating these small particles couldn't be more important. Air pollutants of this type cause premature death in the elderly and sick,

long-term decreases in lung function and increased respiratory illness, especially in children. Many of the particles are also toxic so controlling them gives us a double bang for the buck.

Despite the serious health drawbacks of these small particles, according to EPA, about 60 million Americans live in counties with a 50-percent-or-greater change of violating the standard.

But why include the standard in a new clean air bill instead of issuing regulations as EPA had originally planned? By including PM-10 requirements in a new act the Agency may be able to put them into effect faster and avoid the endless lawsuits and lobbying which accompany almost every EPA regulation.

Just as adding PM-10 improves the current regulatory system, the new sections on auto emissions trading and averaging and fuel pooling may actually make things worse.

In the name of greater market freedom the President added new provisions which make enforcement less likely and less feasible, and increase the chance of cheating or collusion to avoid needed air quality improvements.

Under the President's plan, automakers could engage in emissions trading and refiners in fuel pooling either separately or together to produce alternative ways to meet ozone requirements. In addition, automakers would be allowed use of emissions averaging, trading, and banking to demonstrate compliance with auto requirements.

These provisions sound good on paper but are they really? Such complicated systems could tempt auto and oil companies to play games with emissions reductions. Instead of certain, specified standards applying to an entire industry, we might be left with anarchy as each company schemed to discover the minimum it could do to win EPA's approval.

How would State inspection stations recognize a car violating the standard when different cars would meet different levels of control? Even if regulations could be written to take these differences into account, they would still be a nightmare to administer. Even worse, we would lose the benefit of the safety margin now built into the system where some cars are overcontrolled in order for the entire fleet to meet the standard. In fact, some car's emissions could actually get worse under the President's plan as makers of the more difficult-to-control cars stopped trying.

New and unintended problems might crop up. How could we insure that the cleanest cars went to the dirtiest areas, especially if whole lines were either dirty or clean? What would happen if a consumer wanted the "wrong" kind of car?

Mr. Speaker, these unfortunate additions to existing law are just part of what plagues the President's entire auto plan. His centerpiece is a huge, new and untried program to promote the uses of alternative fuels. Worse still, in his case, alternative fuels is just another name for imported methanol.

Instead of following the lead of the group of nine by embracing a modest, fuel neutral, alternative fuels program aimed at fleets, the President goes whole hog, insisting that by 1995 a half million cars must be sold which use alternative fuels. And the plan requires that these cars must be sold, and not just

manufactured. Just how does the President intend that this get done?

Mr. Speaker, I have a vision of how this might happen. Bill Reilly would get on TV, complete with a funny hat, balloons and maybe even a cane or fancy suspenders. He screams out his pitch over the airwaves about the great deals he has on alternative fuel cars. I can hear him now as he tells America, "Have I got a deal for you."

Surely there is some way to avoid this silly spectacle and avoid reliance on the single most expensive way to meet ozone requirements.

Mr. SLATTERY. Mr. Speaker, one thing that became clear to us very easily as we developed our bill was that in many cities attaining the Federal standard for ozone will require the application of controls wherever it is technologically feasible to do so. The smog debate has often seemed as though success hinges on our efforts on a few well publicized issues when in reality a complex series of smaller issues must also be addressed. Two of the issues that have received less attention in the debate are so-called running losses from cars and trucks and a special category of emissions known as area sources.

We believe that the President's bill is on the right track in recognizing the potential reduction in volatile organic compound [VOC] emission from running losses and area sources. Unfortunately, the Bush bill falls short of the legislative mandate needed to develop effective controls for these sources.

RUNNING LOSSES

One of the focal points of the clean air debate has been the emission of VOC's from mobile sources, primarily cars and trucks. While tailpipe standards have received the greatest amount of attention, controlling the evaporation of gasoline from engine and fuel tanks also holds significant potential.

Running losses—the evaporation that occurs while vehicles are being driven—have recently been shown to account for much larger emissions than originally thought. Running losses account for between 10 and 15 percent of total VOC emissions.

EPA estimates that automakers can reduce VOC emissions by 4.2 percent by 2005 through the application of running loss control technology. These reductions would be in addition to much greater reductions that can be made immediately by reducing the volatility of gasoline—as mandated by both H.R. 99 and the Bush bill.

The President's bill authorizes but does not require EPA to issue regulations that would reduce evaporative emissions from gasoline-powered vehicles during use and extended periods of nonuse.

Because we developed H.R. 99 last year, before new information on running losses was available, our bill primarily addresses evaporation that occurs when vehicles are not in use. Based on new information, we believe that significant, cost-effective VOC reductions can be gained from control of running losses. We hope that the final clean air legislation will require stringent control of running losses.

AREA SOURCES

Another significant, yet often ignored and relatively uncontrolled, source of VOC emissions in area sources.

Area sources are a series of tiny sources of emissions which, individually, do not contribute significantly to ozone formation. But taken together, area sources account for 25 percent of total COC emissions in ozone nonattainment areas.

VOC area source emissions usually result from the evaporation of organic solvents, paint, or other petroleum-based products for industrial or household use. Examples include dry cleaning fluid, solvents used for industrial cleaning and degreasing, and evaporation during the shipment and handling of gasoline. These substances are referred to in legislation as consumer and commercial products.

The Bush bill requires a study of VOC emissions from consumer and commercial products and authorizes EPA to develop regulations that would reduce these emissions. The bill does not require regulatory action and does not set a target for emission reductions. We believe this is a major weakness.

We believe that a successful ozone attainment strategy must include a more aggressive control program for consumer and commercial products. Because area sources are largely uncontrolled, significant, cost-effective reductions can be obtained by directing EPA to establish control measures.

EPA estimates that there is a potential reduction of 232,000 tons of VOC emissions in nonattainment areas. To obtain these reductions, appropriate control measures would be applied to all types of paint, roof tar, consumer and commercial solvents, and adhesives. The Office of Technology Assessment has reached similar conclusions, estimating VOC nationwide reductions of 420,000 tons per year with half of that total in nonattainment areas. OTA estimates that the nationwide cost of controls would be \$930 million per year.

We believe that EPA should be required to reduce emissions from consumer and commercial products by 25 percent in 5 years and 50 percent in 10 years. If these goals prove infeasible, EPA should require the lowest feasible rate of emissions.

We have only recently come to understand the significance of sources like running losses and consumer and commercial products in VOC emissions inventories. As we debate the clean air bill, I hope that Congress will recognize the importance of these sources and adopt tough control strategies.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, first of all, I'd like to commend President Bush for recognizing the importance of the Nation's environmental problems and for taking positive steps to clear our air of dangerous ground level ozone, acid rain, and toxic air pollutants.

Reviewing the provisions in the administration bill relating to reducing ground level ozone, the group of nine, of which I am a member, found that the bill contains some good ideas and some not so good ideas. While each of us will limit our remarks to include just a few areas, I want to make it clear that I am equally concerned about the provisions discussed by the other group of nine members.

My primary concern with the administration bill is with the proposed Clean Fuels Program. Although the President's proposal is written as

fuel neutral, many are worried that it will result in the mandated production of cars equipped to run only on methanol. I believe that mandating, *de facto* or *de jure*, the use of any one fuel is shortsighted and ignores both the differences in regional needs and capabilities and the potential clean air benefits to be gained by a comprehensive alternative fuels program.

Cost efficient access to the fuel and the degree to which an area has not achieved attainment are factors that should be taken into account. Importing expensive methanol makes no economic sense, when extremely clean burning fuels such as natural gas have such a large domestic supply. Not coincidentally, a good portion of this supply is found in my home State, Louisiana. I have driven a car fueled by compressed natural gas, and the performance is excellent. Mandating the use of methanol in areas such as Louisiana would simply be counterproductive.

The group of nine bill, H.R. 99, takes a much better approach, creating a level playing field among all competitive alternative fuels, and begins the process in a workable manner with fleet vehicles.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Navigation, I noted that this bill includes provisions addressing the problem of marine vapor recovery. Vapors emitted during fuel loading and off-loading in tank ships, refineries, and barges are considered to be major contributors to our clean air problems, and I applaud the President's efforts to include this important provision.

The administration bill provides that, within 4 years of the date of enactment, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall promulgate standards for emissions from loading and unloading marine tank vessels. The regulations are to take effect after the period EPA finds necessary to permit the development of the requisite technology.

Under the administration bill, the Coast Guard is required to issue regulations to ensure the safety of the emission controls. The Coast Guard has been studying this issue and is expected to issue safety rules by February 1990. The EPA would then set standards incorporating the safety concerns. The bill provides that no State or locality may regulate in this area until EPA does, and after that, any State or local regulations must apply standards at least as strict as those imposed by the EPA.

This provision echoes the approach in the group of nine bill, H.R. 99 which provides that no State shall require marine vessel measures until the Secretary of Transportation has promulgated regulations governing the safe recovery and control of such emissions.

In my own State of Louisiana, the Department of Environmental Quality has decided that marine vessel recovery at various docks along the Mississippi River is important for attainment of ozone standards within the State. In developing its regulations for vapor collection systems designed to collect 90 percent of vapors emitted from marine vessels, Louisiana has recognized the safety concerns involved and delayed implementation of the regulations. These rules go into effect for gasoline on May 1, 1991, and for crude oil on May 1, 1992. As Coast Guard regulations should be

out by February 1990, this leaves time to incorporate any Coast Guard concerns and should give shippers plenty of time to comply.

Having EPA and the Coast Guard work together to develop regulations addressing the role of both environmental protection and safety in the problem of marine vapor recovery is an excellent example of sensible, effective national legislation. Having nationwide regulations in this area will both improve the Nation's air quality and assure that shippers in all States adhere to the same safe, environmentally sound regulations.

One important provision I found missing in the administration proposal relates to banning leaded gasoline. Lead is a dangerous toxic pollutant by itself. It contributes to the ozone problem because it irreparably damages the catalytic converter even if leaded gas is only used a few times. Then the catalytic converter cannot work to control carbon monoxide or hydrocarbons, and NO_x which are the primary ozone precursors.

H.R. 99 bans leaded gasoline for all highway vehicles effective January 1991. EPA may postpone the ban for a maximum of 2 years if the Administrator determines that the ban will reduce the availability of leaded gasoline for farm vehicles and that alternative fuels for farm vehicles are unavailable. In any case, under H.R. 99 leaded gas is a fuel of the past. This is one important area the administration should take another serious look at.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. SWIFT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my special order today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BERMAN). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

DEFENSE BUDGET

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BRUCE). Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. BENTLEY] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mrs. BENTLEY. Mr. Speaker, in a time of tight budget constraints, it is necessary for every expenditure to be closely investigated for all its benefits. As a member of the Budget Committee, I am painfully aware of the need for budget cuts, but when we do the cutting—we must make certain of the full cost to the country—not just this year, but in the future.

This afternoon, I would like to focus attention on the defense budget cuts as proposed by the administration. As you, Mr. Speaker, are probably aware, I am frequently out on this floor reporting the losses of certain sectors of the economy to foreign imports and foreign purchasers.

I have identified U.S. civilian manufacturing capabilities as being our first line of defense recalling the dependen-

cy of our Allies on the American industrial base for the war effort in World War II. With economies occupied and in ruins—both in Europe and in Southeast Asia—the United States was truly the "Arsenal of Democracy."

Plants which had produced farm trucks began to produce Army trucks. Tires manufactured for convertibles were diverted to staff cars and ambulances and much of the remaining available rubber was shunted into the aircraft industry.

Fiber and clothing mills were converted overnight into uniform factories and the silk from hosiery mills sent to the parachute makers. And at every step of the way, the skilled labor pool which had been trained in the private sector, performed incredible feats for the Defense sector—or the war would not have been won.

My concern over the loss—in recent years of the television industry and radios and watches—of shipbuilding and the shrinkage of our steel production, fasteners and machine tools—has been the impact of these losses were we to get into a shooting war.

But, beyond the loss of these items, there has been another grave loss—the skilled labor force who were capable of producing these products.

What young man or woman—desiring a lifetime career—would want to train as a metalworker or as a machinist—as a tool-and-die maker? Only if he or she was going to go to work now in U.S. defense-related industries.

U.S. automakers are increasingly producing autos offshore. The Japanese automakers who have located in this country are not into manufacturing, they are only running assembly operations with parts either being imported from Japan or purchased from Japanese transplants—imports which incidentally were responsible for much of the large increase in our trade deficit with Japan last year.

The lack of real manufacturing—from the mines and the mills to the finished product—in this country is evidenced by the sluggish growth in the gross national product.

Predictions this year have been that economic growth will be under 3 percent. The Federal Reserve hails this as being wonderful and "not inflationary." Considering GNP growth in the major exporting nations, I wonder whether the Federal Reserve is putting a good face on a bad indice. Compared to the rest of the world, we are slipping out of the competition as an industrialized nation.

The leading exporting nations—Japan with 3.7-average growth in the 1982-86 period. Korea, 8.5; Taiwan, 6.9; Hong Kong, 5.9 to our 2.7 percent of growth in that same timeframe makes the point very well that manufacturing for export is the engine driving their economies.

In manufacturing capacity and ability to supply our own needs—"made in America" is becoming an anachronism. Two years ago we ranked ninth among industrial nations with even Norway ahead of us in its ability to supply its own domestic demands.

Now what does this have to do with the Defense budget? Lots! I suspect that much of what is showing up in our GNP as manufacturing is coming from Defense contractors. And that were these cuts to go through, at least one of our defense companies will suffer staggering losses and may be forced out of the defense business. This company will lose three programs as a prime contractor—one as a sub.

I must question the wisdom of the bookkeeper at DOD who seemingly cannot understand the necessity of retaining a defense industrial base. If we are being told—all of the time—by this administration—as untrammelled "free trade" guts out our industrial-commercial base—that competition is wonderful and gives us the best prices in the market, then I must think that those in the Defense Department would have been much more careful in spreading these losses to insure that no one company would suffer life-threatening hits. To insure the sustained health of as many of the companies as possible to guarantee future competitiveness.

Every major country in the world subsidizes its Defense contractors, especially when they are in competition with our own for the U.S. defense dollar. There is another subsidy to foreign producers. The European Community pumps at least \$1 billion a year into its steel industries and on all products exported out of the EC there is a rebate—on average—of 19 to 20 percent to manufacturers—a return of the value added tax collected by the various country governments.

I am not sure that these facts alone are a justification for underwriting our own defense industry, but certainly—if the goal of defense continues to be our ability to defend ourselves against foreign threats—then they should be part of the equation in the decisionmaking process of whom we cut and how we cut.

In closing, I would like to put the proposed DOD cutbacks into a more understandable frame. The cost to Maryland—my State will be over \$267 million. Most of it in my district. On the first cut, 268 jobs will be affected. And then hundreds more, into the thousands at the defense plant and base. And in trickle down—63,000 real jobs in the State will feel the effects—"the butcher, the baker, the candlestick maker."

I have no hesitancy fighting for these appropriations and presenting the case to the taxpayers. Of all of the budget dollars we expend every year,

these are the ones that come back to our districts thousands fold.

These are the dollars that sustain research and development in the microelectronics industry—at a time that tax law has been very destructive of research and development in the private sector. These are the dollars that maintain the major source of skilled manufacturing labor in the country. And at which time this country decides that it must again become competitive among the industrial nations, it will be to this labor force we will have to turn for the institutional memory and the gains garnered from hands on experience.

If as some economists suggest private sector development in this country over the last 8 years has been sacrificed for the buildup of our defense capabilities, then it is not wise to begin gutting the defense industrial base—the last major remnant of a once mighty arsenal.

This is all too important to be left to the bookkeeper's red pencil. The buck not only stops here, it is our ultimate responsibility for how it is spent.

THE FUTURE OF THE ICBM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. McCRERY] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. McCRERY. Mr. Speaker, in the next few days this House will decide an important question regarding the defense of this country. We will decide the future of the ICBM, or the intercontinental ballistic missile, modernization that this country will take into the 21st century.

Mr. Speaker, if the United States is going to maintain a viable strategic deterrent against Soviet political or military aggression, it is my belief that we must modernize our strategic offensive forces by deploying highly survivable mobile ICBM systems. The rail mobile Peacekeeper ICBM and the small ICBM in a hard mobile launcher are necessary to strengthen and maintain a stable United States strategic deterrent in the years to come. Failure to deploy both of these mobilized ICBM forces will severely undercut the United States' strategic deterrence policy and jeopardize U.S. national security interests.

Mr. Speaker, let me point out that the Soviet Union is currently modernizing its strategic ICBM force and has already deployed two mobile ICBM's in substantial numbers, rail mobile SS-24 ICBM's, each with 10 warheads, and road mobile SS-25 ICBM's, each with a single warhead. This gives the Soviet Union the only survivable ICBM reserve force, affording Soviet leaders with a viable third strike deterrent to a United States retaliatory strike.

In addition, the Soviet Union continues to improve its countersilo capability by deploying the Soviet SS-18 modified. The new SS-18 has twice the throwweight of its predecessor and better accuracy. This will increase the threat to the United States' silo-based ICBM's. When combined with improved Soviet countersilo potential, Soviet leaders have a greater incentive to strike first in a crisis.

Deployment of the rail mobile Peacekeeper and road mobile small ICBM will eradicate the Soviet advantages and provide the United States with a highly reliable and stable strategic deterrent. Since one cannot target what one cannot find, the two mobile ICBM forces will make current and future Soviet improvements in accuracy irrelevant.

Furthermore, the prompt, hard target capabilities of the small ICBM and rail mobile Peacekeeper ICBM offer the best deterrent to Soviet attack since both ICBM's can destroy those targets most valued by Soviet leaders, Soviet strategic and military forces, command and control assets, and leadership facilities. The hard target capabilities, prompt delivery and high reliability of these ICBM's are unmatched by any other system in the U.S. strategic arsenal.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, the rail garrison Peacekeeper and small ICBM in hard mobile launchers are affordable. The cost of deploying 50 rail mobile Peacekeepers and 500 ICBM's in hard mobile launchers is 25 percent less than the cost of creating a new U.S. armored division, yet the contribution of these mobile ICBM's to U.S. national security and deterrence policy is immeasurable.

In addition to the strategic importance of ICBM modernization to continued effective deterrence, an important consideration is the effect that such modernization will have on the strategic arms reduction talks. The Soviet Union now deploys 50 rail mobile SS-24's and 144 road mobile SS-25's to the best of intelligence. More are being built as the Soviets modernize their ICBM force and make it more survivable. Meanwhile, the United States fiddles on the mobile ICBM issue while Rome burns. We have yet to deploy our first mobile ICBM.

Mr. Speaker, if we wish to put limits on Soviet ICBM modernization and deployment and achieve cooperation in getting a verifiable START Treaty, the United States must deploy its own mobile ICBM's. Soviet negotiators are not going to ban mobile ICBM's when they have many, and we have none. Nor are they likely to place limits on such things as overall mobile ICBM warhead totals when they are the only ones with such programs. Nor are they likely to agree to intrusive verification

limits on mobile ICBM's if they are the only ones being restrained.

Mr. Speaker, the Soviet leaders and negotiators are far more likely to agree to a START Treaty with such constraints if they believe that the pact will place real limits on real U.S. programs.

□ 1630

There is little reason to agree to such limits if the United States Congress unilaterally ends United States mobile ICBM funding or cuts it so drastically that the Soviets are left alone in the field.

The ability of the United States to field meaningful and verifiable limits on Soviets mobile ICBM's through the Strategic Arms Reduction talks will depend upon our willingness to deploy and fund mobile ICBM's ourselves. This is elementary common sense.

Therefore, I argue that we need to fully fund in fiscal year 1990 the two-missile mobile ICBM package recommended by the President and concurred in by the Armed Services Committee. This is perhaps one of the most important decisions we will make as a House this week with regard to our future strategic deterrence to the Soviet Union, and I urge my colleagues to support both the rail garrison Peacekeeper and the small ICBM, the Midgetman.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1990

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The pending business is the question of ordering the previous question on House Resolution 211.

The Clerk read the title of the resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous question.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw the motion for the previous question on House Regulation 211 in order that I may offer an amendment to the rule; and I ask unanimous consent that the amendment to the rule be debatable for 2 minutes, equally divided and controlled by the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. MARTIN] and myself.

The amendment to House Resolution 211 would on page 8, line 7, insert the following: "Following disposition of said amendments, it shall be in order to consider an amendment relating to F-14 aircraft and an amendment relating to the V-22 aircraft, both amendments to be offered by Representative DICKINSON of Alabama, to be debatable for not to exceed 20 minutes each, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services. Said amendments shall not be subject to amendment, and shall be considered

in lieu of amendment No. 25 in part 2 of the report of the Committee on Rules. Said amendments shall be deemed to have appeared in part 1 of the report of the Committee on Rules," and appear at this point, in the RECORD.

Strike out section 127 (page 36, lines 4 through 16) and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 127. PROCUREMENT OF F-14D AIRCRAFT AND SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS.

Of the amount appropriated for procurement of aircraft for the Navy for fiscal year 1990, the amount of \$771,300,000 shall be available only for the F-14D aircraft program, none of which shall be available for new production aircraft. Of the amount provided in section 102(a) for procurement of aircraft for the Navy, \$1,552,707,000 shall be available only for spares and repair parts.

Strike out section 126 (page 35, line 18 through page 36, line 3 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 126. MARINE CORPS AIRLIFT PROGRAMS.

Of the amount appropriated for procurement of aircraft for the Navy for fiscal year 1990—

(1) none of such amount shall be available for the V-22 aircraft program; and

(2) the amount of \$411,000,000 shall be available for CH-53E aircraft.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] will be recognized for 1 minute, and the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. MARTIN] will be recognized for 1 minute.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR].

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, after consultation with the minority and with our leadership and interested parties in the V-22 and the F-14 we have, I believe, come to an agreement which would allow the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] after the section in the RECORD labeled Davis-Bacon to offer separate amendments on striking the V-22, to be debated for 20 minutes by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee or his designee, and the ranking minority member or his designee, and then after that debate, which would be equally divided, 10 minutes apiece, we would proceed to the next question, which would be the F-14 and the control of that debate would be similar in nature. The ranking minority member and the chairman of the committee would control the time, they or their designees, 10 minutes apiece. It would occur on Thursday after the section of the rule entitled Davis-Bacon.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, we support the majority and congratulate the gentleman for his leadership in this area.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I do so only to express my profound thanks and appreciation for the consideration on the majority side, particularly the gentleman from Michigan, who was so good as to counsel with us on this earlier in the day, and I am most appreciative of the outcome.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, just to recap so we understand where we are, the debate on the issue at hand would come after the Davis-Bacon provisions on Thursday of this week.

There would be debate on an amendment offered by the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] for 20 minutes on the F-14, divided equally, the time controlled by him and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN] or his designee.

Then we would move, if the gentleman so desires, to a debate on the V-22 under a similar situation.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH].

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, I just want to commend our colleagues in the Democratic Party. I think in the course of the day, the gentleman from Michigan and his leadership have done a very appropriate bipartisan thing. We occasionally gripe when we do not think we are being treated fairly. I think this is an example of their considerable flexibility, and I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan and the gentleman from Massachusetts for the way in which they have worked this out. I think on our side of the aisle we are very grateful to the gentleman for what he has done, and I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, just to clarify the situation, this would be in lieu of amendment number 25, the original amendment that we had in section 2 of the report, which allowed the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] to consider this jointly under a 10-minute debate situation.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the amendment to the resolution is agreed to.

There was no objection.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution, as amended.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution, as amended.

The resolution as amended was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BRUCE). Pursuant to House Resolution 211 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the

Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2461.

The Chair designates the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI] as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KLECZKA] to assume the chair temporarily.

□ 1640

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2461) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for military functions of the Department of Defense and to prescribe military personnel levels for such Department for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and for other purposes, with Mr. KLECZKA (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.

Under the rule, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN] will be recognized for 1 hour, and the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] will be recognized for 1 hour.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN].

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I will represent the gentleman from Wisconsin until he arrives. He is on the way over at the present time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR].

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Mississippi for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, in the course of the debate on the rule on this issue this afternoon, in an exchange I had with my dear friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], I used some intemperate remarks, and had I to speak again on this issue, I would have done so a little bit more judiciously and with a little bit more understanding.

I apologize to my friend, the gentleman from California, and I look forward to a working relationship with him. I consider him one of the finest people I have associated myself with in this body, and again, I do apologize for the nature of my remarks to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2461, the DOD authorization bill.

Mr. Chairman, others will speak in behalf of the various parts of the bill. I would like to take a moment to emphasize a couple of key areas concerning the National Guard and Reserve.

In this bill is an accepted amendment by the Committee on Armed

Services which gives the National Guard and Reserves equipment which they need very much to complete their missions.

Mr. Chairman, I will point out that the National Guard and Reserve is more than ever an integral part of the total force. The Guard and Reserve has more than 50 percent of the Army combat missions, 33 percent of the Air Force combat missions, and over 20 percent of the Navy-Marine Corps combat capability.

Mr. Chairman, we need to ensure that they are as prepared as our active components. In other words, Mr. Chairman, the National Guard has 50 percent of all of the combat missions of the Army. The Army cannot fight now without the Reserves and the National Guard.

Also, the Guard and Reserve contain and are involved in hometown and community activities. The National Guard has been deep in support in civil disasters such as support in tornado mishaps, the many floods this past spring, and the recent Sioux City airline crash. I will point out that it was the National Guard who jumped in and provided helicopters to airlift the crash victims to hospitals. They are now providing other support about this terrible disaster.

DOD historically has not provided sufficient new equipment in the procurement budget for the National Guard and Reserves. In the last 8 years, it has been the Congress who has provided this procurement for the Reserves.

During the full Committee on Armed Services markup I offered an amendment to add \$1.2 billion to Guard-Reserve procurement. This equipment will not be going overseas. It goes to the Reserves. It will be going to different States of the Nation and into the different districts of Members of Congress. It is important that this item stays in the bill.

There will be several other amendments offered to this package, and I will not cover those amendments at this time. I will say, though, that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES] will offer an amendment for funds for drug interdiction. I certainly would support that, \$70 billion for continued efforts of the National Guard on drug interdiction.

The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. EVANS] will offer an amendment to prevent the National Guard technicians from wearing military uniforms while performing their duties. In my opinion, this is a bad amendment. It should be defeated. If these technicians want to stay in the National Guard, they ought to wear the uniforms when they are performing their duties. I hope this amendment will be defeated.

To summarize, I support the authorization bill to resist any reductions in

the National Guard and Reserve procurement, and also the drug interdiction amendment, which has merit, and would oppose the technician uniform amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to support and to explain as best I can some of the things that are in the defense authorization bill that we will be dealing with this week.

By and large, I think it is a pretty good bill. Some things are in here that I think should not even have been, and some things came out of our committee that I do not agree with, and we will be enumerating these as the week continues.

Mr. Chairman, I think that Secretary Cheney provided the Congress with a defense budget that, in these times of tight budget, made tough but sound choices to most effectively and efficiently meet out national security needs. When Dick Cheney testified before the Committee on Armed Services, I told him at that time, "Mr. Secretary, some people think that you have cut too much, others think that you might have cut too little, but everybody agrees that you cut the wrong thing."

Mr. Chairman, everybody has an interest in the bill. Not everybody can agree that cuts made by the Department of Defense were made in the right place, in the right amounts, or at the right time.

However, faced with the prospect of \$7.2 billion in requests for add-ons—and we had amendments submitted to our committee requesting over \$7 billion in proposed expenditures—chairman joined me in supporting the Cheney procurement budget in total. Tomorrow we will again have a chance to put our parochial interests aside when we consider my amendment to restore the Cheney procurement budget.

I asked for, and the Committee on Rules has made in order, my amendment, that will, in effect, restore the Cheney procurement budget in this bill. Unfortunately, however, this process is looking more like business as usual than anything else. The Democrat majority in the Committee on Rules has in instances run roughshod over proposed guidelines for consideration of this bill that were proposed by both the chairman and myself.

Our requested suggestions were basically ignored in many instances and replaced by the whims of whatever forces governed the Committee on Rules.

□ 1650

Dealing with SDI, which will be the first thing that we take up, we have the basic committee position which was voted on in this committee of \$3.5 billion for the strategic defense initiative. To that there will be three amendments made in order and offered as the bill is under consideration. The first made in order will be the Kyl amendment which is offered to increase the funding of SDI to a level of last year's spending plus inflation—that is—no real growth, just last year's level of effort plus inflation. This amounts to some \$3.8 billion. As I said, the committee position is \$3.5 billion.

There will then be an amendment offered by the gentleman from California to reduce that amount to \$1.3 billion. Then we have the amendment of the gentleman from Florida, to fund the SDI at a level of approximately \$2.8 billion, plus the DOE figures, for a total of \$3.1 billion. These are very substantial cuts that effectively will decimate the program. I would hope that members of the committee would not vote for any of the cutting amendments. I would hope that they would support the Kyl amendment, which is still \$1 billion less than the administration request. Some cuts have already been made. We are trying to just fund SDI at last year's level plus inflation.

If the members of the committee do not see fit to support the Kyl amendment, at least do not cut this below the committee markup, because to do so would cause irreparable harm to SDI and the program could not proceed in an orderly fashion, because people will be laid off and many of the very promising elements of the program would have to be canceled.

So I would urge a "no" vote on any of the amendments that would cut the SDI Program.

Almost as an adjunct to the SDI cutting amendments, the Rules Committee has made in order three add-backs. If cuts are made in the SDI program sufficient to support these amendments, then the three add-backs that will be offered will be one, for drug interdiction and control; second, for toxic waste cleanup; and third, for conventional arms procurement—the Bennett amendment.

The committee knows full well that these are very popular amendments. As a result, they almost tacked them onto and made them a part of the cuts. Who could vote against drug interdiction? Who can vote against the cleanup of toxic waste and toxic spills? Who wants to vote against conventional weaponry when we know that the Soviets still outnumber us in most area categories and that if we should have another war, it would probably be a brushfire lower level conflict with some Third World country, not the ex-

change of nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union.

All of us are in favor of these additions in principle. But let me point out that we have drug interdiction funds still unexpended in the Department of Defense. There is a Superfund for the toxic cleanup. The Department of Defense is doing everything that it can do on the cleanup. We do not need these funds from this SDI source at this time. We do need them for the SDI. I would urge the Members not to delete further SDI funding.

This gets us to the B-2, and we all know what the B-2 is by now, surely. The B-2 represents a radical departure in aviation. It is at the cutting edge and state-of-the-art technology. It is revolutionary, and Lord knows that it is expensive.

We have spent to date, before it was made public, some \$23 billion developing the B-2—\$23 billion of some \$70 billion total that is projected to develop and procure 132 B-2's.

I must confess, Mr. Chairman, I have some ambivalence when we discuss the B-2, because the price tag of the B-2, the program unit cost, is \$530 million.

This cost estimate is based on the most optimistic of estimates. The cost assumes that inflation will be at a certain level, that there will be no major technical foulups and stretchouts, and that the Congress will fund as proposed the funding profile put forth by the Department of Defense. The proposed annual expenditures for B-2 in the last 3 years are approximately \$8 billion.

I would urge all Members, and I will say this tomorrow when we have a better crowd, if they vote to fund the B-2, they must do so with the knowledge that the cost is going to escalate, the \$530 million in program costs is going to escalate if anything happens to delay the production of the plane. The Air Force itself delayed by 1 year in this budget the production of the airplane, and that 1-year delay cost \$1.8 billion.

If we do not fund it adequately and we do not procure it at the projected efficient rate, every stretchout runs the cost up. So if Members are going to fund the B-2 at \$4 billion a year instead of \$8 billion a year, it is projected that it would cost somewhere close to \$800 million apiece. If inflation should go up and be higher than is estimated by OMB, the price would go up. If we just build a few aircraft and then shut down the production facilities, conduct the flight test program, fly the B-2 throughout its performance envelope, terminate all of the company employees, close down the entire production until we get through our testing, and then blow the whistle and say, "All right, everybody back on board," there is not going to be anybody to come back on board.

We will have to start from scratch, train the employees, go through the learning period, reprocess security clearances for people who are going to work there, and it will be tremendously expensive if we, in fact, stretch the program out in the manner I have described.

So in voting for the B-2, and I hope that Members do, I hope that they vote with the full knowledge that this is the minimum cost, and anything that happens to upset the production schedule, if it runs into big technical problems, then the price is going to be higher than that, and Members should be prepared to pay these extra costs if they vote to go forward with the B-2 but delay it significantly.

The next issue is ICBM's, the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Modernization Program. The Rules Committee structured the MX and the Midgetman debate such that ICBM opponents will get three bites at the M-X apple and two bites at the Midgetman. The passage of any of these amendments would abrogate the bipartisan agreement with the administration on modernization of our ICBM's.

I would remind Members that the rule does not give us the opportunity to offer any substitutes. Again, the two-missile program is needed to modernize our land-based leg of the triad, and it is crucial in the arms negotiations process currently underway in Geneva. Let us give our negotiators some muscle with which to bargain.

Let me point out that if many of our colleagues had had their way in the past, and had done away with the short-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, we would not have the INF Treaty we have today, and because we had the operational capability and the ability to use these weapons, the Soviets did come to the negotiating table, and we did negotiate all these weapons away on both sides.

We are doing away with ours and they are doing away with theirs. If we want to negotiate away any part of our strategic program, we must go to the negotiating table and negotiate away with the Soviets, whether it be the long-range weapons or any portion of the strategic triad. Certainly we should not be giving these programs away in the Congress and unilaterally taking the cards away from our negotiators in Geneva who are at this very moment negotiating START.

□ 1700

Arms control amendments in this bill are also postured for the majority, not allowing for any substitutes to protest the President's foreign policy obligations.

I would ask the Members to oppose the Wyden, Brown, Markey amendments on their merits, but also because we have no opportunity to

counter them. The Committee on Rules fashioned as process so these amendments could be in order, and I was not given the right to offer substitutes.

In closing, to the extent we are allowed by this rule, I would hope that all of the Members would rise above parochial and special interests, job programs back home, et cetera. The Congress has demanded, the public has demanded that we reduce Federal spending.

Make the hard choices, do not stretch out programs. Some programs are unaffordable, some are just not justified in terms of their expense.

The Secretary has made the hard choices as he has been directed by the Congress to do. It is up to us now to decide whether or not we want to vote to support this and vote to support good Government, or is it just going to be business as usual with everybody getting their own parochial programs out of the pork barrel?

I have in my hand a letter addressed to me from the President of the United States urging that we support the administration.

The letter reads in part:

We cannot afford to pull the rug out from our negotiators, and we cannot afford to forfeit the investments we have made in strategic modernization. We can afford to make the needed improvements provided by this cohesive, fiscally sound package. It deserves your support.

It is signed George Bush.

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, tomorrow you will be asked to make some hard choices. Are you going to do business as usual? Are you going to vote for parochial interests? Are you going to vote for what sounds good at home? Or are you going to come up here and bite the bullet and do what the Secretary of Defense has done, saying that several programs are not economically feasible, they do not make sense in light of today's budgets? Make the tough choices.

I hope when I offer the Cheney amendment you will support it, vote for good Government and not business as usual, everybody fishing out of the pork barrel.

The letter referred to follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, July 24, 1989.

HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN DICKINSON: When the Fiscal Year 1990 Defense Authorization Bill comes to the floor next week, you and your colleagues will make critical decisions affecting the future of deterrence and arms control for the balance of the century. Before you vote, I want to be certain that you understand my reasons for the strategic modernization program I have proposed.

Taken together, these strategic programs are essential to preserve a capable, survivable and effective deterrent. They are an integrated package that deals with the evolving threat and is flexible enough to hedge

against uncertainties. They also undergird our arms control negotiations and provide incentives to the Soviets to continue the internal changes they appear to be making. Each represents, not simply modestly improved capability but fundamental change in strategy or system performance.

I am optimistic about what we are beginning to see in the Soviet Union. The Soviets may finally be willing to make significant changes in the character and size of their military forces. This willingness is at least in part the result of our commitment to a modern, capable deterrent force. Weakening the commitment now could undermine the positive trends we see emerging in Soviet forces.

I have taken another hard look at SDI and confirmed that the goal of the program—providing the basis for an informed decision on deployment of defenses that would strengthen deterrence—remains sound. We owe it to ourselves and our children to pursue that goal. I am personally and deeply committed to doing so.

Moreover, SDI is at a critical juncture. The technological progress we have made means that we need to conduct large scale realistic, and therefore expensive, tests to prove the feasibility of defenses. Already, because of cuts required in the overall Defense budget, I have reluctantly submitted a revised budget, cutting over \$1 billion from the program. If the Congress cuts even more deeply, our ability to investigate and test the most promising options will be seriously damaged. We will be unable to determine, in a meaningful way, whether we can rely more on defenses for our security. The American people are entitled to that assessment.

The B-2 is also at a critical point. The aircraft is based on revolutionary technology that will guarantee the effectiveness of the penetrating bomber well into the next century. Without it, the strategic Triad, which has been the bedrock of our nuclear strategy, will virtually disappear. The B-2 is also the core of our START strategy for achieving stable deterrence at reduced levels. Indeed, under the terms of our current arms control proposal, the bomber force will be assigned a very large percentage of our targets. I have no doubt that the B-2 is worth its cost and deserves your support.

ICBM modernization has been marked with considerable controversy and strong opinion. Yet there is broad agreement that mobility is required for our land-based missiles to improve their survivability and enhance their unique capabilities. After careful review of the issue, I have determined that we should deploy, in carefully phased manner, the Rail-garrison Peacekeeper and the Small road mobile ICBM. I am committed to doing so.

Rail-garrison Peacekeeper will improve the survivability of the ICBM force quickly and at modest cost, while preserving the considerable military capability of this system. The Small ICBM represents the future of the ICBM force. It offers a high degree of survivability, even with virtually no warning. But, it will not be ready to deploy as soon as Rail-garrison and will obviously be more expensive than a multiple warhead system. We can field Rail-garrison in the near term while at the same time continuing development of the Small ICBM for 1997 deployment. We likewise need to commit to an ICBM mobility program to avoid a deadlock in the START negotiations on the mobile issue.

In addition to the requirement for these forces as the heart of our nuclear deterrent strategy, in which they form an integrated and inseparable whole, there is the role which this modernization program plays in our arms control strategy. We are entering a very important and promising stage in our strategic arms control negotiations. We have already introduced some changes in our position and we are actively considering others which could make a significant contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance. To pull the rug out from under me at this crucial juncture by weakening my program could destroy this opportunity to make real progress. Indeed, it could even prevent the conclusion of an arms control agreement. I need the negotiating flexibility which this dynamic and sensible modernization program provides. Don't prevent me from achieving a treaty which could make great strides toward reducing the chances of nuclear conflict.

Let me add two cautionary notes. First, good arms control cannot be legislated. I seek and welcome the advice and counsel of the Congress and regularly consult you on the full range of arms control issues. But, in the final analysis, I must be responsible for negotiating arms control agreements. The many arms control amendments that are customarily proposed to the defense bills only undercut me and our foreign policy and frequently have an effect opposite to that intended by their sponsors.

Second, the pressures to play one modernization program off against another or to pay for one with cuts in another threaten the balanced strategy behind our programs. Secretary Cheney and I have had to make hard choices in these times of tight budgets—this budget is the best balance of needs and affordability and represents an integrated strategic approach.

As you begin final debate on the defense bill, I ask you to carefully consider the affordable, integrated plan we have designed to strengthen deterrence, to reinforce the incentives for change in the Soviet Union, and to further our goal of negotiating arms control agreements that will reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. We cannot afford to lower our defenses because of Gorbachev's rhetoric, and we cannot afford to pull the rug out from our negotiators, and we cannot afford to forfeit the investments we have made in strategic modernization. We can afford to make the needed improvements provided by this cohesive, fiscally sound package. It deserves your support.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. KLECZKA). The gentleman from Alabama has consumed 17 minutes.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], a member of the committee.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. DARDEN], a member of the committee.

Mr. DARDEN. I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, today I rise in strong support of this legislation which authorizes and brings forth to this House of Representatives our bill for the Defense Department authorization this

year. This bill makes a strong commitment to our strategic triad and at the same time makes the necessary tactical and conventional authorizations to keep America safe and to keep America strong.

This is always a controversial bill, Mr. Chairman, and it will always be controversial whenever we come to the floor and authorize in a single bill more than 50 percent of the total amount of discretionary spending that the entire Federal Government appropriates every year; \$306 billion to be authorized by this legislation represents more than half of the money over which this Congress has control. So consequently it should be very hotly contested, it should be debated very carefully and we should spend a lot of time considering this legislation.

I know there is a general tendency among those of us in Congress to come in and say, "Follow what the committee does and let the committee system bring to you the right decision."

I am a member of the Committee on Armed Services and I am very proud of what this committee does. However, I realize this is one bill in which the entire membership is involved because all of us must be interested in the defense of this country and all of us have some responsibility on this vast amount of money that we spend on the DOD authorization.

So as one Member, Mr. Chairman, of the Committee on Armed Services, I welcome our colleagues to come to the floor and give us input here. This is a very difficult job and it is one that we need all the help and assistance we can get from the entire body and not just from the committee alone.

I would also like to say on behalf of our chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN] has done an outstanding job here. He has done a difficult job and he has done an unpopular job.

There have been many of those of us who have been critical of his positions from time to time because we had our priorities and we had our problems and our interests. But I do not know of anyone who has withstood more pressure in any more difficult situation than he has done in bringing this bill to the floor.

Mr. Chairman, I used to practice law, a number of years ago in Georgia, and was called upon to take a number of domestic relations cases.

I found out in a small town that the type of practice that you had was dictated by what happened to be coming into the office on that particular day. I found out handling a number of divorce cases that whenever a settlement was reached that did not please everyone and all sides were somewhat upset at the results, that perhaps that might be a good solution. I think that is the situation we have here on a bill

which has been acted on by the committee.

If I were personally writing the legislation, I would change a number of things in it. I am sure the various committee members, if they were solely in charge, might make some changes. I think this bill represents the best possible compromise we could reach under the circumstances.

When you consider we have 52 committee members from all philosophies, from all parts of the country, from every single perspective, I think the committee has done a good job.

Our vote was not unanimous. Our vote in many instances was very, very divisive. But I think we have a product here of which we can all be proud and it deserves the overwhelming endorsement of this House of Representatives.

There are a couple of issues I want to mention specifically that the committee addressed and addressed very responsibly.

First of all, the issue today that everyone seems to be interested in and that everyone seems to have discovered recently is the B-2 or Stealth bomber.

Ladies and gentlemen, this issue has been with us for many years. It is not something that just happened overnight. I see a number of our colleagues who jumped up recently in righteous indignation at the so-called sticker shock. But we have known for a long time this was coming. Many of us have known that the costs were going to be exceedingly high.

We have already paid for one-third of the cost of this entire program.

I do not think it is responsible to at this time walk away from it.

The other topic I am particularly interested in, Mr. Chairman, is that of the National Guard and Reserve modernization. There is no question that we must continue to improve and upgrade the equipment of our Guard and Reserve forces. Budgetary restraints will only result in an ever-increasing reliance on the total force concept. If we expect the Guard and Reserve to fight we have the responsibility to give them the necessary weapons and equipment with which to fight.

So this bill I think makes adequate provision for the National Guard and Reserves.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, several days ago I had an opportunity to discuss our defense priorities with the President of the United States. I reminded him that the National Guard and Reserve, more than any other group, was carrying its share of the load, but to do its job it must have the necessary equipment. But what I told the President of the United States I tell my colleagues here today, "It does not make sense to give these people the job and not give them the tools."

□ 1710

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 8 minutes to the very distinguished gentleman from Arizona [Mr. KYL].

Mr. KYL. Chairman, when President Bush was elected and sworn into office, one of the very first things he did was to ask for a comprehensive review of this Nation's foreign and defense policy. He said that we should challenge assumptions. Nothing should be left unchallenged, including the strategic defense initiative.

When the report was in, my colleagues, the strategic defense initiative remained one of the highest priorities of this administration, recently confirmed by our own President Bush.

Why do we need the strategic defense initiative? I would like to very briefly go over the six primary reasons, and then discuss amendments we will be called upon to vote upon the very first thing tomorrow.

The first reason we need SDI is to enhance our deterrence and to place it on a more stable basis. If the enemy is not sure he can succeed in an attack, then he is not going to attack. SDI will inject that doubt into any enemy's planning process, so complicating any attack, that he would not dare to attack. That is the basic reason for the strategic defense.

Second, robust funding of SDI will enable us to have a hedge against a Soviet breakout. Let there be no doubt that the Soviets have been spending a lot more money on their version of SDI than the United States, 8 to 10 times as much is the estimate; and, in fact, they have a partial system in place. Whatever else is happening in the Soviet Union, with glasnost and perestroika, we know one thing: They have not pulled back at all on the amount of effort and money spent on their high technology and science projects. They are continuing to fund the kind of effort that we need to fund in the area of strategic defenses, and therefore, this is the second reason for supporting SDI.

The third reason, Mr. Chairman, is that the Soviets have developed two very sinister mobile systems, at a time when we have not done so. Both the SS-24 and the SS-25 are systems which can elude our attacking ICBM. There is no way we can identify where they are. In fact, we have been talking about the B-2 not being able to find these relocatable targets. As a result, we have no way of holding these assets at risk, and it is important to us to be able to defend against them. That is another reason for the strategic defense initiative.

The fourth reason, Mr. Chairman, is that we are engaged in START negotiations now, and our intention there is to draw down the number of offensive weapons on both sides. If we reduce

the number of weapons below the 50 percent threshold or even more, cheating becomes very important, because if one side or the other were to cheat, it makes its advantage much greater than if we have the tens of thousands of warheads that we have now. As a result, in a START regime, verification and insurance become very important. SDI provides that insurance. Even if the Soviets cheat, we are able to protect ourselves against such cheating by having SDI. Concomitantly, Mr. Chairman, what this does is make it much easier for the United States to agree to significant limitations under a START agreement because we will always know that even if the Soviets do cheat, we can protect ourselves through SDI.

Fifth, we need SDI to protect against accidental launch or Third World launch. CIA Director William Webster has recently noted that 15 Third World countries are likely to have the ballistic missile capability within the next decade, and that means that since it is not too difficult to put a chemical warhead on a ballistic missile, those nations are going to have the capability of blackmailing others in the world. If we do not have some method of protecting ourselves or others against such attack, we subject ourselves to that kind of blackmail. It is important, therefore, to protect either against accidental launch or attack by Third World countries. I might note, Mr. Chairman, that the vast majority of Americans overwhelmingly support a defense for this purpose.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, SDI promotes our negotiating position in both START and the D and S talks. Ambassador Rowny has recently confirmed that we need to demonstrate our will to the Soviets in order to have the kind of leverage that will bring them to the bargaining table and cause them to make the kind of commitments and the concessions that we want them to make. Conversely, if we unilaterally reduce the amount of our commitment to SDI, we are giving up something for nothing. There is no quid pro quo, and there is no reason why the Soviets do not simply sit back and say, "Well, let us wait for the United States to make another concession next year. If they cut it in half this year, maybe they will cut it in half again next year, and we do not have to worry about SDI."

Mr. Chairman, it does not make sense for Members to vote deep, deep cuts in SDI at the very moment we are at the bargaining table. For all these reasons, I hope my colleagues will vote for a robust funding amendment for SDI, and reject the Dellums amendment tomorrow.

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Installa-

tions and Facilities, the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER].

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to chair the Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over both military bases and defense burden-sharing. I will spend a moment to describe what the committee did in these areas:

The subcommittee cut lower priority overseas projects totalling \$390 million and, with those funds and some domestic cuts, funded \$305 million in new and revitalized family housing, over \$400 million in high priority projects brought to our attention by Members of Congress, and 38 new child care centers costing \$68 million. Of the added projects, over \$100 million was for our citizen-soldiers, the National Guard and the Reserves. The subcommittee added family housing where it was most needed: Long Beach, Camp Pendleton, El Toro, and San Francisco, CA; Hawaii; Ballston Common, NY; and Guantanamo, Cuba.

I am very proud of what we were able to do because of the inadequate amount of military construction funds we had allotted. The rest of the DOD budget was shaved; Milcon was scalped in the Bush budget. And, due to the way the budget process works, we cannot do much to record priorities between defense accounts. Still, the Members of the House should know that conditions at many Army and Navy bases are deplorable. Only by aiming our resources at improving base conditions can we turn this embarrassing situation around.

About 75 percent of the cuts we made came from projects abroad. Bricks and mortar last half a century; our base rights in countries like Panama, the Philippines, and Greece may not last the decade. The conventional force reduction talks in Vienna may mean that we abandon many of our bases in Germany and other countries in the central front.

Moreover, the subcommittee believes that we should be pressing our allies to provide much more military construction as host nation support, using the Japanese Facilities Improvement Program as a model. Japan has a strong host nation support program; Korea has a weaker one. Germany provides little support at all. If American troops are stationed in these countries, the host nation should foot a major portion of the bill.

Given all these factors, it was only prudent to subject overseas spending to the most rigorous scrutiny. This scrutiny meant that we funded no projects in Panama, the Philippines, the Bahamas, Honduras, Luxembourg, Oman, and Somalia. New construction in Germany was cut from \$320 million

in fiscal year 1989 to \$139 million in fiscal year 1990.

One overseas issue of great interest is the forced move of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing from its present base of Torrejon, Spain. For a whole batch of reasons, the Spanish do not want 79 American F-16's in the suburbs of Madrid. Our negotiators, together with NATO and the Italians, developed a proposal to build a brand new base at Crotone, in southern Italy. The whole base will cost \$900 million. The United States will end up paying \$500 million. The subcommittee did not consider this a good deal and voted to cut our contribution to the NATO infrastructure account to stop construction on Crotone. In full committee, an amendment was adopted to place a cap at \$250 million on the U.S. share of any new base for the 401st TFW outside the United States. If NATO will not come up with the extra money, we will have to move the plans to an existing base in Europe or back to the United States.

Besides the burdensharing provisions I have already discussed, H.R. 2461 reduces the European troop ceiling by nearly 15,000 positions associated with Intermediate Nuclear Forces [INF]. The INF Treaty eliminated this class of weapons and so there is no further need for these positions. The end-strength of the Air Force was also reduced to reflect the elimination of these INF positions. The Army had already scheduled the reduction of their INF positions.

Another important issue concerns the Navy's plan to lease 3 million square feet of office space by accepting bids only from northern Virginia landlords. This plan will raise prices by shifting competition. So, the subcommittee added language to require the solicitation to cover the entire National Capital region. Also, the subcommittee added language to require the Secretary of Defense to look at the concentration of Navy functions in Washington, compare that with other services, and see whether some Navy functions can be moved elsewhere.

The subcommittee has jurisdiction over the real property maintenance account [RPMA] within the O&M budget and over the new base closure account. We funded 97.4 percent of the RPMA request, transferring the balance to build new family housing. We authorized the full \$500 million request for the base closure account. Congress voted to have the base closures take place as recommended; the subcommittee acted to make sure that happens.

Last Congress, I chaired the Armed Services Panel on Defense Burden-sharing. That panel sent out a strong message: That it is neither fair nor affordable for the United States to do so much and our allies to do so little to

meet our common defense burden. The administration takes the view that we have to spend even more to encourage our allies to spend more. We believe that we should have a defense budget which meets our own vital interests and, thereby, force our allies to structure their budgets to meet their defense needs.

H.R. 2461 is a strong burdensharing bill. It can be made stronger by the adoption of two amendments:

Representative IRELAND will offer an amendment to reduce the number of civilian employees of the Department of Defense in Europe to account for the elimination of INF combat units. Since the INF Treaty eliminated INF weapons, there is no need to retain the employees whose jobs related to these weapons.

I will introduce an amendment to prohibit the use of funds to operate or maintain bases in countries where the base rights agreement involves the promise of foreign aid. The amendment only applies to new base rights agreements, so it does not affect any existing arrangements. Nevertheless, we now spend about a quarter of our foreign aid budget—about \$2 billion a year—to pay for base rights. This is wrong. Decisions about foreign aid should be made independently of basing arrangements.

□ 1720

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. WOLFE). The time of the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER] has expired.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER].

Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if, for the edification of the Members here, the gentlewoman would discuss what was done on the Milcon portion of the bill as it deals with the 401st in Crotone, Italy.

We had a delegation here recently from the North Atlantic Assembly. From the conversation that ensued, this is probably one of their priority things. They wanted us to tell them what had been and what we could expect. This is not business as usual. We on the Committee on Milcon have addressed this problem, and I wonder if the gentlewoman could enlighten the Members as to what the Milcon Committee did in fact do.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Certainly. The gentleman from New York [Mr. MARTIN] and I and the committee did not want to drive a spike into the Crotone situation, because as things get restructured, maybe our NATO allies think that is of the highest priority. But our feeling was that we knew it

was costing us a lot of money and we could not be expected to fund this in the same way we have funded everything from 1945 on.

We were being kicked out of Spain, and we were paying severance pay. We were being a good neighbor in Spain, and all sorts of things. We were not saying, "No, they cannot move," but we do say, "no, they cannot shift all sorts of costs on us the way they used to."

As we know, the United States picked up a certain percentage of the NATO infrastructure, but then they turned around and said, "However family housing isn't included." In that part of Italy we have to have housing because there is no housing there; it is undeveloped. But they say that all sorts of things are not included.

So as we looked at it and as we held extensive hearings on it, we saw it was going to be very expensive for us because they were going to shift off a lot of costs on us. So what we are saying to the Europeans is: "Hey, we don't want to be bad guys, but we just want you to know that the deal cut in 1948 does not fit today, because you are all thriving and you have got to help us a little more. We are getting kicked out of Spain, and if you want to pay a little more of this, we will talk about it."

So we did not kill it, but we also did not run out and say, "Oh, yes, that's a great idea. How much should we pay?"

So we are changing it from "Uncle Sugar" to "Uncle Saccharin," I guess, and we are looking at this with great skepticism.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I was wondering if the gentlewoman could inform the Members as to how she dealt with it, if there are treaties and other prospective agreements as it relates to severance pay in the future, and also job preference for dependents, and so forth. Was this dealt with in the military construction portion of the bill?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. There was also some of this done in the subcommittee chaired by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HURTEL], as I understand it, relative to the future of it. But as the gentleman knows, no treaty has been signed yet with Italy vis-a-vis Crotone. We do not want anymore treaties signed like the one signed with Spain where there can be severance pay for Spanish workers after the Spanish voted to kick us out. We felt that was absolutely foolish. So that cannot be done.

I am going to be offering an amendment on the floor that I could not offer in the committee saying that in the future they cannot tie bases to military aid, that they cannot use military aid as extortion or rent for bases. We could not do it in committee because there would have been a joint

referral to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

I felt that that is very important, that our allies should not be using us to tap-dance around those issues. We tried to take a good government type approach to it and a new day type of approach to it to tell our allies that we are there as an ally and not as a deep pocket.

Mr. DICKERSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER], and I now yield 9 minutes to the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from New York [Mr. MARTIN].

Mr. MARTIN of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the committee bill as it was reported to the floor, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Construction, the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER]. She has my sincere appreciation for her outstanding leadership, her fairness, and her personal dedication that she has shown in leading the subcommittee through some very difficult times. The subcommittee has had to make some very tough decisions in this year's military construction authorization.

Two years ago, at nearly the same time of year, I stood before the Members and related the declining status of military construction. If I may, let me recap some of the number for the Members so they may have some indication of where we are going in this area.

In 1985 the military construction authorization was cut by 14 percent, in 1986 it was cut by 11 percent, in 1989 by 16 percent, and by 18 percent in 1988 and 1989. This year we are maintaining that 18-percent reduction level. It does not take a rocket scientist to see that even though the defense budget is advertised at zero growth, in military construction we have been losing ground. The cuts—or maybe I should call them adjustments—that were made this year were made to accommodate many of the long overdue quality-of-life facilities urgently needed by our services. I do not blame the individual services for not funding these projects themselves. There are many competing programs within the defense budget. The committee has reprioritized or bumped up several projects.

We have added nearly 1,500 units of family housing and 15 additional child care centers to the administration's original request. The committee made a conscious decision to fund these additional housing and child care projects rather than invest more in overseas areas, because due to current arms reduction talks, they may not be needed in the near future. This is not

to say that overseas projects are not important, not at all. This merely means that we must invest more for our servicemen and woman here in the United States, where we know they will be located for the next 5 years.

Trying to strike a balance on this issue is a difficult task, a task that the Department of Defense has tried to accomplish for many years. This budget, as far as military construction is concerned, as passed by subcommittee and the full committee, is a sincere effort to balance the scales.

I wanted to make some other comments, if I might, relative to the comments of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] and the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER] relative to the 401st Tactical Fighter Unit that we apparently want to move from Torrejon, Spain, to Crotona, Italy. What the committee did is this: In feeling, as the gentlewoman from Colorado said, that we were being asked to bear an inordinate share of the construction of the new base in Italy, we have put a ceiling of some \$250 million in the budget. Under the arrangement in NATO infrastructure, we pay a share of some 27.8 percent, but unfortunately, when we total up the cost of this entire facility, we find out that the United States is being asked to bear the cost of the base exchanges, the commissary, the bowling alleys, the housing, and everything else that goes along with the base, and that would require us to pay something on the order of a half a billion dollars. We feel that this is inordinate and unwarranted, and I think we are going to have to have continued negotiations and more understanding from our NATO allies, that if we are going to be asked to leave a base through no fault of our own, it is the responsibility of all the NATO countries working together to make us whole.

We would hope that the Department of Defense, as well as the State Department, would understand that we feel very strongly about this, and over the course of the next 3 years, as this change has to be made, we are going to hang very tough in ensuring that we are not called upon to pay an inordinate share of the budget.

Mr. Chairman, as I said, I rise in support of the committee bill as it was reported to the House. The committee accepted some changes in the budget that was sent to us by Secretary Cheney. In particular, by a division vote in the committee of nearly two to one, the committee felt without question that notwithstanding our support of Secretary Cheney, we did not agree with the naval aviation package, and the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] was agreed to, which changed the priorities as far as Secretary Cheney is concerned on the V-22 and the F-14D. I want to point out that about 98 per-

cent of Secretary Cheney's budget is here intact and there were very few changes made in committee.

□ 1730

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that Secretary Cheney, when he was here, was probably the most popular Member I have ever served with. He was well liked by Members on both sides of the aisle, but I cannot find one person who served with Dick Cheney who voted the same way he did each time, and, when his document was sent up here after only 39 days as Secretary of Defense based on his acceptance of the recommendations of the people he inherited, we felt at least two things had to be changed. One was the V-22, which is something that the Marine Corps has given up a lot of their budget for in the last 2 years in order to ensure that they have this vehicle to carry the Marines into the next century. It is a lot faster. It has greater range and versatility.

Mr. Chairman, I was at the Brooke Army Hospital not long ago, and I had the opportunity to visit with 12 heroic marines who were burned in that terrible helicopter crash in Korea not long ago, and it occurred to me that perhaps helicopters are not the best way to carry us into the next century.

Mr. Chairman, the other thing I want to talk about in the limited time I have is the F-14D. Secretary, Lehman, a few years ago, came up with a very good idea that we buy some new F-14D's, the state of the art, and we also get some good-as or better-than, cheaper, remanufactured F-14D's, and I think that is a good package. Good-as or better-than F-14D's would be less expensive, and the Navy would accept them knowing full well they have a shorter lifespan because of the number of hours on the airframe. What is very interesting, when they talk about closing down the production or manufacture of new F-14D's, when I hear conversations on the floor of the House, and in committee, talking about the F-14D, Members speak as though the Navy had some of them. Mr. Chairman, it might come as a real shock to my colleagues that the U.S. Navy does not have one single F-14D. They are still on the production line, and yet we are talking about shutting down that production line and remanufacturing the F-14A's into F-14D's when we have not even accepted or test flown the F-14D's.

Mr. Chairman, that has been a pretty well-kept secret around here, and I ask my colleagues, "Do you know what they tell you is going to replace the F-14D's in the mid- to late-1990's?" Are my colleagues ready for this one? The Navy version of the advanced tactical fighter. The House Appropriations Committee I understand just cut over \$1 billion from R&D on that project. As we go through the

debate here on the B-2, does anyone really think that the Navy advanced tactical fighter is going to be on the aircraft carriers in the mid-1990's? My colleagues know far better than that.

Mr. Chairman, I have three cities in my district that are smaller than a carrier battle group, and, if we are going to be protecting them with paper airplanes that have not even come off the design board, I think maybe the committee was absolutely correct, and I think that the entire House ought to support the committee position, which was about 98 percent of the Cheney budget and only changing the naval air package. I would hope that the Congress would support the Armed Services Committee work product.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES].

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bill and I will proceed with further discussion of the issue on the merits tomorrow.

Mr. Chairman, after careful consideration of numerous measures within the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Investigations, the subcommittee recommended incorporating several amendments into the fiscal year 1990 defense authorization bill. Besides four technical amendments, the subcommittee adopted the following: A requirement for submission of budgets by the combatant commanders, two amendments relating to professional military education, a mandated study of close air support, and report language on night vision goggle accidents and casualty assistance programs.

Several amendments that concerned acquisition policy and reform were referred to the subcommittee. Secretary of Defense Cheney and President Bush recently released a report on Department of Defense acquisition management. A careful study of these recommendations, as well as other provisions aimed at improving acquisition, will require more analysis. Consequently, during the subcommittee's markup, I moved that those 13 amendments dealing with acquisition be deferred, and included in a subcommittee acquisition reform package to be considered later.

As a result of several hearings, including a meeting with Federal "drug czar" William Bennett, the Subcommittee on Investigations developed and approved unanimously an extensive drug interdiction amendment. This amendment includes \$450 million earmarked from within the defense budget for drug interdiction, including \$70 million for the National Guard. The package also includes extensive legislative and reporting provisions designed to clarify, and strengthen DOD's contribution to our war on drugs, without directly involving the military in search, seizure, and arrest actions. We believe the military can make a significant contribution, at no cost to our other anti-drug efforts, or to the defense budget, and at the same time enhance conventional readiness.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. LOWEY].

Mrs. LOWEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, today I rise to urge my colleagues to join Chairman RANGEL and myself in supporting an important amendment which will be brought up before this body later in the week. Congressman RANGEL and I have introduced an amendment expressing the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should give highest priority to the conversion into prisons and drug treatment centers of the 86 military bases targeted for closure under the Base Realignment and Closure Act.

I supported closing the military bases recommended in the Base Realignment and Closure Act because the closings will save some \$693 million immediately. But, the closing can potentially save much more money in the long run by making the closed bases available to the appropriate authorities without reimbursement for conversion into prisons and drug treatment facilities.

Converting the closed bases into Federal or State prisons or drug treatment centers will help us respond to the dangerous national shortage of prison and drug rehabilitation space—a shortage that will prove extremely expensive and risky if we do not act now.

The drug crisis in the United States is a national emergency and should be treated as one. Foreign troops are not coming over our borders today, threatening our way of life. If they were, we would all respond with unquestioned vigor and commitment. The tragic reality is, however, that drugs are crossing our borders and threatening our country's future every day. Drugs rob the young of their initiative, drug trade entices otherwise productive members of society to turn their energies to illicit behavior, and drug use results in increased crime which threatens every community. We must respond with the same commitment with which we would respond to an armed invasion.

As we know, Federal prisons are between 37- and 73-percent overcrowded. The pressure from overcrowding is building, resulting in increased pressure for early releases which are, in many cases, totally inappropriate. From 1980 to 1987, total U.S. prison population, including State and Federal prisoners, increased from slightly over 300,000 to almost 600,000. That is a 76-percent increase in 7 years. This jump in prison population is not just the result of more crime. Since 1980 the number of incarcerations compared with reported crimes has risen steadily. In 1980, 25 offenders were committed to prison for every 1,000 murders, manslaughter, rapes, robberies, aggravated assaults and burglaries

reported to the police. In 1986, 43 people were incarcerated for every 1,000 offenses.

This trend of increased enforcement needs to continue. But there is a very real and serious constraint—space.

In addition, the need for drug treatment facilities is unquestioned. To win the war on drugs we must fight it both from the supply and demand sides. Fifty-one percent of the cocaine consumed in America is being used by only 10 percent of cocaine addicts. Demand for cocaine is clearly driving the supply.

But, even if an addict wants to get out of the cycle of addiction, treatment is available for very few of those who need it; 6.5 million addicts need help to break the habit. Two million of those addicts are willing to pay for available, affordable treatment every year. But there are only 250,000 treatment slots available nationwide. Even if an addict wants to rid his life of drugs, the chances of finding treatment are slim, and delays can often cost lives in this deadly business. We cannot win this war on drugs without curbing demand. Affordable, available treatment is critical to achieving that goal. Converting these closing military bases into drug treatment centers would be a major contribution to that end.

Mr. Chairman, I urge all our colleagues to support this important measure.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON].

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the bill as reported out the Committee on Armed Services. Later on during this debate I will be offering an amendment regarding the Krasnoyarsk treaty violation that the Soviets have been involved in that is currently violating the ABM treaty, and I would ask my colleagues to support that action.

Mr. Chairman, this budget and this defense bill is really a credit to Secretary Cheney, an effort that he put forth in about 39 days to come up with an approximately \$300 billion budget. Ninety-eight percent of his procurement requests were held, and a line was kept in committee as we debated the various issues and programs under our consideration. That in itself is a major accomplishment.

As a matter of fact, only two major amendments were accepted in the full committee that actually changed the Cheney request. One was the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY], my colleague and friend, relating to support for the Guard and Reserve, and the second was an amendment offered

by myself and my colleagues, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SISISKY] and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOGLIETTA], dealing with the restoration of the F-14 and the V-22.

□ 1740

These two amendments, even though they were considered, kept within the framework of the congressional and administration budget summit agreements, so we did keep within the dollar amount laid out by the President and by the leadership of Congress.

These issues were heavily debated in the subcommittee and in the full committee and these amendments that were finally accepted in the committee were done so after extensive deliberations.

As a matter of fact, the V-22 program itself sustained five separate votes in the subcommittee and in the full committee activities in the Armed Services Committee. It was 11 to 7 in the Research and Development Subcommittee; 31 to 19 to reverse that action in the full committee; 28 to 15 on a divisional vote to accept the F-14 and V-22; a 26 to 26 tie to delete the V-22 and F-14, and a 47 to 5 vote to report the bill out to the full House.

In addition, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee has already put in their bill full funding for the V-22.

The logical question is why the tremendous support for the V-22 program, the new tilt rotor technology?

It will be argued on this floor that it is because of pork or parochial interests in certain Members' districts. I will submit to my colleagues that that is the last thing that was involved in this decision to reverse the decision of the Secretary to cut the V-22. It was the right thing to do.

As a matter of fact, the best arguments for restoring the V-22 were given not by Members in Congress or by this body, but by the officers and the key leaders in the administration of the Secretary of Defense, people like Admiral Dunn, responsible for Navy aviation; General Pittman, responsible for Marine Corps aviation; General Grey, the Commandant of the Marine Force. These individuals in at least five separate subcommittee and full committee hearings on the record refuted the two basic arguments put forth by Secretary Cheney as being the foundation for cutting and eliminating the V-22. They argued that the issue of affordability and of a narrow mission should not cause us to cancel this very vital program, important for the Marine Corps and our special operations forces; yet in talking about the rebuttal to the narrow mission, it was put on the record that the Marine Corps itself has listed and the Department of Defense has listed 33

separate missions that the V-22 can perform if allowed to be completed.

On the affordability issues, and we will get into this in more detail during the debate, two alternatives were provided to us to meet the demand that the V-22 would be able to handle. Both the single sling option and the dual sling option are both in fact more costly than the V-22 and, in fact, neither of them have been tested by the Marine Corps and by the Department of Defense.

So in reality, there is no alternative to the V-22, and the key people for the Secretary of Defense, General Pittman, Admiral Dunn and General Grey, stated this on the record time and again.

Because of the arguments presented by the leadership of the Marine Corps and the Navy and because of the strong support of the Members of this body and the Senate, overwhelming votes were taken to restore the V-22 program, and it is a key part of this bill that we are going to be considering this week.

I would ask my colleagues to look hard and fast at the arguments for the V-14, for the V-22 and for the Montgomery amendment that restores funding for the Guard and the Reserves.

We need to support this bill as it came out of the committee because it is good legislation. It looks at our priorities, and more importantly, takes care of those needs that we will have into the year 2000 and beyond.

I ask my colleagues to strongly support the bill as it was reported out, and to strongly oppose efforts to eliminate the V-22 when that appropriate time arrives.

I thank my colleagues again for yielding me this time.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. BYRON].

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, I rise in support of titles IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII of H.R. 2461—the military personnel portion of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991.

During the first session of the 101st Congress, the subcommittee has held 11 hearings to date—I worked them very hard—two of them in the field, on the budget request for the active and reserve forces, medical care, child care, shortages of health care professionals, and pilot retention. The product before you represents the fruits of those labors.

In the area of end strengths, the revised Cheney budget represents an 11,700 cut for fiscal year 1990—7,400 in the Army, 1,200 in the Navy, and 3,100 in the Air Force—and an additional 1,400 cut for fiscal year 1991. The committee made several major changes to

the manpower request: First, the elimination of 1,305 active duty spaces identified in the report of the DOD Deputy Inspector General as duplicative and overlapping headquarters functions; second, an additional end strength reduction of 4,385 for the Air Force in fiscal year 1991 reflecting the full take-down of forces associated with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force [INF] Treaty; and, third, a reduction from 326,414 to 311,627 in the European troop ceiling—reflecting a cut of 14,559 authorizations for INF and 228 for headquarters personnel.

Several of the services have begun to experience recruiting difficulties during the current fiscal year at a time when youth unemployment has declined significantly and private sector wages are on the rise. To enhance the tools available to recruiters, H.R. 2461 increases the maximum enlistment bonus authority which the Army plans to use for difficult-to-recruit skills, like electronic warfare specialists, and increases the Montgomery GI bill kickers which are used as an added incentive to attract upper mental category recruits into critical skills. In addition, as further inducement for enlisted reserve recruiting, we added vocational-technical training to the program of education available under the reserve portion of the Montgomery GI bill.

In the area of pay and other compensation, H.R. 2461 includes the 3.6-percent pay raise requested in the President's budget. The committee felt strongly that this was the minimum pay raise needed to recruit and retain the high quality young men and women we currently have in the Armed Forces. We would, in fact have liked a higher raise since both private sector wage growth and inflation will substantially exceed 3.6 percent this year, but that wasn't possible under current budget constraints.

This year we focused special attention on the recruitment and retention of two groups of highly trained professionals who can command high salaries in the private sector: pilots and physicians. In both cases, the value of their special pays has eroded considerably since the substantial increases enacted in 1980.

For pilots, H.R. 2461 provides a 60-percent increase in Aviation Career Incentive Pay [ACIP]—or flight pay—for those in their prime flying years and also tightens the gates—the number of years of cockpit time needed to qualify for ACIP.

In the case of physicians, H.R. 2461 increases the medical special pays for all physicians with 6 or more years of service by 33 to 41 percent, depending on specialty and years of service.

In the face of a nationwide shortage of nurses, the committee has also approved a comprehensive package of incentives for military nurses, including

an accession bonus for nurses who did not receive DOD financial assistance for their education, a Navy educational test program for nursing students at colleges that don't have ROTC programs, and an incentive special pay for nurse anesthetists, a highly paid group in the civilian sector.

The committee remains extremely concerned about that lack of adequate nursing, ancillary, and clerical support personnel for military hospitals. Far too often, a military physician, after a long and busy day of seeing patients, supervising interns, and attending to a multitude of administrative duties, must spend several hours handwriting or typing patient medical records. I have talked to any number of military doctors who report wheeling patients to radiology or the laboratory themselves because of the lack of a corpsman to do the job. Such conditions would be unthinkable in the civilian sector and are a major factor in declining physician retention rates. The committee has taken several actions to improve military hospital staffing support.

As an outgrowth of four hearings on child care during the past year, H.R. 2461 includes a number of provisions to improve the quality and expand the availability of child care to military personnel. I have to thank the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER] for her help in this area with child care facility finding.

In conclusion, let me say that I view the document before you as the bottom line minimum required to keep the high quality force we currently have. We have remained within the budget restraints approved in the budget resolution and have made the hard choices necessary to ensure that the increased pay and benefits approved by the committee are adequately funded. There is no question that people are our most precious asset and you get what you pay for. I strongly urge my colleagues' support for the personnel titles of H.R. 2461, as reported by the Committee on Armed Services.

□ 1750

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the very distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BATEMAN], who is the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, as ranking member of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, I rise in support of the personnel titles of H.R. 2461. Before getting into the specifics of what we accomplished this year, I want to thank our subcommittee chairman, Mrs. BYRON, as well as the other members of the subcommittee for their efforts in working to-

gether through the year and during markup.

This year's bill includes provisions designed to make a number of improvements in the quality of life for our military personnel and their families. For instance, in addition to the 3.6-percent pay raise which I am sure everyone will welcome, we included a provision which will prevent a reoccurrence of the net pay reductions we have seen in years past because of negative adjustments to the variable housing allowance. We have also been able to include provisions which will compensate active duty members for the upfront costs of moving into private quarters overseas. In conjunction with our approval of most of the President's request for active and reserve end strengths, I think we have done a good job of keeping the quality and readiness posture of our military forces strong.

With regard to bonuses, the committee has made a number of changes to the requirements and benefits package for pilots, physicians, and nurses. These actions are in direct response to the crisis we foresee in these specialties in the years ahead. In the case of pilots, we have increased flight pay and bonuses in exchange for relatively modest increases in their flying hour requirements. Bonus provisions for doctors have been restructured, and we have approved a number of new incentives to recruit and retain nurses. We have also increased reenlistment bonuses for those in other critically short career fields. All in all, I believe these provisions will measurably improve the quality and quantity of professionals serving in our armed forces today.

Overall, Mr. Chairman, this year's defense bill represents a balanced and farsighted approach to the areas of military personnel and compensation and I urge my colleagues to vote for them.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I rise as chair of the Subcommittee on Research and Development. In that capacity, I have a written prepared statement on the activity of the Subcommittee on Research and Development and our contribution to this legislation, and I would simply submit that for the RECORD. I will use my time wearing my other hat, and that is as a representative of the Eighth Congressional District in California, and speak to the legislation in general.

First, I would like to thank my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], a member of the Committee on Rules,

for his apology to me earlier today on the floor, and I, in turn, apologize to him. He and I are close personal friends.

When I took the well earlier today on the rule, I was simply attempting to say, Mr. Chairman, as I have done over the years, that when it comes to debating the defense authorization bill, we tend to opt for efficiency as opposed to substance, that we ought to spend much more time debating the national-security issues of our time and the megabillions of dollars that go forward in the name of American national security. That was the only basis upon which I was making my argument, no other strategies involved, but when one is reduced, as I am for example, in offering an amendment tomorrow whose practical effect will be to stop the program we euphemistically refer to as star wars, and reduced today to 6 minutes on an issue of such incredible magnitude, it at least lets one understand what this gentleman was trying to say.

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I would like to move on. I was impressed on Friday of this past week, when a Soviet general appeared before the Committee on Armed Services, and I might add parenthetically that the distinguished Soviet general was better received by the Committee on Armed Services on Friday than this gentleman was in the early 1970's when I went to the Committee on Armed Services from Berkeley, CA. So the world is changing. And, in my humble opinion, changing for the better.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that this moment is pregnant with great potential, the potential to move the world closer to peace, to be in a position to turn over to our children and our children's children a world less dangerous than the one we inherited, a world better than the world we inherited, hopefully a world without the danger and tragedy of nuclear weapons. I believe that the Members and I desperately need to fashion a military budget based on these new emerging realities.

When this bill was reported from the full committee, I voted against this bill, but it was not a knee-jerk vote each year, but a vote to simply say, "You have not fashioned a military budget based upon new policy assumptions that ought to be marching us down the road toward peace and toward nuclear disarmament and toward that day when we have the audacity to think beyond the cruelty and insanity and absurdity of war itself," and if we were to do that, we would not be coming to the floor with this military budget that, in my humble opinion, still is a military budget based upon the obsolete notions of the cold war and not the emerging new realities of the world.

Mr. Gorbachev is a new reality. INF is a new reality. Some of the unilateral positions placed on the table for the reduction of several thousands of troops in Europe, standing down of tank divisions in Europe are new realities. What is taking place in Eastern bloc countries are new realities. Young students challenging in Tiananmen Square, in Beijing, are new realities.

This budget continues to be fashioned on obsolete notions of the cold war, and that is why I opposed it. If we could fashion a military budget based upon the new realities, we could redirect much of the resources of our country and begin to deal with the human misery that is taking place in America.

We are about the business of losing an entire generation of our children, children having babies, children killing children, children selling other children drugs. These are the realities. Children dropping out of school. These are the realities.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we could address new priorities. We could make America a better place. We could turn over to our children a peaceful world.

In that regard, later this week we will debate should we go forward with the batmobile, euphemistically referred to as the Stealth bomber, at a cost of \$70 billion, and I say no. Should we build two mobile missiles that we do not need? I say no. A number of other weapons systems we will challenge on this floor that we do not need and will give us the opportunity to redirect our resources, establish new priorities and reduce the budget deficit.

I look forward to a rational debate, and I wish very much, Mr. Chairman, that we would have come to the floor with the kind of time that would allow us to speak so that this gentleman would not be reduced to begging for 1 minute to talk about a \$300 billion military budget and the future of this Nation and the future of the world.

Mr. Chairman, title II of H.R. 2461, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1990 provides authorization of \$39.6 billion for defense research, development, test and evaluation. Although this is the same level as requested by the Bush administration, some significant shifting in priorities has taken place.

The most significant change made by the committee in title II (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) is centered on technology base programs. A number of experts advised the committee, during our hearings, that the component of the RDT&E budget with greatest opportunity to help maintain a strong defense industrial technology base is the research, what we call 6.1, and the exploratory development, known as 6.2, categories. The committee is painfully aware that beginning in the late 1960's, an unchecked erosion of the defense technology base has occurred, with the Department of Defense spending a little

more than half the funds it spent in 1965 on technology base programs. The committee has started a major initiative intended to both correct trends and redirect certain efforts in the defense technology base program that will insure a vigorous, modern and advancing pool of technology will be available to provide the needs of the Nation's defense in the future.

The initiative would also provide a real growth rate of 2 percent each year over the next 5 years, for technology base programs. The committee has recommended specific programs in fiscal year 1990 intended to foster and encourage linkages among the Department of Defense, industry, and universities, and to bolster the defense industrial base by providing greater opportunity for "spin off" technology into the civilian sector for commercialization. These specific programs include additional authorization for high temperature superconductivity, high definition television, digital gallium arsenide microelectronics, neural networks, x-ray lithography, university research, defense sciences and exploratory development.

The committee is also recommending additional authorization of \$95 million and \$90 million, respectively, for advanced submarine technology and anti-submarine warfare technology.

This title also contains \$285 million to continue research for the national aerospace plane.

Another major concern of the committee was what we have called satellite survivability, an area which some people call Asat or anti-satellite capability. The committee is recommending that the administration perform an extensive analysis of options for countering Soviet Asat and military satellite capabilities. At a minimum, the committee wants this analysis to address treaty options, verification requirements, satellite survivability enhancements, rapid replenishment of space assets, Asat options, and perform net assessments of various combinations of these options. The committee also believes that there should be a better balance between the Asat activities and the satellite survivability activities and is therefore recommending an additional authorization of \$35 million for satellite survivability programs, \$35 million for rapid replenishment programs, and \$2 million for additional verification capability. The committee has also directed that the Secretary of Defense not carry out any tests of the MIRACL [the mid infrared advanced chemical laser] against an object in space unless specifically approved by Congress.

The committee has made a substantial reduction in the strategic defense initiative program reducing the request of \$4.6 billion down to \$3.5 billion, to bring the program more in line with the previous 2-year funding level.

Finally, the committee agreed to continue the V-22 R&D Program by utilizing offsetting funds from the B-2 advanced technology bomber program.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yielded 4 minutes to the very distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. IRELAND].

Mr. IRELAND. I am not at all happy about the shape and makeup of the fiscal year 1990-91 defense authoriza-

tion bill as it is being presented on the floor today.

The problem in my mind boils down to one very simple fact: there isn't enough money downstream to fund the programs in the bill. The Pentagon has had a habit over the years of undertaking more programs than can be covered by its budget. Very simply—the programs don't fit in the long-term budget, and the committee, in all its wisdom, has made matters worse.

Mr. Charles Bowsher, Comptroller General, testified recently that an additional \$150 billion will be needed over the next 5 years to fund the programs in the defense budget. This assessment is based on the GAO's first time ever evaluation of the 5-year defense program. Our committee compounded the money shortfall by adding billions and billions of dollars for programs like the V-22 and F-14D and National Guard and Reserve initiatives that were not requested. Although Congress has no capability to determine with precision what the additional 5-year costs of those acts will be, you can be sure that DOD will need an extra \$200 billion or more through fiscal year 1994 to fund the bill approved by the committee.

We all know in reality it won't work that way. The extra money needed to pay the bill just isn't there. DOD will have to make massive cuts in the out-years. We must face up to the realities of the DOD funding shortfall now, to avoid the high cost and terrible waste of stretchouts and terminations down the road.

Secretary Cheney has made some very tough decisions and canceled programs based not on their individual merits but on their costs. The cancellation of the V-22, for instance, after the expenditure of more than \$2 billion is outright waste that could have been avoided if previous administrations had done better long-range planning. The V-22 is a prime example of what happens when Pentagon planners ignore fiscal realities. The time has come to end this kind of agonizing waste and to use the 5-year defense program as a credible planning tool.

To avoid past fiscal pitfalls, I will vote for the amendment to restore the Cheney procurement account as originally proposed and to knock out all the add ons made by the committee such as the V-22 and F-14D and the National Guard and Reserve initiatives.

Simple math will tell you that there isn't enough money in the defense budget to buy the V-22, F-14D, Midetman small ICBM, B-2 bomber, MX Rail Garrison, SDI, LHX helicopter to name a few of the big ticket items in the pipeline. We must pick and choose. We don't need two mobile, land-based ICBM programs, and the MX Rail Garrison is the way to go. Another \$50

billion, and possibly more, will be needed to finish the B-2 bomber whose mission is not clear. This is a logical place to halt the program. The Air Force should be allowed to flight test a small number of B-2 prototypes to explore stealth technology while keeping future options open.

In keeping with this spirit and philosophy, I have focused my energies this year on two rather specific issues: First, a search for ways to improve long-range financial planning at the Pentagon; and second, the elimination of military and civilian personnel assigned to the missile units slated for deactivation under the INF Treaty.

My initiatives are largely embodied in the bill before you, and I will describe them in some detail in my revised remarks. I hope my colleagues will take heed and resist the temptation to authorize commitments to programs whose future costs we cannot possibly afford.

FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PLANNING

AMENDMENTS

At the Investigations Subcommittee markup session on June 22, I offered first, an amendment to maintain consistency between the Department of Defense [DOD] 5-year defense program [FYDP] and the President's budget; and second, report language recommending that the committee begin to examine ways to link its decisions to a 5-year funding plan. My proposals were adopted by the subcommittee and subsequently approved by the full committee.

OBJECTIVE

Since the beginning of the year, I have been hammering away at the FYDP. I want to put an end to the continuing mismatch between the DOD 5-year plan and the President's budget and overall fiscal policy. I want to see the FYDP returned to its original stature as the Department's premier planning and programming document. The DOD FYDP is supposed to reflect all the decisions taken by the Secretary of Defense to bring all programs into line with the President's fiscal guidance, but the process is no longer functioning. The hard choices are not being made in a timely way.

PROBLEM

Long-range financial planning at the Pentagon is in total disarray.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 10, 1989, Mr. Charles Bowsher of the General Accounting Office [GAO] presented the results of the GAO's first evaluation of the FYDP. It was a bleak picture indeed. The FYDP has ceased to be a useful planning tool.

He stated that DOD's 5-year planning "has been fiscally unrealistic" and admitted under questioning that the FYDP was essentially worthless. He said: "tough decisions and tradeoffs are not made in the plan—everybody gets what they want," which leads to "program funding instability, costly stretchouts, and program terminations." In summary, Bowsher said, "this is not an effective way for DOD to manage." He concluded his testi-

mony by reporting that an additional \$147 billion would have to be cut from the programs in the FYDP to bring them into line with available funding. I request permission to place the results of the GAO's evaluation of the fiscal year 1990-94 FYDP in the RECORD.

The FYDP has several major deficiencies. First, the programs don't fit in the budget. The dollar cost of the programs in the fiscal year 1990-94 FYDP exceed the money in the President's budget by \$45 billion. Second, the FYDP is based on unrealistic economic assumptions. For example, the FYDP assumes an inflation rate of 3.6 percent in 1990 declining to 1.7 percent in 1994 and a 2-percent growth rate in fiscal year 1993-94. Third, there is a continuing mismatch between projected funding levels and congressional appropriations of major proportions, ranging from a low of -4.5 percent to a high of +69.9 percent. Fourth, program costs are consistently underestimated. These shortcomings are a failure of leadership in the Pentagon—tough decisions are postponed, which leads to instability, stretchouts, and wasteful terminations like the V-22 and F-14D.

TWO-PHASED SOLUTION

For the short term, I am recommending some very modest changes—fine tuning—of the legislation governing submission of the FYDP to Congress. For the long-term, I want the committee to begin exploring ways to link its decisions to a 5-year funding plan.

CHANGES TO LAW GOVERNING SUBMISSION OF FYDP: SECTION 1202 OF BILL

AMENDMENT

The committee has agreed to my proposals to first, amend the law governing submission of the FYDP by striking the language allowing inconsistencies between the FYDP and the President's budget; and second, rewrite the original law to simplify and clarify the language. I request permission to place bill and report language in RECORD.

RATIONALE

First, I believe that the dollars programmed in the FYDP should conform with the President's fiscal guidance. In the past, there have been vast discrepancies between the dollars in the FYDP and the President's budget. A law was passed in 1987 to end that practice. At that time, there was an \$80 billion mismatch between the FYDP and the budget. Unfortunately, the practice continues. The fiscal years 1990-94 FYDP is no exception—a \$45 billion gap persists. A tricky accounting device, known as a negative funding wedge, was inserted into the FYDP to make the dollar totals in the FYDP and budget match as required by law. The fiscal years 1990-94 FYDP complies with the law since an explanation—albeit convoluted—was provided.

The FYDP has no value as a planning tool if the dollars programmed exceed the money in the budget. A failure to squeeze the programs into the budget means the hard choices have been postponed.

My amendment would close the loophole in existing legislation that allows discrepancies between the FYDP and budget by stipulating that FYDP's be consistent with the President's budget. Very simply, it says the FYDP must conform with the President's fiscal guidance. That's it. This amendment exemplifies macro-

management not micromanagement—and the kind of approach Congress should take on defense issues in the future.

The use of the word "consistent" is general enough to permit some minor differences—and some flexibility—when and where appropriate. I asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood during a hearing before the Armed Services Committee on July 12, to comment on the requirement for consistency between FYDP and the budget under the new legislation. He said, "I agree they ought to be consistent. That is a point well taken."

Others in DOD have suggested that my amendment would preclude the use of management contingency accounts in the budget. That simply is not the case.

DOD would still determine the form and substance of the FYDP. If DOD needs additional flexibility—a cushion or positive wedge—as a hedge against unanticipated requirements such as cost growth or higher than expected inflation, then such accounts should be included in both the FYDP and the budget. Positive contingencies have been in use for years and are considered useful and legitimate planning tools. The use of negative wedges in the FYDP, by comparison, is without precedent, and they are, in fact, outlawed in defense contracting, because they were once used by defense contractors to hide the cost overruns. The result of that practice, according to the DOD Deputy Inspector General, "was a breakdown in management control, discipline, and reliable reporting." Clearly, the use in DOD's central planning document would undermine its integrity. I request permission to put Mr. Vander Schaaf's report in the RECORD.

NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL 5-YEAR FUNDING PLAN: REPORT LANGUAGE

Each year Congress makes major decisions on defense, issues that entail spending commitments far into the future, yet Congress lacks the capability to determine what effects those decisions have on outyear funding levels. Congress needs to better understand the future consequences of its near-term budget decisions.

The Joint Committee on Taxation, for example, has an impressive capability, using computer models along with extensive access to executive branch data, to determine how changes in the tax structure effect revenues over 5 years. Though by no means an exact science, that capability provides a useful tool for evaluation proposed changes, and in the long-term should provide a more systematic way of making decisions. Expense estimates should be on an equal footing with revenue estimates. The defense committees need to acquire an information system that projects the outyear consequences of their near-term program and budget decisions.

My language on page 323 of the committee report recommends that the committee begin to explore ways to link its decisions to projected 5-year funding levels in line with the recommendations of the Packard Commission. Congress might legislate a 5-year defense plan. While fixed in law, such a plan would not be binding. It would represent no more than a declaration of policy that would commit Congress to a set of fiscal objectives.

As a first step, CBO is directed to conduct an experiment by attempting to project the outyear fiscal impact of changes to the fiscal year 1990-91 budget request as reflected in the conference report on the fiscal year 1990 defense appropriations bill and to provide the committee with the results of the analysis within a reasonable period of time.

I am also planning to convene a panel of experts, under the auspices of the Congressional Research Service, to examine all the issues—technical, legal, organizational—surrounding the question of how to link congressional defense decisions to a 5-year budget plan. And as we search for ways to establish linkage between congressional decisions and long-range fiscal policy, we have to also find a way to link strategic and policy decisions in the JCS with the FYDP as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

INF PERSONNEL AMENDMENTS

The bill, as presented on the floor today, incorporates the bulk of my amendments relating to military and civilian personnel covered by the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter range missiles, commonly referred to as the INF Treaty. These amendments are discussed on pages 261 and 262 of the committee report and are included in sections 401-402 of the bill. I request permission to place in RECORD.

The amendment has two main parts: First, lower troop ceiling in Europe; and second cuts end-strengths of the military services. The proposed cutbacks would be gradually phased in over 2 years to coincide with the schedule for unit deactivations.

RATIONALE

The military and civilian positions that would be eliminated under my proposal would be taken from first the Air Force ground-launched cruise [GLCM] and Army Pershing missile units slated for elimination under the INF Treaty and second the excess headquarters slots selected for elimination by the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the JCS, and Inspector General.

Initially, there was considerable disagreement over the exact number of personnel involved in these realignments, but the matter has now been resolved and carefully documented in several GAO reports. I request permission to place reports in the RECORD.

Most of the INF and excess headquarters personnel, under DOD plans, would be reassigned in Europe or elsewhere, negating potential savings and efficiencies. Vacant positions in Europe could be a bottomless pit. If DOD has urgent requirements there, then it should ask Congress to raise the ceiling.

Between 1983 and 1985, Congress raised the troop ceiling in Europe by 10,814 personnel, in part, to make room for INF deployments, and 2,600 INF personnel are exempted from the ceiling. The ceiling was raised mainly because of GLCM, since the Pershing II's were swapped out one-for-one with Pershing I's. With the INF Treaty now in effect, the ceiling should be lowered and the waiver removed. The INF Treaty eliminates an entire mission. Personnel performing that mission, including excess headquarters personnel, can

now be taken out without affecting our military capabilities one iota. With the recommended end-strength reductions, the CBO estimates that \$2.3 billion could be saved through fiscal year 1994.

SUBCOMMITTEE—LOWER TROOP CEILING

The Military Personnel Subcommittee adopted part of the amendment as follows:

Lower ceiling in Europe for military personnel from 326,414 to 311,627—a reduction of 14,787, including 14,559 INF personnel and 228 excess headquarters personnel; some excess headquarters personnel linked to INF; 1,305 excess headquarters personnel cut from service end-strengths in fiscal year 1990; and 939 excess civilian headquarters positions reallocated to medical support activities.

FULL COMMITTEE—CUT END-STRENGTH

In the full committee, I introduced a perfecting amendment to cut Air Force end-strength and eliminate INF civilian employees from the DOD work force.

The full committee agreed to an additional end-strength reduction of 4,385 for the Air Force. Planned Air Force end-strength reductions of 4,200 through fiscal year 1991 did not fully offset the 8,585 Air Force personnel assigned to INF—8,585 minus 4,200 equals 4,385. Further reductions were clearly in order. By contrast, no Army end-strength reductions were necessary. Planned Army end-strength reductions of 7,700 through fiscal year 1991 exceeded the number of Army personnel—6,974—assigned to INF.

Following full committee action on the bill, there remained one unresolved portion of my INF initiative.

FLOOR AMENDMENT—INF CIVILIANS

The full committee decided to defer action on the 1,142 civilian employees assigned to INF units, pending further investigation. I then asked the GAO and DOD to provide me with the latest available information on the disposition of these employees. On June 17, I received a brief report prepared by the GAO, indicating that most of these employees are scheduled to be eliminated from the work force by the end of fiscal year 1991. request permission to place report in RECORD. That being the case, I decided to modify and refocus the final piece of the initiative.

Consistent with my amendments relating to military personnel assigned to INF units, the modified amendment, which I will offer on the floor, would reduce the number of DOD civilians in Europe by 1,017—the number assigned to INF units there. The recommended reduction would take effect by the end of fiscal year 1991.

The approach taken in the case of the civilians is identical to the approach taken in the case of military personnel: first, reduce the number of personnel in Europe; and second, cut the end-strength or work force. Another approach would be to establish a ceiling on civilian personnel in Europe, but I know the committee is adamantly opposed to such a policy, so I selected a more acceptable approach.

A United States-Soviet treaty has been signed, ratified, and taken effect. That treaty eliminates the need for those civilians. The military need for these people simply disappears, therefore the total number of DOD civil-

ians assigned to duty in Europe should be decreased accordingly.

The latest DOD information suggests, however, that the trend is in the opposite direction—civilian strength in Europe is creeping upward. Between September 30, 1988, shortly after the INF Treaty took effect, and March 31, 1989, the number of civilians in Europe increased from 105,284 to 106,630—an increase of 1,346. This is the continuation of a trend that began in the early 1980's when there were about 95,000 civilians in Europe. And there is room for expansion. A large number of authorized and funded civilian positions in Europe lie vacant. The Air Force, for example, which has 96 percent of the INF civilians in Europe—974 of 1,017, has close to 900 vacant slots in Europe.

Further increases in the number of DOD civilians in Europe must be stopped. This trend must be reversed, or else the Appropriations Committee will put a much tighter lid on the number of civilians overseas and in Europe, and I will help them do it. My approach is a more reasonable one.

The need for 1,017 civilians positions in Europe no longer exists. I hope you will support my amendment when it is brought to a vote.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC, June 8, 1989.

B-229195.1.

HON. ANDY IRELAND,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. IRELAND: This letter is in response to your May 17, 1989, request for our assistance in drafting legislative amendments to address inconsistencies between the Department of Defense's (DOD) Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) and the President's budget.

Section 114(f) of title 10, United States Code, specifies that program and budget information submitted to the Congress by DOD be mutually consistent with the President's budget submission unless, in the case of each inconsistency, there is included detailed reasons for the inconsistency.

As you know, DOD used negative accounting entries in its fiscal year 1990-94 FYDP to bring it in line with the President's budget. The procurement line in the FYDP for these years contains \$21.7 billion more than is included in the top-line figures of the President's budget. The FYDP also includes a line entitled "unanticipated requirements" totaling \$23.3 billion, which is not reflected in the President's budget. Together, these additions total \$45 billion. To bring the FYDP in line with the President's budget, negative entries called "program estimates" were used to offset the \$45 billion.

An explanation of the negative entries was provided in the FYDP. DOD explained that \$21.7 billion in procurement over-programming represents approximately 2 to 3 percent of the programs currently planned that historically do not materialize, and can be scrubbed out as out-year plans become more defined budget year proposals. DOD explained that the \$23.3 billion for unanticipated requirements contains no programmatic content at this time, but is intended to account for requirements likely to emerge but are not yet known.

Section 114(g), of title 10, United States Code, specifies that the "Secretary of defense shall submit to the Congress, not later than April 1, of each year, the FYDP used

by the Secretary in formulating the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations included in such budget to support programs, projects, and activities of the Department of Defense."

The April 1 date was specified in the law for the purpose of providing DOD with an opportunity either to fully conform the FYDP with the President's budget submission or to explain any remaining differences. The current program planning and budgeting system (PPBS) results in a FYDP that is consistent with the President's budget at or about the time of the budget submission. Some additional time (up to 2 weeks) is routinely required to have the FYDP documents printed for distribution to authorized recipients.

Since 1963 the FYDPs supporting DOD budget proposals have been distributed in January or early February each year. The only exceptions were January 1987 and January 1988 when DOD did not publish FYDPs in support of its first biennial budget (fiscal years 1988-89).

DOD officials told us that delaying submission of the FYDP until April is not necessary. They stated that inconsistencies would only occur under unusual or extraordinary circumstances such as a major change in fiscal guidance at the last minute. In such an event, and on an individual case basis, it is expected that DOD and the Congress would agree on a sufficient amount of time necessary to produce a corrected FYDP.

In conclusion, the Congress intended for DOD to provide a FYDP that is mutually consistent with the President's budget. In the event that a FYDP could not be completely updated to match the President's budget before submission to the Congress, the law required that any inconsistencies be explained. We do not believe Congress intended for DOD to intentionally include programming and other entries that exceed the President's budget. We believe the FYDP is inherently flexible, and if funding provisions are needed for unanticipated requirements, they should be reflected in both the FYDP and the President's budget.

To address your concern that future FYDPs be consistent with the President's budget and be submitted in a timely manner, Congress may wish to consider the following legislative changes:

"Section 114(f) of title 10, United States Code, be amended by striking out 'unless in the case of each inconsistency, there is included detailed reasons for the inconsistency'."

"Section 114(g) of title 10, United States Code, be amended by striking out 'not later than April 1 of each year, the five-year defense program' and replacing this language with 'at or about the time of the President's budget submission each year, a fully current five-year defense program'."

The Congress may also want to consider legislation that will ensure that a current FYDP is produced each time the President submits a new proposed defense budget. Under biennial defense budgets, there is the potential that the FYDP would not be kept current in the intervening year. This could result in the FYDP becoming detached from changes in fiscal guidance as we experienced last year. This makes it difficult for the Congress to exercise effective oversight.

DOD officials told us that they are conducting a program execution review that is scheduled to be completed on September 15, 1989. This review is in preparation for the fall comprehensive budget review. The ob-

jectives of the review are (1) elimination of negative planning wedges in the FYDP, (2) close consideration of the affordability of currently proposed major weapons programs, and (3) an examination of the impact growing amounts of prior obligations have on future outlay requirements.

Our review of defense planning will continue. We plan to identify models or other analytical procedures that can be used to better reflect the out-year implications of current budget decisions. We will continue to work with your staff and keep them informed as our work progresses.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK C. CONAHAN,
Assistant Comptroller General.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION.

Washington, DC, May 8, 1989.

Hon. ANDY IRELAND,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. IRELAND: This letter is in response to your May 3, 1989, request concerning the use of negative program planning entries in DOD's Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and an undistributed contingencies account.

The procurement line in the FYDP contains \$21.7 billion more than is included in the topline figures of the President's budget. Also, there is a new line entitled "unanticipated requirements" that totals \$23.3 billion for which there is not defined programmatic content at this time. Together, these positive additions total \$45 billion. Under current fiscal guidance, the entire \$45 billion would have to be eliminated to come in line with the President's topline estimates. In the meantime, the \$21.7 billion in procurement and the \$23.3 billion in allowances for unanticipated requirements is being offset by a single negative entry called "program estimates". The single negative entry offsets the two positive additions in each of the three outyears so that the FYDP topline will be consistent with the President's budget submission. No other positive or negative planning wedges are evident in the FYDP.

You also asked about the undistributed contingencies account. In the past this account retained sums to cover potential future pay raises, amounts for future undefined initiatives, and amounts to cover legislative proposals. Currently, this account contains only a small amount to cover future legislative proposals. Estimates to account for future pay raises are now contained in the Military Personnel and Operations and Maintenance accounts. The undistributed contingencies account in the last FYDP (FY 1988-92) contained \$19.6 billion to cover future, but not yet defined, initiatives. This amount was eliminated as part of the \$311 billion in FYDP reductions DOD made between fiscal years 1988 and 1994.

As we stated in our April 21, 1989, letter to you we are concerned that programming in excess of the established fiscal guidance delays and compounds difficult decisions necessary to bring the FYDP within current fiscal realities. When program planning be-

comes detached from reality it provides an inaccurate view of the future and can hinder rather than assist current decision-making.

We are continuing our review of DOD's fiscal year 1990-94 FYDP and will keep your staff advised on the progress of this work.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL F. MATH,
Director of Research, Development, Acquisition, and Procurement Issues.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,

Washington, DC, April 21, 1989.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you know, we have been reviewing DOD's fiscal year 1990-94 Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). On February 3, 1989, we received a request from Congressman Andy Ireland concerning inconsistencies between the Department of Defense's (DOD) FYDP and the President's budget. He specifically asked that we comment on the use of negative "program estimates" in DOD's fiscal year 1990-94 FYDP. In response to Congressman Ireland's request we provided the following information.

DOD used negative accounting entries totaling \$45 billion to offset over programming in two accounts—procurement and unanticipated requirements. DOD states that the \$45 billion for fiscal years 1992-94 represents reductions it intends to make in future years to bring the FYDP in line with former President Reagan's fiscal year 1990 budget submission.

Section 114, of title 10, United States Code, specifies that all program and budget information submitted to the Congress by DOD be mutually consistent with the President's budget submission unless the reasons for the inconsistencies are explained in detail.

DOD, in its January 11, 1989, letter transmitting the FYDP to the Congress, acknowledges that the fiscal year 1992-94 defense program was developed at a higher level than the budget submitted. DOD explains that ultimately the over programming will be eliminated through an overall net reduction between new requirements that will emerge over the next two years and requirements now anticipated that will not materialize. DOD believes this is a reasonable planning posture given the difficulty in determining which programs to reduce in later years.

While we understand DOD's desire for additional flexibility, we are concerned that negative program planning delays and compounds hard decisions necessary to bring the FYDP within current fiscal realities. For example, President Bush recently reduced the fiscal year 1990-94 defense program by \$60 billion. To meet this new fiscal guidance DOD will now have to reduce its total program \$105 billion (\$45 billion in delayed reductions and \$60 billion in new reductions). It is our understanding that DOD will make the \$60 billion in reductions but

plans to maintain approximately \$45 billion in defense programming in excess of new budget guidance established for fiscal years 1992-94.

We are continuing our review of DOD's fiscal year 1990-94 FYDP and will keep your staff advised on the progress of this work.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL F. MATH,
Director of Research, Development, Acquisition, and Procurement Issues.

BRIEFING PAPER: LEVELS OF DEFENSE PROGRAMMING—FISCAL YEARS 1986-1994

[Figures not reproducible in the RECORD]

During the Reagan Administration, more defense growth was planned than could be funded. Defense programming was growing at such a rate that the FY 1986-90 five year defense program (FYDP) totaled nearly \$2 trillion. The initial planning figure for FY 1990 alone was \$478 billion. Since this program was submitted to Congress in January 1985, DOD has made a considerable effort to reduce its future programming and bring its budget proposals more in line with national resources. As a result, a net \$371 billion in planned future growth has been deleted since FY 1986. This briefing paper provides a perspective on reductions to the defense program and additional reductions that may be required to meet funding constraints. The analysis is presented in 3 parts.

Part I shows changes in the amounts of defense planning for each five year defense program (FYDP) since FY 1986. Part I also provides an analysis of these changes by major appropriation account.

Part II discusses nearly \$150 billion in additional reductions that may be required to bring the FYDP within current fiscal constraints.

Part III provides a breakdown of President Bush's revisions to President Reagan's FY 1990-94 defense program estimates.

PART I

Figure 1, and tables 1 and 2, show DOD's plans/reality mismatch. The mismatch resulted primarily from DOD's assumptions that funding increases it experienced during the early 1980s would continue into the early 1990s. For example, the five year spending plan for 1986-1990 totaled \$1.9 trillion. This was several hundred billion more than was ultimately funded. Between 1981 and 1985 more weapons were being planned and developed than could be produced in an economic manner or supported once they were produced.

Figure 1, and tables 1 and 2, also show that DOD substantially reduced its five year spending plans subsequent to 1986 and that progress was made in closing the gap between planned and actual spending. Figure 1 also indicates, that DOD assumes its funding proposals for FY 1990-94 will be sufficient to execute that program. In Part II, figure 2, we reconstruct this graph using less optimistic planning assumptions. Under these assumptions an additional \$147 billion in reductions may still be required to meet future funding constraints.

TABLE 1.—REDUCTIONS IN DEFENSE PROGRAMMING—FISCAL YEAR 1986 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 1994

(Budget authority in billions of current year dollars)

Fiscal year	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	5-year total	Difference
1986	313.7	354.0	401.6	438.8	477.7					1985.8	—
1987		311.6	332.4	353.5	374.7	395.5				1767.7	-218.1
1988			303.3	323.3	343.9	364.9	386.5			1721.9	-45.8
1989				290.8	307.3	324.3	342.0	360.3		1624.7	-97.2
1990 (R) ¹					305.6	320.9	335.7	350.7	365.6	1678.5	-53.8
1990 (B) ^{1 2}					295.6	311.0	322.0	335.9	349.8	1614.3	-64.2
Total											-371.5

¹ Does not include \$45 billion (then year dollars) planning wedge.² From testimony of the Secretary of Defense to the House Armed Services Committee, Apr. 25, 1989.

(R) Reagan budget submission.

(B) Bush budget submission.

Source: Annual Reports to the Congress, Secretary of Defense, 1986-90.

TABLE 2.—REDUCTIONS IN DEFENSE PROGRAMMING—FISCAL YEAR 1986 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 1994

(Budget authority in billions of constant 1986 dollars)

Fiscal year	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	5-year total	Difference
1986	313.7	343.4	376.2	396.9	419.5					1849.8	—
1987		302.3	311.6	319.8	329.0	337.5				1600.2	-249.6
1988			284.4	292.5	302.0	311.4	321.7			1512.0	-88.2
1989				263.1	269.8	276.8	284.7	293.2		1387.6	-124.4
1990 (R) ¹					268.3	273.9	279.4	285.4	291.4	1398.5	-10.9
1990 (B) ^{1 2}					259.6	265.4	268.0	273.4	278.8	1345.2	-53.3
Total											-504.6

¹ Does not include \$45 billion (then year dollars) planning wedge.² From testimony of the Secretary of Defense to the House Armed Services Committee, Apr. 25, 1989.

(R) Reagan budget submission.

(B) Bush budget submission.

Source: Annual Reports to the Congress, Secretary of Defense, 1986-90.

Tables 3 and 4 show reductions in DOD's planned spending by major appropriation account since fiscal year 1986. Table 3 shows the 1990-1994 five year plan is \$371 billion less than the 1986-90 plan in current dollars. Procurement reductions accounted for \$231 billion or 33 percent of total reductions. These reductions were primarily in

support equipment and facilities, spare and repair parts, ammunition, and other procurements. Some major weapon systems were terminated while a number of major weapon systems procurements were reduced, delayed, or stretched out. Additionally, the research and development account was reduced by \$50 billion representing 20

percent of the overall cuts with significant reductions in Strategic Defense Initiative programs. DOD also reduced the operations and maintenance account by \$45 billion or 9 percent. Table 4 represents these figures to constant 1986 dollars.

TABLE 3.—CHANGES IN DEFENSE PROGRAMMING BY MAJOR APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT—FISCAL YEAR 1986 FISCAL YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAMMING COMPARED TO FISCAL YEAR 1990

FISCAL YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAMMING

(Budget authority in billions of current year dollars)

Appropriation account	Fiscal year 1986-90 5-year figures	Percent of the budget	Fiscal year 1990-94 5-year figures	Percent of the budget	Difference	Percent change	Percent of total reduction
Military personnel	385.3	19.4	418.2	25.9	32.9	8.5	8.9
O&M	529.0	26.6	484.2	30.0	-44.8	-8.5	-12.1
Procurement	692.4	34.9	461.7	28.6	-230.7	-33.3	-62.1
RDTE	253.0	12.7	202.6	12.6	-50.3	-19.9	-13.6
Military construction	52.8	2.7	29.6	1.8	-23.3	-44.0	-6.3
Family housing	21.8	1.1	19.2	1.2	-2.6	-11.7	-.7
Other	51.5	2.6	1.2	.1	-50.3	-97.6	-13.5
Total	1985.8	100.0	1,614.3	100.0	-371.5	-18.7	-100.0

TABLE 4.—CHANGES IN DEFENSE PROGRAMMING BY MAJOR APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT FISCAL YEAR 1986 FISCAL YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAMMING COMPARED TO FISCAL YEAR 1990

FISCAL YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAMMING

(Budget authority in billions of constant 1986 dollars)

Appropriation account	Fiscal year 1986-90 5-year figures	Percent of the budget	Fiscal year 1990-94 5-year figures	Percent of the budget	Difference	Percent change	Percent of total reduction
Military personnel	364.2	19.7	353.8	26.3	-10.4	-2.9	-2.1
O&M	490.2	26.5	396.0	29.4	-94.2	-19.2	-18.8
Procurement	644.2	34.8	388.3	28.8	-255.9	-39.7	-51.1
RDTE	234.6	12.7	168.2	12.5	-66.4	-28.3	-13.3
Military Construction	48.7	2.6	24.6	1.8	-24.1	-49.5	-4.8
Family housing	20.4	1.1	16.1	1.2	-4.3	-21.1	-.9
Other	46.8	2.5	1.0	.1	-45.8	-97.9	-9.1
Total	1849.1	100.0	1348.0	100.0	-501.1	-27.1	-100.0

PART II

Figure 2 indicates that a plan/reality mismatch of nearly \$150 billion may still exist over the next four years. This gap is based on what we believe are 4 primary weaknesses in DOD's FYDP projections presented in part I. These factors are as follows. (1) \$12.2 billion reduction required to correct overstatement in real growth estimates; (2) \$42.3 billion reduction required if Congress grants full inflation funding but no real growth; (3) \$45 billion reduction required to bring FYDP down to current topline guidance; and (4) \$47.8 billion in program reductions to offset losses in purchasing power resulting from underestimates of inflation.

Adjustment to FY 1990 Growth Base: Currently, the out-years of the FYDP reflect 1 percent real growth for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 and 2 percent real growth for fiscal years 1993 and 1994. Using these growth projections DOD estimates the total FYDP is \$1,614 billion over the 5-years. These growth figures, however, are calculated based on President Bush's initial FY 1990 submission of \$299 billion and not the currently proposed FY 1990 budget of \$295 billion. This requires an initial downward correction in DOD's estimated funding levels of \$12.2 billion to \$1,602 billion. The annual amount of program reductions that would be necessary to make the correction is presented in table 5.

TABLE 5.—ADJUSTMENT TO NEW BUDGET BASE OF \$295 BILLION

[In billions of dollars]						
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	Total 1990-94
1991-94 real growth (DOD).....	295.6	311.0	322.0	335.9	349.8	1,614.3
1991-94 real growth (GAO).....	295.6	308.1	319.6	333.2	345.6	1,602.1
Subtotal.....	0.0	2.9	2.4	2.7	4.2	12.2

* The current fiscal year 1990 defense budget proposal is \$295.6 billion as indicated in table 1. DOD has calculated its proposed real growth in the out-years 1991-94 on President Bush's initial submission of \$299 billion for fiscal year 1990.

Zero Real Growth: Assuming Congress grants DOD full inflation funding, but no real growth, for fiscal years 1991-94 additional reductions of \$42.3 billion will be required (see table 6).

TABLE 6.—ZERO REAL GROWTH FISCAL YEAR 1991-94

	[In billions of dollars]					
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	Total 1990-94
Bush Amend, Adm Inf, 1,1,2,2.....	295.6	308.1	319.6	333.2	345.6	1,602.1
Bush Amend, Adm Inf, 0 Real.....	295.6	305.1	313.3	320.2	325.6	1,559.8
Subtotal.....	0.0	3.1	6.3	13.0	20.0	42.3

Negative Planning Wedges: Currently, DOD's FYDP accounts total \$1,659 billion. To bring the overall FYDP down to the President's topline guidance of \$1,614, DOD used negative adjusting entries for fiscal years 1992, 93, and 94 totaling \$45 billion (see table 7). According to DOD, the \$45 billion adjustment to program estimates represents reduction decisions planned but not yet made.

TABLE 7.—REDUCTIONS PLANNED BUT NOT YET MADE (\$45 BILLION)

	[In billions of dollars]					
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	Total 1990-94
FYDP accts.....	295.6	311.0	336.0	350.9	365.8	1,659.3
Submitted Bush toplines.....	296.5	311.0	322.0	335.9	349.8	1,614.3
Subtotal.....	0.0	0.0	14.0	15.0	16.0	45.0

Inflation Assumptions: The Administration's inflation assumptions are very optimistic. Current estimates assume inflation will be 3.6 percent in FY 1990 and fall to 1.7 percent by 1994. CBO inflation estimates assume inflation will be somewhat higher than 4 percent over the entire five year period. Under CBO's inflation assumptions DOD will experience \$47.8 billion in lost purchasing power over the 4 year period 1991-94. In other words, nearly \$50 billion in current defense programming would not be funded under the Administration's proposal (see table 8).

TABLE 8.—CBO VERSUS ADMINISTRATION INFLATION ASSUMPTIONS

	[In billions of dollars]					
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	Total 1990-94
Bush Amend, CBO Inf, 1,1,2,2.....	295.6	311.0	327.1	347.3	368.8	1,649.9
Bush Amend, Adm, Inf, 1,1,2,2.....	295.6	308.1	319.6	333.2	345.6	1,602.1
Subtotal.....	0.0	3.0	7.5	14.2	23.2	47.8
Grand Total Tables 5-8.....	0.0	9.0	30.2	44.9	63.4	147.5

Note.—Figures in table 8 may not add exactly due to rounding.

Making these additional reductions will require difficult decisions and tradeoffs among broad areas where gains have been made such as (1) maintaining or reducing force structure in terms of people and equipment, (2) maintaining or reducing the pace of modernization in terms of cancelling new systems or stretching out procurement of others, reducing current levels of readiness and sustainability.

Adding to the difficulty of these decisions are the constraints imposed by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction act. Meeting annual budget outlay targets has historically resulted in reductions in areas that have the greatest impact on outlays for that budget year. Weapon systems outlays are relatively low during the initial stages of development but increases drastically once they reach production. However by this time a substantial commitment has been incurred. Therefore, if some costly programs are not terminated, or force structure reduced, more weapon systems programs will be stretched out and funds needed to maintain military readiness and sustainability will bear a disproportionate share of reductions.

PART III

Table 9 presents a display of revisions made to President Reagan's FY 1990 five year defense budget proposal. The total reductions of \$64 billion are broken-down by appropriation account.

TABLE 9.—REVISIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FISCAL YEAR 1990-94 DEFENSE PROGRAM

	[In billions of dollars]			
Appropriation account	Original fiscal year 1990 plan	Revised fiscal year 1990 plan	Difference	Percent
Military personnel	421.874	418.207	-3.667	5.7
O & M	492.575	484.184	-8.391	13.1
Procurement	496.420	461.704	-34.716	54.0
R D T & E	211.368	202.647	-8.721	13.6
Military construction	32.484	29.552	-2.932	4.6
Family Housing	19.585	19.246	-0.339	5
Other	4.303	1.240	-3.063	4.8
Total	1678.653	1614.300	-64.309	100.0

SECTION 1202—RESTATEMENT AND CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR CONSISTENCY IN THE BUDGET PRESENTATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Section 1202 would amend the existing provision of law (10 U.S.C. 114 (f) and (g)) that requires the submission of the five year defense program to Congress by April 1 each year. The provision also calls for consistency between the budget projections in the President's budget and the five year defense program, but permits inconsistency if such inconsistency is explained. The amendment provision would adjust the date of submission to be at or about the time that the President's budget is submitted to Congress. The amended provision would also omit that language which, under current law, permits inconsistency between the President's budget and the five year defense program.

FIVE YEAR PLANNING

Each year, the committee makes major decisions on the Department of Defense (DoD) budget and programs that entail spending commitments far into the future. Presently the committee lacks the capability to estimate the effect of its decisions on outyear funding levels. The committee believes that it needs a basis to project the future consequences of its budget decisions.

In its final report the Packard Commission recommended that Congress develop a way to link its defense decisions to the DoD five year defense program. Consistent with that recommendation, the committee is exploring ways to link its decisions to a five year spending plan.

As a modest first step, the committee requests the Congressional Budget Office to project the outyear fiscal impact of congressional changes to the fiscal year 1990 and 1991 budget request, as reflected in the conference report on the fiscal year 1990 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, and submit the projection to the committee within a reasonable time after enactment of the Appropriations Act.

SEC. 1202. RESTATEMENT AND CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSISTENCY IN THE BUDGET PRESENTATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

(a) RESTATEMENT AND CLARIFICATION.—(1) Chapter 2 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 114 the following new section:

"§ 114a. Five Year Defense Program: submission to Congress; consistency in budgeting

"(a) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress each year, at or about the time that the President's budget is submitted to Congress that year under section 1105(a) of title 31, the current five-year defense program (including associated annexes) reflecting the estimated expendi-

tures and proposed appropriations included in the budget submitted to Congress by the President for that year.

"(b)(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that amounts described in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) are consistent with amounts described in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2).

"(2) Amounts referred to in paragraph (1) are the following:

"(A) The amounts specified in program and budget information submitted to Congress by the Secretary in support of expenditure estimates and proposed appropriations in the budget submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31 for any fiscal year, as shown in the five-year defense program submitted pursuant to subsection (a).

"(B) The total amounts of estimated appropriations necessary to support the programs, projects, and activities of the Department of Defense included pursuant to paragraph (5) of section 1105(a) of title 31 in the budget submitted to Congress under that section for any fiscal year."

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 114 the following new item:

"114a. Five-Year Defense Program: submission to Congress; consistency in budgeting."

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 114 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out subsections (f) and (g).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Arlington, VA, April 6, 1989.

HON. ANDY IRELAND,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: This is in reply to your letter of March 10, 1989, requesting an explanation of the term "negative management reserve."

The management reserve discussion in the Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) Joint Implementation Guide refers to a reserve that a contractor may set aside from the amount awarded on a contract. Its purpose is to provide a "performance measurement" budget for within scope problems that may occur during contract performance. The performance measurement reserve should not be confused with any reserves that may be established at the Government program office or higher management levels. It is used, for example, in contracts involving technical risk, where a contractor anticipates difficulties within the scope of the contract statement of work, but cannot determine when or where they will occur, or how serious they will be. Management reserve in this context is within the contractor's purview, and is not subject to use by the Government program manager.

The term "negative management reserve" in C/SCSC dates from the early years of C/SCSC implementation. Because C/SCSC requires disciplined contract cost management, overruns are identified earlier in contract performance than was true using previous management techniques. Some contractors, perhaps believing that the incurred overrun could be made up through improved performance in subsequent periods, entered a negative value in the management reserve block on their cost reports to the Government to offset the identified overrun. The result, however, was a breakdown in management control discipline and reliable reporting. A 1980 revision to the Joint Implementation Guide, used by the

Department of Defense to implement uniformly the C/SCSC requirements in Department of Defense Instruction 7000.2, Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria, added the clarifying statement, "There is no such thing as negative management reserve."

We are not aware of any contractors that are reporting negative entries for management reserve. Legal prohibition is unnecessary because the Joint Implementation Guide effectively prohibits their use in contractors' cost and schedule management control systems. In addition, the instructions in the Data Item Description for contractor cost performance reports to the Government Prohibit negative management reserve entries.

If you have any questions, please contact me or Mr. James J. McHale at 694-6257.

Sincerely,

DEREK J. VANDER SCHAAF,
Deputy Inspector General.

[Fact sheet for Hon. Andy Ireland, House of Representatives]

INF TREATY: ARMY AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,

Washington, DC, June 8, 1989.

B-230521.

HON. ANDY IRELAND,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. IRELAND: On January 24, 1989, you requested that we obtain information on the number of Department of Defense (DOD) military and civilian personnel associated with the weapon systems affected by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. As agreed with your office, we identified—to the extent possible—the authorized number of affected positions as of the treaty's effective date, June 1, 1988.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

When the treaty became effective, 16,701 military and civilian positions were authorized for the two affected units in Europe and the United States: the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) units, with 9,684 positions,¹ and the Pershing units, with 7,017 positions. By October 1, 1989, DOD plans to reduce GLCM and Pershing units by 5,822 positions—4,159 GLCM positions and 1,633 Pershing positions. By the end of fiscal year 1991, DOD estimates that all military and civilian positions formerly authorized for GLCM functions will be eliminated and 885 Pershing positions will remain.

BACKGROUND

The INF Treaty, signed on December 8, 1987, and effective on June 1, 1988, specifies that all missiles of a certain range, including their associated launchers, training equipment, and facilities, are to be destroyed within 3 years. For the United States, these missiles are the Air Force's GLCM and the Army's Pershing missiles. The operating bases for the GLCM are located in Belgium, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. All Pershing operating bases are located in West Germany. In addition, some personnel associated with these

¹ According to an Air Force document, the GLCM authorized level of 9,787 positions was adjusted to accommodate manpower for the On-Site Inspection Agency (55 positions) and a previously approved antiterrorism initiative (48 positions). Therefore, Air Force reduction plans address only 9,684 positions.

units are located in the United States. As a result of eliminating these missiles as required by the INF Treaty, DOD plans to deactivate all GLCM and Pershing units.

PERSONNEL POSITIONS AFFECTED BY THE INF TREATY

When the INF treaty became effective, 16,701 military and civilian positions were authorized for the GLCM and Pershing units (9,684 GLCM and 7,017 Pershing). Of these, approximately 14,559 (about 87 percent) were military positions (8,244 GLCM and 6,315 Pershing) authorized for INF bases in Europe.

TABLE 1.—POSITIONS AUTHORIZED FOR GLCM AND
PERSHING UNITS

Location of positions	Number of positions		
	GLCM	Pershing	Total
Military:			
Europe.....	8,244	6,315	14,559
U.S.....	341	659	1,000
Subtotal.....	8,585	6,974	15,559
Civilian:			
Europe.....	974	43	1,017
U.S.....	125	0	125
Subtotal.....	1,099	43	1,142
Total.....	9,684	7,017	16,701

PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS RESULTING FROM INF TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

According to DOD, military and civilian personnel in GLCM and Army Pershing units to be deactivated will be (1) reassigned within Europe to complete their overseas tours, (2) reassigned to the United States, or (3) retired or separated from military service.

According to DOD plans, by the end of fiscal year 1991, authorized staffing for GLCM military and civilian positions will be reduced to zero and Pershing authorized staffing is estimated to be 885 positions.² Table 2 portrays how these positions are scheduled to be reduced as a result of implementing the INF treaty.

TABLE 2.—REDUCTION SCHEDULE FOR GLCM AND
PERSHING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL POSITIONS

Fiscal year	Authorized positions			Positions reduced	
	GLCM	Pershing	Total	Number	Percent
June 1, 1988.....	9,684	7,017	16,701	0	0.0
1988.....	9,684	7,017	16,701	0	0.0
1989.....	5,525	5,354	10,879	5,822	34.9
1990.....	4,756	5,153	9,909	6,792	40.7
1991.....	0	885	885	15,816	94.7

¹ Cumulative numbers.

² Earlier Army data reflected a reduction of 111 authorized positions in fiscal year 1988.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Our objective was to obtain information on the number of military and civilian personnel associated with the INF treaty. We interviewed key Army and Air Force officials and obtained documents and other

² Of the 885 spaces, 868 are the 2nd of the 4th Infantry Battalion. This battalion provides security for the Pershing battalions but after 1991 will be used as an opposing force for training maneuver battalions at the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany. The remaining 17 spaces are a Pershing Operational Test Unit, which will be reassigned to an Arms Reduction Management Activity.

data detailing this information. We conducted our review between February and June 1989 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We discussed the information obtained with DOD officials and included their comments where appropriate. Unless you announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this fact sheet until 5 days from its issuance. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairman, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and on Armed Services; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to other parties upon request.

GAO staff members who made contributions to this fact sheet were Albert H. Huntington, III, Assistant Director; Mary K. Quinlan, Evaluator-in-Charge; and Ruth McIlwain, Evaluator. If we can be of further assistance, please call me on 275-4128.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH E. KELLEY,
Director, Security and
International Relations Issues.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC, June 6, 1989.

HON. ANDY IRELAND,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. IRELAND: After the issuance of our May 17, 1989, fact sheet (*Defense Manpower: Reductions in Joint Activities and Service Reallocations*, GAO/NSIAD-89-148FS), Mr. Charlie Murphy of your staff asked us to identify how many of the 2,900 positions that were eliminated as a result of the *Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters* (commonly known as the Vander Schaaf report) were in Europe. Mr. Murphy also asked that the number be broken down by military and civilian positions.

According to officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel, of the 2,900 positions eliminated as a result of the Vander Schaaf report, 608 were located in Europe. Of these, 380 were civilian and other 228 were military. If you have any additional questions, please call Bill Beusse, Assistant Director, at 275-3990.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD J. JOHNSON,
Director, Manpower Issues.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISIONS,
Washington, DC, May 16, 1989.

HON. ANDY IRELAND,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. IRELAND: On April 24, 1989, Assistant Director Bill Beusse briefed Mr. Charlie Murphy of your staff on the status of our job concerning DOD's response to the manpower cuts recommended in the Vander Schaaf report. Mr. Murphy inquired specifically about DOD's action on the positions associated with the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM).

The Vander Schaaf report made two recommendations regarding personnel associated with GLCM. Recommendation D3-4 recommended the elimination of 37 positions through the disestablishment of the 7000 Special Activities Squadron, which was set up to support planning and execution of

GLCM development. In addition, Recommendation D3-5 recommended elimination of 35 positions in United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) headquarters that were involved with various aspects of GLCM support.

According to officials from the Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, those 72 positions are among those that will be eliminated in fiscal year 1991 in conjunction with the implementation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty. If you have any additional questions, please call Bill Beusse at 275-3990.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD J. JOHNSON,
Director, Manpower Issues.

[Fact sheet for Hon. Andy Ireland, House of Representatives]

DEFENSE MANPOWER: REDUCTIONS IN JOINT ACTIVITIES AND SERVICE REALLOCATIONS
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC, May 17, 1989.

B-233015.

HON. ANDY IRELAND,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. IRELAND: On January 24, 1989, you asked us to review Department of Defense (DOD) plans for implementing the reductions in headquarters organizations outlined in the Secretary of Defense's report to the Congress dated December 1, 1988. That report responded to a study by the DOD Deputy Inspector General on streamlining unified and specified command headquarters. Specifically, you asked us to determine (1) the extent to which the reductions have been incorporated into the DOD budget, (2) which organizations received reductions, (3) how the reductions were being accomplished, and (4) what kinds of units were receiving reallocated positions.

RESULT IN BRIEF

Of the 7,309 positions originally identified for elimination in the DOD Inspector General study, DOD eliminated 2,990 positions from its budget—426 from joint activities² and 2,564 from the services. The reductions are expected to be accomplished through normal attrition and rotation. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved the reallocation of 2,244 of these positions to combat and other high need areas.

BACKGROUND

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, DOD's Deputy Inspector General studied the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, the unified and specified command headquarters and headquarters support activities, and component commands. That study, entitled "Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters," commonly known as the Vander Schaaf report, was completed in February 1988. It contained numerous organizational recommendations for eliminating duplicate functions and overlapping responsibilities among the various command headquarters. The study team identified 7,309 positions that it believed could be eliminated. The DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1989 (P.L. 100-463)

¹ Unified commands are composed of forces from two or more services, and specified commands are made up of forces from a single service.

² Joint activities are those that report to or through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in which more than one military service is normally represented.

required the Secretary of Defense to submit an evaluation of the Vander Schaaf report to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.

DOD REVIEW OF THE VANDER SCHAAF REPORT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders in Chief of the unified and specified commands agreed or partially agreed with 53 of the 157 specific organizational recommendations. They said that the study team had inadequate time to comprehend fully the relationship between the unified and specified commands and the military departments and that implementing the other recommendations would adversely affect unified and specified command operations. The initial review by the Joint Chiefs and the Commanders in Chief resulted in an agreement to cut 505 of the recommended 7,309 positions.

After its review of the recommendations, OSD estimated that an additional 1,000 positions could be saved by streamlining the policy and oversight functions for base operations and that another 1,500 positions could be saved by additional reductions in the policy, plans, operations, and logistics directorates of the major staff.

On December 1, 1988, the Deputy Secretary of Defense sent letters outlining the cuts that were planned to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services; the Chairmen, Subcommittees on Defense, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations; the Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, House Committee on Armed Services; and the Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services. He stated that the reductions would be made in the January 1989 budget submission. He also stated that the personnel reductions would be used to fund validated combat positions in existing units if the positions could be identified in time.

REDUCTIONS AND REALLOCATIONS INCORPORATED INTO FISCAL YEARS 1990 AND 1991 BUDGET SUBMISSION

DOD's budget submission for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 included the elimination of 2,990 positions attributed to the review of the Vander Schaaf study. Table 1 summarizes the reductions by service.

TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF REDUCTIONS RESULTING FROM THE DOD REVIEW OF THE VANDER SCHAAF STUDY

	Joint activities reductions	Internal service reductions	Total reductions
Army.....	122	1,001	1,123
Navy.....	143	511	654
Air Force.....	131	1,037	1,168
Marine Corps.....	26	15	41
DOD.....	4	0	4
Total.....	426	2,564	2,990

Table 2 shows the joint activities that received reductions.

TABLE 2.—Reductions in Unified Command Headquarters, Joint Activities, and Joint Staff

Organization:	Positions
U.S. Atlantic Command.....	112
U.S. Central Command.....	45
U.S. European Command.....	66
U.S. Southern Command.....	14
U.S. Pacific Command.....	76
U.S. Space Command.....	11
U.S. Special Operations Command.....	28
U.S. Transportation Command.....	4

Joint Staff	20
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff	33
Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center	1
Defense Courier Service	6
World-wide Military Command and Control System Information System Joint Program Manager ..	1
National Defense University	7
Joint Electronic Warfare Center	2
Total	426

Army, Navy, and Air Force organizations that were reduced are shown in tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Internal reductions in the Marine Corps amounted to 15 positions, but the location of these reductions has not been specified.

TABLE 3.—Internal Army Reductions

Organization:	Positions
Force Command	203
Western Command	30
8th U.S. Army	265
Special Operations Command	6
U.S. Army, South	11
Space Command	2
U.S. Army, Japan	16
Military Traffic Management Command	35
U.S. Army, Europe	433
Total	1,001

TABLE 4. INTERNAL NAVY REDUCTIONS

Organization:	Positions
U.S. Atlantic Fleet	240
U.S. Pacific Fleet	191
U.S. Navy, Europe	32
Military Sealift Command	45
Naval Space Command	3
Total	511

TABLE 5.—INTERNAL AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS

Organization:	Positions
U.S. Air Force, Europe	127
Air Force Space Command	94
Strategic Air Command	396
Pacific Air Command	148
Tactical Air Command	167
Military Airlift Command	105
Total	1,037

OSD approved service-requested reallocations of 2,244 (75 percent) of the 2,990 positions. The Army's reductions included 163 officers, 216 enlisted personnel, and 744 civilians. The Army received OSD approval to reallocate all 1,123 Army positions that were eliminated. It reallocated 75 officer positions to combat units, converted 88 officer positions to enlisted positions, and reallocated them along with the 216 lost enlisted positions to combat units. The 744 civilian positions were relocated to medical support positions.

The Navy's reductions included 167 officers, 292 enlisted personnel, and 195 civilians. All officer and enlisted positions were reallocated to ships, squadrons, and submarines, and the civilian positions were reallocated to medical facilities. Of the Marine Corps' reduction of 41 positions, 12 officer and 29 enlisted positions were reallocated to enlisted combat positions.

The Air Force requested permission to reallocate 564 of its 1,168 reduction. However, OSD approved the reallocation of only 426 positions (42 officer and 384 enlisted) to fill aircrew, maintenance, and security requirements. None of its civilian positions were reallocated.

In implementing the reductions over 3 fiscal years, each of the services expects to

be able to meet the reductions through normal attrition and rotation. OSD does not anticipate the need for any major reductions-in-force.

OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Our objective was to obtain information on DOD's plans for implementing the reductions in headquarters organizations outlined in OSD's December 1, 1988, report to the Congress. We interviewed key OSD officials and obtained documents detailing where the reductions were made. We did not verify the accuracy of the documents provided by OSD. We conducted our review from February 1989 to April 1989 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We discussed the information obtained with DOD officials and included their comments where appropriate. Unless you announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this fact sheet until 5 days from its issuance. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and on Armed Services; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to other parties upon request.

GAO staff members who made major contributions to this fact sheet were William E. Beusse, Assistant Director, and James F. Reid, Evaluator-in-Charge. If you need further information, please call me at 275-3990.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD J. JOHNSON,
Director, Manpower Issues.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
Washington, DC, July 17, 1989.

HON. ANDY IRELAND,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. IRELAND: After the issuance of our June 8, 1989, report (*INF Treaty: Army and Air Force Personnel Reductions*, GAO/NSIAD-89-173FS), Mr. Charlie Murphy of your staff asked us to verify the disposition of the 1,099 Air Force civilian positions scheduled to be eliminated as a result of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. According to the Department of Defense, all civilian billets associated with INF have been taken out of its budget submission.

After reviewing Air Force Justification of Estimates for fiscal years 1990/1991 submitted to the Congress in January 1989, we have documented that these civilian positions are scheduled to be eliminated by 1991. All positions are included in the Operations and Maintenance Justification Book Tracks. Of the 1,099 positions, 432 are scheduled to be eliminated in fiscal year 1989, 31 positions in fiscal year 1990, and 636 positions in fiscal year 1991.

If you have any additional questions, please call Albert H. Huntington, III, Assistant Director on 557-1469, or Mary K. Quinlan, Evaluator-in-Charge, on 557-1524.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH E. KELLEY,
Director, Security and
International Relations Issues.

□ 1800

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the commit-

tee bill on the defense authorization bill and want to commend the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN], chairman of the committee, and my subcommittee chairs, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] and the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER], for their diligent efforts in the subcommittees in producing a product that included most Members' views in a very difficult and challenging year.

Mr. Chairman, I heard a statement recently describing the last 40 years of United States-Soviet relations, and I thought it was a very accurate description when it said that for the past 40 years we had blessed certainty and assured simplicity, because it was clear-cut, it was absolute, there was a Berlin Wall, there were good guys and there were bad guys. Today, Mr. Chairman, there is a new reality. We have a new player in the Soviet Union. They are trying desperately to move their economy along, and with that new reality we see all kinds of new statements and new positions emerging from the Soviet Union. I think we are hopeful that they will move to change relations and reduce tensions between our great Nations.

However, in the meantime there is still considerable danger. Although there is great opportunity to enhance our opportunities for peace, there is still great danger. Mr. Chairman, we need to remain vigilant. The administration is a new administration. We have a new Secretary of Defense, and I have decided this year to support the Cheney budget and to allow the administration the flexibility to negotiate, to develop a strategy, to have the opportunity, as an administration should, to deal with this new Soviet regime.

Since we are having a changing role, however, I implore the Department of Defense to work to develop a strategy that handles our security needs. In the past we have had a lot of programming and budgeting, but very little planning, and that is the reason we have needed net assessments incorporated into the planning process. I said some time ago it was foolish to build without a strategy but, Mr. Chairman, it is dangerous to cut without a strategy.

In regard to the Research and Development Subcommittee markup, Mr. Chairman, there were two areas we felt imperative that we have long-range research and development effort. The first was in the antisubmarine warfare capabilities and advanced submarine technologies. This is critical to protect our strategic assets.

Second, I thought it was important, and I think the subcommittee agreed, to develop long-term aviation competitiveness with the funding of the national aerospace plan. This funding

and this program has tremendous potential to improve not only our military capabilities, but also civilian applications as well.

Mr. Chairman, in the full committee we had a contentious debate of the B-2, the Stealth bomber. I have supported the committee's position. I believe it was a balanced approach and a wise approach. I will support the Skelton amendment to add some restrictions on the procurement and the development, but not to delay or stretch the program, which would inherently increase costs.

There are two additional amendments that I would like to speak of. One is going to be offered by the gentleman from Utah [Mr. OWENS] to cancel the C-17. We had that debate in the last Congress. We explored it fully, we debated, we voted, and we voted overwhelmingly to continue the funding of the C-17. It is on pace, and we should not disrupt it now.

The other amendment is the amendment to be offered by the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. HOPKINS] regarding the LHX. I too will oppose that and would urge Members to oppose that amendment as well. It is clear that the Army is continuing on an aviation modernization program. We should not disrupt it.

As I stated in the committee, when the Air Force research and development budget is larger than the entire Army procurement budget, something is wrong within our priorities. A cut in the modernization effort or the LHX would be a mistake.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, could the Chair advise how much time remains on each side?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. DURBIN). The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN] has 24½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] has 10 minutes remaining.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT].

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, in the progress of human-kind, nothing is so unchanging as change. It occurs all the time, and we are in a particular changing period of history at this moment.

The thing that affects me most greatly in my thinking is the fact that we have tremendous surpluses in the field of nuclear power and weaponry, and we have not paid adequate attention to conventional forces.

I am the chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, and as such I have a formal statement here reflecting what that committee has recommended, and I include that in the RECORD at this point.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the committee report on H.R. 2461, the fiscal years 1990/1991 Department of Defense authoriza-

tion bill. I will speak specifically of portions of the bill relating to the Seapower Subcommittee.

For fiscal year 1990 the committee recommends authorization of \$9.9 billion for 19 new construction ships and 2 conversions. Included are the 17th Trident submarine, 1 *Los Angeles*-class attack submarine, 5 *Arleigh Burke*-class guided missile destroyers, 3 mine countermeasures ships, 3 coastal minehunters, 1 landing ship dock, 1 ocean surveillance ship, 1 fast combat support ship, 3 auxiliary oceanographic research ships, 9 air cushion landing craft, and long-lead funds for 2 *Seawolf*-class attack submarines. Also included are an aircraft carrier service life extension, the conversion of a fleet oiler, and the conversion of a retired nuclear ballistic missile submarine to a moored training vessel.

Notably, the bill contains long-lead and research funds for a prototype fast sealift ship. Fast sealift is vitally needed to ensure our ability to move troops and their equipment overseas in a timely manner. The committee bill would begin a program aimed at providing enough ships to move a heavy Army division.

In the Navy's other procurement and weapons procurement accounts the committee recommends a package of upgrades to the Navy's 100-plus frigates that will improve their defensive capabilities against high-speed, low-flying missiles. The committee also approved language that would lead to improved antisubmarine capability on these ships.

In the much neglected area of mine warfare, the committee recommends the transfer of \$15 million for research on a new medium depth mine, something the Navy now lacks.

The committee recommends reductions in two areas, the MK-48 advanced capability torpedo and the other procurement account. In testimony this year the subcommittee found that the MK-48 had not met many of its operational test objectives, and decided that the torpedo should be held at the low-rate production level. The committee recommends cutbacks in certain other procurement accounts in recognition of the typical cutbacks the Navy itself makes each year.

The bill also contains a number of legislative provisions affecting the Navy and its ship construction and repair efforts. These include:

First, a provision to require a report on the implications of a slower rate of building Trident submarines;

Second, a provision to require that ship production engineering funds be requested in the shipbuilding and conversion account;

Third, a provision to amend the Atomic Energy Act to preclude proliferation of naval nuclear power information and to tighten the criteria for exchanges of information under existing sharing agreements;

Fourth, a provision to require a study of shipboard breathing devices used in firefighting;

Fifth, a provision to limit to U.S. sources the procurement of shipboard anchor and mooring chain of 4 inches diameter or less;

Sixth, a provision to amend current law dealing with handling of hazardous waste in naval ship repair to require the Navy to indemnify its shipyard contractors against claims or losses relating to the contractor's handling or disposal of Navy-generated hazardous waste;

Seventh, a provision to increase the progress payment rate on naval ship repair contracts and to extend the applicability of the rate increase;

Eighth, a provision to require that not less than half of the depot-level shipwork scheduled to be accomplished over the next 3 years on ships homeported in Japan be accomplished in shipyards in the United States or its territories; and

Ninth, a provision to require the Secretary of the Navy to contract for the removal of certain scrap material from ships prior to use of the ships for experimental purposes.

The bill also contains a number of provisions dealing with the management of the national defense stockpile of strategic and critical materials. Specifically, the bill would:

First, authorize changes in 21 specific stockpile requirements as recommended by the Secretary of Defense;

Second, authorize the disposal of \$180 million of unneeded materials and the use of the proceeds to purchase \$180 million of needed materials; and

Third, encourage the production of strategic and critical materials from domestic sources and require competitive procedures for grants and contracts involving the national defense stockpile transaction fund.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the committee has worked hard to craft a responsible bill in the seapower area given some difficult fiscal constraints. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the committee-reported bill in these important aspects.

Mr. Chairman, I will speak a bit about what I started to speak about at the beginning, and that is the fact that we are in a time now when the responsibility is put upon us in the Constitution to be responsible for the national defense of our country, and that is what is on our back as the Congress of the United States, we have to look at what we have been doing wrong and what we can do right in the future.

What we have been doing wrong is spending entirely too much money and projecting too much expense for the future in weapons which are really not needed, which are redundant, and we have not done enough to protect ourselves in the fields in which we should be operating, particularly in conventional warfare.

□ 1810

In our committee, the Subcommittee on Seapower, we addressed this question. We reduced some expenditures. We made available three additional ships, one of which will be a prototype for a new type of fast deployment, fast transport, very greatly needed.

There are other things in this report from the Subcommittee on Seapower which show we have done some new things.

In R&D, the Subcommittee on Research and Development, of which I am also a member, there we struck \$1 billion out of the SDI account, and as a result of that made available some

money for microelectronics and semiconductors and other things which will be very valuable to us in the field of conventional warfare.

So this money out of SDI has so far gone to very good purposes. Tomorrow I hope there will be further money made available and in that process of reducing SDI expenditures we will make money available for conventional warfare in a way which is really meaningful for the challenges that we have in 1989.

We have very real challenges in the field, for example, not having adequate ammunition, not adequate provision for various aspects of our conventional responsibilities. These can be met by making this money available from SDI.

I am delighted that opportunity occurred.

Mr. Chairman, I am not an enemy of SDI. I just feel like SDI probably will have a very obvious answer, which is the production of additional ICBM's. After all, it is not a perfect shield, no one thinks it is going to be a perfect shield.

Under those circumstances it is clear that the opponent, whoever he may be, would produce more ICBM's pointed in our direction, which would be a calamity.

It would not be a step forward for mankind, it would be a step backward.

So I hope tomorrow when the matter comes up, that the people will support the conservative position with regard to SDI; \$3.1 billion would be the amendment I will offer.

As a result, that money would be loosened up for a number of conventional things which are very greatly needed.

Some of them are obvious things which are very important to us, such as repairing the helicopter fleet which has been destroyed recently in Texas; such as providing additional ammunition for the Army; providing other things of that nature.

So, Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to make these remarks about this bill. It is a watershed bill, it comes at an important time in our history. It is important not only because there is greater opportunity for greater friendship throughout the world, which I certainly hope will be the result of a lessening of tensions, but I would say it is more important really because we are not looking at the fact that we are overextended in fields where we should not be spending as much money as we are spending and we are not extended as far as we should be in some of our conventional challenges.

So I think this bill will be a move in the direction of protecting ourselves as our responsibilities under the Constitution, our Constitution, requires us to do. We are required under the Constitution to provide for the national de-

fense, and that is what we are doing in this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the chairman and the members of the committee for bringing forth this bill. I think it is a good bill and I hope we will resoundingly pass it.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE], the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, to follow the chairman of that subcommittee.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Alabama for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2461, the committee-reported version of the fiscal years 1990-91 Department of Defense authorization bill. I would like to take a few moments to discuss certain aspects of the bill relating to the Seapower Subcommittee, on which I serve as the ranking Republican member.

The bill would make a number of significant improvements to the Navy's ability to deal with conflicts across the warfare spectrum. Many of these improvements are the result of lessons learned from the Persian Gulf experience.

For example, the bill would divert from other sources \$85 million to begin an upgrade program for the Navy's 100-plus frigates that would improve, to a large extent, their ability to defend themselves against low-flying, high-speed cruise missiles like the Exocet. These improvements would include the addition of new guns and electronics and the application of techniques to make the ships harder to detect on enemy radars.

The bill would also beef up the Navy's mine warfare capabilities. For example, the bill would authorize a total of six new mine countermeasures ships—including two coastal minehunters added by the committee—to replace the existing fleet of obsolescent, 1950's-vintage minesweepers. Although these older ships showed they still had some fight in them in their Persian Gulf service, they must be replaced soon if we are to keep up with the modern mine threat. The committee also acted to shore up the Navy's inventory of modern mines, diverting \$15 million to develop a new mine to be used in medium depth waters.

The committee also moved to improve our ability to move troops and equipment overseas in time of emergency by recommending the start of a fast sealift ship program. For too long we have neglected this vitally important area of military capability. The recent reports of the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense point most dramatically to the need for virtually all kinds of sealift for defense purposes. Although neither the Department of Defense nor the commit-

tee are in a position to solve unilaterally, the sealift problem, we can and should take on the responsibility for the militarily unique need for fast sealift.

Having indicated my support for the bill and several areas where the committee made significant improvements, in my view, I would be remiss if I did not express certain misgivings I have about the overall dollar level in the bill and about the Navy program in particular.

Simply put, Mr. Chairman, this bill barely passes muster in the amount it proposes for defense spending. Some apparently believe we can withstand a fifth year of negative growth in defense spending because "peace is breaking out all over." But to a large extent, all we've had so far are a number of nice-sounding statements from the Soviet leadership. Their forces aren't appreciably smaller; their production rates for major weapon systems aren't appreciably lower. As a matter of fact they're still outproducing us in many areas. In short, Mr. Chairman, we should not let down our guard, based on a few well-received speeches from the other side. The President has indicated his desire to move cautiously in the military arena, watching Soviet capabilities—not just perceived intentions—as the guideline for United States actions. I support this approach.

Nowhere is this approach more important than for our Navy. Regardless of the outcome of the current Soviet experiment, the United States—a maritime nation—will always need a strong and capable Navy. This bill would begin the decommissioning of ships at a pace that will leave us with 1 less aircraft carrier and 53 fewer deployable surface combatants by the end of fiscal year 1993. If we're not careful we will find ourselves on the same slippery slope of the 1970's, when we worked our Navy people and ships at such a frenetic pace that people left the Navy in droves and the ships just plain wore out.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot permit this sort of thing to happen again.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HUTTO].

Mr. HUTTO. I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee I rise in support of H.R. 2461.

The committee recommends authorization of \$87.9 billion for Department of Defense operation and maintenance activities, \$2.3 billion below the administration's request. We also recommend \$801 million for working capital funds, \$27 million above the budget request.

The committee endorses the Department's decision to protect the O&M

accounts in this time of budget turmoil. Ten years ago this would not have happened, and it is a significant sign that the Department has finally reached the same philosophy espoused by this committee over the last decade; that is, without adequate O&M funding readiness will suffer.

Even with this significant change in philosophy by the Department, a number of issues surfaced this year that will have important ramifications in the years ahead. First, the cost to operate and maintain all of the new equipment purchased during the 1980's is two to three times what was anticipated. The cost to operate an M-1 tank, for example, is 2½ times greater than an M-60. Similarly, the cost to operate an Apache helicopter is more than twice as much as its predecessor. These high operating costs will cause a dilemma for commanders, because if O&M funds do not increase, training on the new equipment must be cut back or alternative methods substituted for actual hands-on training.

Second, environmental problems are increasing at an alarming rate, with some estimates indicating that as much as \$2 billion will be needed annually. With a level budget, the Department will be faced with cleaning up environmental problems at the expense of national security programs.

The Department is already experiencing increased backlogs in its equipment and property maintenance. These areas are vital to readiness, yet they are the first areas to be reduced when budgets become tight. Continued level budgets will force managers to choose between repairing equipment and property or laying off civilian employees. Since over one-quarter of the O&M account is for civilian pay, additional O&M reductions in the future will lead to lower levels of civilian employment.

The committee views with increasing concern a pattern of harassment of American military personnel and their families at several overseas locations. The Readiness Subcommittee conducted a hearing to review the state of military quality of life. At the hearing witnesses cited increased harassment and, in some cases, physical harm and threats to military personnel in Panama, Greece, the Philippines, and South Korea. In other nations, too, there is rising sentiment against U.S. military presence, making life difficult for military personnel.

The committee appreciates diplomatic and host nation efforts to improve these situations and supports added measures aimed at quelling the insecurity faced by our military personnel and their families. The committee continues to advocate adequate resources for quality of life improvements, and endorses the quality of life funding budget supported by DOD,

particularly for overseas locations. If Americans face isolation, it is imperative that their on-base facilities be adequate. Several measures are included in this bill to further support DOD efforts to improve conditions.

The committee made various adjustments to the operation and maintenance and working capital funds accounts, staying within the administration's request. Major adjustments include:

First, \$300 million to increase readiness-related activities, such as supply operations, depot maintenance, transportation, and base operating support.

Second, \$13 million to continue humanitarian aid for Afghan refugees.

Third, \$14.6 million to provide security assistance for the goodwill games to be held in Seattle, WA, in 1990.

Fourth, \$105 million to repair helicopter damage caused by a wind storm at Fort Hood, TX.

Fifth, \$10 million for transportation costs of U.S. beef for commissaries in Europe.

Sixth, \$42 million restored to Guard and Reserve units in light of the committee's decision to study the total force concept.

Seventh, \$2 million to continue expansion of satellite transmissions to overseas locations and live radio to Navy ships.

Eighth, \$83 million to increase defense environmental restoration fund.

Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to endorse our efforts to maintain readiness and support H.R. 2461.

□ 1820

I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Since this comes under the purview of the gentleman's committee, I wonder if the gentleman could tell the House what, if anything, the committee is doing to address two particular problems: One is whether or not local hire would be preferred or made a requirement over U.S. personnel and dependents; and the second, as we look at Americans being kicked out of Torrejon, in the future, what provision might be made in severance pay if we remove, not due to any part of our own?

Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Chairman, yes, we do give preference to Americans and not to foreign nationals on hiring. Second, our subcommittee felt strongly and overwhelmingly supported language in the bill, section 311, to say that if the host nations kicked Americans out of their country, close our bases, they should be responsible for the severance pay, and not the United States of America. We do have that in section 311, and this prohibition would also apply to severance pay for the foreign national employees of contractors who may have a contract.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Dyson].

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 2461 and I also wish to address one of the issues which this Congress must face as it debates the Department of Defense authorization for fiscal years 1990 and 1991.

This is an unusual year for the DOD. The Secretary of Defense was appointed and approved far later than anyone expected and it has taken even longer for other DOD appointments to follow. However, of great importance to this body is the budget which Secretary of Defense Cheney has submitted for our review.

Overall, I wish to extend my compliments to Mr. Cheney for making some tough decisions in a very short period of time. In only 39 days, the Secretary reviewed and submitted the entire DOD budget. However, after reviewing the Secretary's budget, I believe that some areas are in desperate need of revision, most notably naval aviation.

Mr. Chairman, the Secretary has determined that the Navy will be able to cruise through the future troubled waters of the world, safely protected by the aircraft it possesses. I not only disagree, I join a great number of my colleagues who foresee serious military shortages and costly buildups in the future under the Cheney proposal.

Today's newspaper and yesterday's evening news contained stories of trouble in many areas of the world. The ayatollah may be dead, but I do not believe that the threat from Islamic terrorists has decreased one iota. In fact, I can imagine few events that would give the world's extremists more happiness than causing destruction of American property and the deaths of American servicemen.

I was a part of the congressional delegation which visited Beirut after the suicide bombing which killed almost 300 of our marines who were stationed there as peacekeepers. I could never adequately express the horror and the pain that I encountered during that visit. It is forever etched upon my memory, and perhaps it is good to remember that war is more than snazzy weapon systems and bad things that happen far, far away from America. The simple fact is that our marines were unprotected in what is one of the most dangerous and unstable countries in the entire world.

We must ensure that our naval forces are not left unprotected when we send them out to sea. Today's reality is that we cannot depend upon foreign countries to protect American lives by providing refueling or landing privileges for U.S. aircraft. We learned that lesson in the Persian Gulf where our naval vessels protected the oil tankers of the very countries that

would not permit our Navy or Air Force to use their airports. This Nation's Navy was forced to survive in a war zone with the only air support available being that aircraft which was carried on naval vessels outside of the gulf.

As our Navy faces hostile situations and threats in the future, we in Congress must not forget that these carrier groups are not just composed of a dozen or so steel ships and high technology computers and defense systems. Rather, they are composed of thousands of American men who also have hopes and dreams for their future. These sailors, their family, friends, and loved ones depend upon the Congress to provide the Navy with every possible consideration for their safety. And this is one task on which, if we do err, we must err on the side of our sailor.

Mr. Chairman, this Congress will soon be asked to vote on a number of crucial amendments which will shape our Nation's defense and its policies. It will also serve as our commitment to the men and women who proudly serve this Nation in the Armed Forces.

For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to reject the Cheney amendment which will be offered. I am convinced that if we accept that amendment today, we will regret that vote in the years ahead.

The Cheney proposal cancels a number of vital Navy aircraft programs, including the F-14 and the EA-6B. The facts are plain: We are either short of these aircraft or we can expect shortfalls in the midnineties. While I support the Navy's efforts to move into its next generation of fighters, I believe that its advanced tactical fighter risks development and production delays that could prevent its introduction into the fleet until after the year 2000. The EA-6B has also been canceled by the Cheney budget. We also have an acknowledged shortfall of this aircraft that is exacerbated by the fact that there is no follow-on aircraft program.

As my colleagues have heard already, there are other serious concerns associated with the Cheney proposal. This great country has only two sources of naval aircraft production. Canceling the F-14 will probably force its manufacturer out of business and could create a naval aircraft monopoly. I deeply believe that the taxpayer loses in those arenas that are without competition.

Even without war, this Nation's active naval air force will be reduced in the years ahead due to accidents, normal maintenance, retirement from advanced age or usage, use in training, or mechanical problems. Continued naval aircraft production is the only way to ensure that the Navy has enough aircraft without a shortfall or without transferring aircraft among

carriers. Continued production is also vital to the Nation's ability to retain two qualified production companies and to retain a vital segment of the Nation's defense industrial base.

I strongly urge my colleagues to reject the Cheney amendment and to join their colleagues on the Armed Services Committee who have already reviewed and rejected the Cheney proposal.

I thank the chairman of the committee for yielding this time and for providing the full House with a Defense bill that addresses the shortfalls in naval aircraft.

I also wish to take a moment to compliment and thank the dedicated staff of the committee which has put many long nights and weekends into assisting the members to draft the legislation before us today.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. RAY].

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Committee on Armed Services bill, H.R. 2461.

I want to quote briefly from an article published today by syndicated columnist George Will, and I ask the complete remarks be inserted into the RECORD. He says in his opening statement that the, "Costly airplane is coming to decision time in Congress at the moment of maximum uncertainty about Soviet intentions."

B-2 MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE A SPECTACULAR BARGAIN

(By George Will)

The costliest airplane is coming to decision time in Congress at the moment of maximum uncertainty about Soviet intentions. The Stealth bomber comes in a period of severe budget constraints that the president promises to continue (read his lips), constraints that have made Congress eager for a "detente dividend" of defense cuts to finance the pent-up demand for domestic spending.

The B-2 is the 150-ton flying wing, product of 900 new materials and processes, with a million parts and 200 on-board computers, with radar-nullifying technologies that give it a radar cross-section of a goose or (some say) a moth. B-2s cost about \$500 million apiece, \$70 billion for the proposed fleet of 132.

Can we afford it? About a third of the \$70 billion has already been spent on research and development, so the "fly-away" cost would be under \$300 million per plane. A Boeing 747's base price is \$125 million and it need not be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses that include more than 300 surface-to-air missiles for every U.S. bomber and five fighters devoted to interception for every U.S. bomber. The S&L bailout will cost more than \$100 billion. The Air Force argues that the B-2 fleet would deliver 2,000 warheads at a cost-per-warhead comparable to ICBMs and SLBMs.

We can afford what we need, which is stable deterrence. That means retaliatory forces sufficient to survive a Soviet attack and inflict intolerable damage. It means an array of forces that complicates, to the point of paralysis, war planning by a Soviet leader.

The B-2 could contribute to that, but the cost might mean the cannibalizing of the defense budget to finance it (particularly because the commander in chief is willing to sacrifice national security on the altar of his anti-tax obsession). The argument for finding the money begins with the basic argument for bombers: They deliver a large variety of ordinance over long distances under close control. Cruise missiles fired from vulnerable stand-off aircraft cannot travel as far, recognize changed situations or report back.

Bombers are long-lived and improvable. The newest B-52 is 28 years old. Improved avionics have doubled the potency of some B-52s in the last six years. The B-2 has been designed to deliver conventional as well as nuclear weapons. One B-2 can deliver more conventional ordinance than all the cruise missiles carried by a 688 class submarine (or a battleship) and a submarine needs two weeks to re-arm and return to station. The B-2 performs with a crew of two.

It can be especially effective striking certain targets that must be held at risk if deterrence is to be strong. These included mobile ICBMs and some hardened sites, such as the deep shelters that the Soviets elite has built for itself with war-fighting in mind.

It is said that the B-2 could be used against terrorist targets. We have fewer overseas bases than before, and use of them for attacks against, say, Libya, can cause political problems in the host country. However, such a use of the B-2 seems like (in Sen. William Cohen's words) sending a Rolls Royce into a combat zone to pick up groceries. And U.S. reluctance to act against the likes of Libya suggests that improved capability would be pointless. However, one reason for the reluctance is fear of diplomatic and domestic political trouble from any U.S. losses. The B-2 could reduce that danger, and hence the reluctance.

Any decision about a strategic system is, fundamentally, a decision about this question: What are Soviet intentions? The plain truth is that we do not know what they are, and whatever they are, they are changeable. Soviet arms production rolls along unabated. It would be folly for the United States to rest its security on faith in the words of, and confidence in the long tenure of, one Soviet leader. Intensifying economic decline, ethnic violence, and now labor unrest, make Gorbachev's future highly uncertain.

This is no time to reduce the pressure. This is a good time to signal U.S. determination to regard the Soviet threat as unchanged until many things more substantial than Soviet rhetoric are changed.

The B-2 would vitiate more than \$200 billion of Soviet investment in all defenses. The B-2 would be a dramatic demonstration of U.S. determination to use the leverage of technological superiority to conduct an arms race in which the unreformed Soviet economy cannot compete.

The fundamental hope behind U.S. policy is that economic reform will presuppose, and presage, political reforms that will reduce the Soviet urge for military competition. So Congress should consider this: If building the B-2 would help convince the Soviet Union of the ruinous futility of its militarism, the B-2 would be a spectacular bargain.

Mr. Chairman, today I had the Library of Congress research the cost to the first airplane bought by the United States in 1908 from the Wright

brothers by the U.S. Army. Let me put into the RECORD what the Library of Congress said about the first airplane purchased. It said:

In 1908, the Army bought one plane from the Wright brothers. It was the first purchase, and it was delivered until 1909. The cost of the plane was in their dollar \$25,000, which in today's dollars is 345,000. The plane exceeded expectations and specifications so the Army paid a \$5,000 bonus, which is \$69,000 in today's dollars. Therefore, we paid a total of, in today's dollars, \$414,000 in today's dollars for this first plane.

So the truth of the matter is that all of our technology and new weapons is expensive. "The B-2 is the 150-ton flying wing, product of 900 new materials and processes, with a million parts and 200 onboard computers with radar nullifying technologies," according to George Will, "that give it a radar cross-section of a goose or—some day—a moth. B-2's cost about \$500 million apiece." A horrendous sum, a tough sticker price. However, Mr. Chairman, we have to pay for technology that we develop.

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WEISS].

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I will be offering an amendment to this year's Department of Defense authorization bill. As in previous years, my amendment deals with the D-5 missile program. However, unlike in the past, my amendment would only affect the refit portion of the D-5 program.

The D-5 refit program would backfit eight Trident submarines, currently equipped with C-4 missiles, with D-5's beginning around 1993. The costs of this program will exceed \$6 billion.

The Navy plans for a Trident fleet of at least 20 submarines. The first eight have been deployed with C-4 missiles. The next 12 or more Tridents will be equipped with D-5 missiles. With these new D-5's, the United States will have, for the first time, the capability of hitting hard targets inside the Soviet Union from the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad.

If there were no backfit program, our Trident force would contain at least 12 submarines equipped with D-5's with the capacity to aim well over 2,000 hard-target warheads. For point of reference, the Soviet Union has a total of 1,283 silo-based ICBM's. Clearly, even without the additional capability that would result from backfitting the first eight Trident subs with D-5's, U.S. SLBM's would have an overwhelming hard-target capability. When land- and air-based forces are taken into account, our ability to strike hard targets is much greater still.

This amendment would allow the D-5 program to proceed almost entirely unencumbered. Every Trident submarine which is deployed from now on would be equipped with D-5 missiles if

my amendment were to pass. The only change in U.S. nuclear force structure resulting from the passage of my amendment would be a marginal reduction in our hard-target capability from the sea. However, as I mentioned before, in the context of our entire Trident force and the rest of our strategic nuclear arsenal, this change would have a negligible impact on our overall nuclear capability.

The U.S. Treasury does not have an extra \$6 billion to spend on a program which has little, if any, strategic benefit. I urge my colleagues to support my amendment as a measured, responsible, and fiscal sound change in our defense policy.

□ 1830

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER].

Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER. Mr. Chairman, let me say to my colleagues that we face a major crisis in Naval aviation. The Cheney budget, as it was presented to the Congress, irreversibly guts Naval aviation. Despite the fact that the Navy recently reconfigured its air wings by calling for a smaller number of aircraft in order to mask the shortage of aircraft that is coming in the future, we still have a tremendous shortage. This chart presents that shortage.

I served in the Navy as an enlisted man in a squadron, and I worked for 25 years in aerospace engineering, and I look upon myself as a bit of a student of Naval aviation—if we look at the 5 major aircraft on our carriers today, we find that we have the A-6 aircraft, and the Navy says they need 741 of them by the year 2000. We are going to be 198 aircraft short, 42 percent short of A-6's, the medium attack bomber, the Intruder.

Then there is the EA-6B, the electronic warfare aircraft, the Prowler, that is used to jam enemy radars so that the A-6's can get in and get out safely. The Navy said we need 145 of those, and we are going to be 47 short by the year 2000; 32 percent short.

Then the F-14, the Tomcat. Everyone knows what a Tomcat is. It is the aircraft featured in the movie, "Top Gun." It is a sensational aircraft that works extraordinarily well, and it is the one that the Navy relies on most heavily when we have confrontations such as with Libyan jets over the Mediterranean. The Navy says we need 457 of those. We will be 56 short by the year 2000, 12 percent short.

The E-2c, the Hawkeye, the early warning aircraft that the Navy does not go anywhere without, because it lets us see anything coming at the fleet, and it allows the F-14's to be vectored to protect the fleet. We will be short of those aircraft also.

Those 4 aircraft are built by Grumman, they are already heading for

shortage and we are moving toward an irreversible gutting of Naval aviation.

The 5th aircraft, the F/A-18, the Hornet, built by McDonnell Douglas, is a very good aircraft. It is a fighter-attack aircraft combination. It is a good aircraft, but it is not an F-14 and it is not an A-6. We will have a slight surplus of those by the year 2000.

We have a major problem here. These shortages are irreversible, because the present Cheney budget has no money for A-6's, no money for EA-6B's, no money for F-14's, and there is money for only 4 E-2c's. If that budget were to go through unchanged, we would find ourselves in a situation where Grumman would go out of business, and when we finally come to our senses and decide that we cannot allow the gutting of Naval aviation, Grumman will not be there to turn back on.

Certainly the ATA and the Navy ATF, the advanced aircraft that will eventually replace the Grumman A-6 and the Grumman F-14 are coming, there is no question about it, but our problem is to have a smooth transition from the existing aircraft to the next generation aircraft. We understand that. But it is poor public policy to terminate the three major aircraft that are most effective in the Navy in exchange for the hope that the ATA and the Navy ATF will come in on time. These are unproven designs, and we are not sure of their affordability.

The Armed Services Committee has acted. We put back funding for the F-14. It is in the bill that we will be addressing here in the full House this week.

I offer a challenge to all my colleagues, as I offered it recently to Mr. Cheney. These numbers are real. If they are wrong, please correct me. If they are right, please join me and support Naval aviation and let us keep the F-14's in the budget.

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPRATT].

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, the Defense authorization bill, which we take up today, allocates \$9.387 billion to the Department of Energy. This is the same amount the President requested, but it is not authorized to be spent exactly as he requested.

First of all, we cut \$75 million, which the President sought to start construction of the special isotope separator at INEL, and we prohibited any money at all from being spent next year on construction of this plant to purify plutonium. Instead, we funded research and development in the amount requested, and we directed the Department of Energy to complete the final round of experiments at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, using their SIS prototype. These experiments will tell whether the SIS can use lasers efficiently to purify fuel-grade plutonium into weapons-grade plutonium, or Pu 239. We thought it was only prudent to see what these experiments

showed before pushing ahead with construction; and we thought too that it would be wise to wait a year, and let the START negotiations unfold, before deciding whether we need to build a plant and new process for making weapons-grade plutonium.

We took \$35 million of the \$75 denied for SIS and added it to the account for Defense waste and environmental restoration. Tomorrow, after the votes on SDI have been taken, I will offer an amendment to add \$300 million more for Defense waste and environmental restoration.

Mr. Chairman, when President Reagan put together his budget, he added \$128 million for Defense waste and environmental restoration. His addition increased the total for this account to \$1.145 billion.

At the first of this year, however, the DOE published its 2010 report. The 2010 report was a report called for by Congress; and in a year when the Secretary of Defense has criticized the number of reports Congress asks for, and questioned their utility, it should be noted that the 2010 report was of unquestionable value. It caused the Department to look 20 years into the future, and calculate the cost of cleaning up toxic and radioactive wastes accumulated over the last 45 years, plus the cost of replacing or refurbishing its aging reactors and other depreciated plant and equipment. The DOE estimated that in 1990 constant dollars, it would need \$52 billion over the next 20 years for modernization and \$29 billion for cleaning up the waste and environment around its existing plants. The General Accounting Office has analyzed this estimate, and found it on the low end of what is likely to be needed. GAO thinks billions more may, in fact, be required. In the face of this 2010 study, the Bush administration added \$156 million to Defense waste and environmental restoration.

Unfortunately, even this \$156 million addition is not enough. Basically, what the Bush administration proposes is to start the environmental effort in earnest in about 1995 or 1996. There is a risk in that strategy: At about that time, the new production reactors will be well underway, and the mounting cost of modernization could crowd out clean-out in the future, as it has in the past. So, what we will propose in our amendment tomorrow is to step up, and step up substantially, the environmental and waste cleanup effort, increasing it by \$335 million to \$1.636 billion, which is about 60 percent over this year, and about 100 percent over fiscal year 1988.

Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by assuring the House that although we propose to increase the cleanup accounts substantially, we do not propose to "throw money at the problem." In the committee's report accompanying this bill is an illustrative list of 18 cleanup and waste operations programs, which the Department of Energy compiled and provided. All of these are well warranted—programs the Department can carry out if we make the funds available. Indeed, on June 27, Secretary Watkins in his press conference acknowledged and effectively endorsed our efforts to add this \$335 million supplement to Defense waste and environmental restoration.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. DURBIN). The gentleman from Ala-

bama [Mr. DICKINSON] has 6 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. DYSON] has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to one of the most effective members of our committee, the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. MACHTLEY].

Mr. MACHTLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, today and for the next several days we will be discussing expensive weapons systems, B-2's, Midgetman, the MX, and SDI, but I believe that the military is more than weapons systems; it is the people who serve in the military.

This year the Personnel Subcommittee has made remarkable strides in housing, medical, human services, and education, and this is a credit to the leadership of that subcommittee, chaired by the distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mrs. BYRON], and including the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BATEMAN].

The professional Military Educational Panel chaired by the distinguished gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] has brought us revolutionary thinking in education theory for our military officers. This also will provide our officers the ability to discuss joint strategy. It will give the generals and the admirals of tomorrow the opportunity to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the other services, and it will introduce more civilians into our teaching senior schools.

So as we discuss and debate the military weapons systems, let us never lose sight of the fact that the backbone of the military is the men and women who serve on our ships and who fly our planes and drive our tanks, both here and abroad.

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Chairman, we wish to reserve our remaining 5 minutes for the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of our time on this side, 4 minutes, to the very distinguished gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. ROWLAND].

Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to express my appreciation to the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON], for his keen leadership this year.

The entire debate today and the debate throughout the rest of the week may have been different had we been successful in passing the Cheney budget. On a tie vote, we lost the Cheney budget in committee.

I would also like to thank and applaud the chairman of the full com-

mittee, as well as the entire staff, for a job well done.

In the final analysis, President Bush and Secretary Cheney made many tough choices. They cut defense spending by \$10 billion, they cut programs, they canceled programs, and they reduced the rate of increase in the defense budget from 2 percent real growth to below a level of no real growth at all.

Before I proceed further, I would like to commend Mr. Cheney, one of our former colleagues, who has done an outstanding and superb job in presenting the defense budget.

Mr. Chairman, this is my third year as a member of the Committee on Armed Services. One thing I have learned relates to a story that former Secretary Russell Long of Louisiana used to tell in the Senate Finance Committee. It went like this: "Don't tax you, don't tax me, tax the guy behind the tree."

How easily this can be adapted to the defense bill. By and large, Members want defense spending reduced, but when specific programs are targeted, resistance suddenly crops up, largely for local parochial reasons.

Yes, I like the F-14, and yes, I like the V-22. The problem is that we cannot afford every single program that we want. The bottom line is that the committee had the opportunity to hold the line on defense spending by canceling a number of programs. What they did instead was the worst possible alternative. We added a minimum amount of dollars to keep these programs barely going into the year 1990. What this actually does is shove off the funding problems into the next year and later years.

Given the reality of flat budgets for the foreseeable future, we need to make some tough choices here on the floor of the House.

For too long, it seems as if our procurement process has been guided by the "Noah's Ark" theory. That is, when we are in doubt, we buy two of everything. We buy two land-based missile systems, and we buy two bombers. So my question is quite simple. Why do we do it, and how do we do it?

How on Earth are we going to fund the B-1 and the B-2? How are we going to fund the MX, the Midgetman, SDI, the F-14, AHIP, the V-22, and on and on?

This week we can carry on business as usual or we can begin to make tough choices. For starters, I suggest that we can fund just the MX missile and not the Midgetman, and I also suggest that we continue with the B-1 bomber, that we put the fix in this year and not proceed with the B-2. There is an amendment that will be offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH], along with the gentle-

man from California [Mr. DELLUMS] and myself, that does just that.

What we are basically saying to the full House and to the committee is quite simple. We will conclude all of our testing on the B-2 in 1993.

□ 1840

Mr. Chairman, we then should make a decision whether to continue to procure 132 B-2 bombers. Under the present system, by 1993, when the testing is completed, we will have spent \$40 billion, and we will have procured 44 B-2 bombers. If we need to just finish the testing and the developmental phases by 1993, why build 43 bombers?

Our proposal simply states, "Let's continue with the procurement and research and development. Let's have 13 bombers which we can test and develop."

To end business as usual, I also believe we need to support the amendment of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] in regard to the procurement issues. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] will seek to bring the procurement part of the DOD bill back in line with the original Cheney proposal.

Again the F-14 and V-22 are good programs, but we cannot afford them.

As we begin the debate on the 1990 Defense authorization bill, there are many aspects that deserve support. To name one, we have a good pay raise for our enlisted personnel. As the Members know, we need to do everything we can to encourage young men and women to join the military. Adequate compensation is a main consideration of this. We have a 3.6-percent pay raise in the bill that should be looked at as an absolute minimum. In that regard, I stand opposed to the amendment of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. FRENZEL]. The Secretary of Defense clearly has the executive privilege and the authority to make the pay raise adjustment. Passage of the Frenzel amendment not only violates this authority, but raises some grave concerns about legislative versus executive authority, and passage of the Frenzel amendment will result in severe cutbacks to the quality of life of our service men and women and their families and a possible elimination of positions. It is a sure way to restore service morale and the quality of life for our service men and women.

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM].

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Stenholm-Stangeland-Valentine amendment to H.R. 2461. This amendment would provide significant reforms to the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931. Although Davis-Bacon was well-intentioned, over the years it has come to operate in a counterproductive way. My amendment will restore Davis-Bacon

closer to its original intent and give Congress some \$3.55 billion in budget authority, \$2.4 billion in outlays, to reprogram in more effective ways over the next 5 years.

My amendment is the same as H.R. 2259, which has been cosponsored by 105 Members. It raises the Davis-Bacon threshold (below which contracts are exempted) to \$250,000, allows the expanded use of semi-skilled helpers, reduces paperwork, protects against splitting of contracts with intent to subvert the act, and includes codifying and technical provisions.

Opponents will characterize our amendment as "backdoor repeal." Nothing could be further from the truth. A \$250,000 threshold exempts only 7 percent of the dollar volume of currently covered contracts. Unless you believe a \$5,000 contract for a carport is the equivalent of a \$10 million highway repair contract, dollar volume is the best measure of the amount of work done.

Representative STANGELAND sought to offer an amendment with a \$1 million threshold and stronger market-oriented definition of prevailing wages. Representative DELAY sought to offer an amendment allowing exemptions for military family housing and quality of life construction. Both were denied.

Our amendment is the compromise.

Probably a third of the Members of this House would rather vote to repeal Davis-Bacon. The General Accounting Office, Grace Commission, National Association of Minority Contractors, New York Times, and many others have urged repeal. Our cost-savings, according to CBO, amount to only a little over half of what repeal would save. Because Congressional intent is longstanding to protect prevailing wages, our amendment does that—but strikes a moderate balance that updates Davis-Bacon for the 1990's.

I ask my colleagues to be aware that the amendment to be offered by Representative MURPHY is not a compromise. The respected chairman of the Labor Standards Subcommittee is offering an amendment deserving of a vote in this House. But know that the Murphy amendment takes what is the Davis-Bacon status quo and simply gives us more of it.

The Murphy amendment may look to some like watered-down reform, with a \$50,000 threshold on new construction and \$15,000 on repair contracts. However, related provisions totally undermine the threshold changes. Other provisions expand the coverage of the act to leases, off-site suppliers, independent contractors, fabricators, and privately financed projects only tenuously related to Federal grants for nonconstruction purposes. Brand new, private rights of action would send potentially thousands of contract disputes into the Federal courts every year.

Moreover, keep in mind that the Murphy amendment is being offered as a substitute to our amendment. That means the House will have no opportunity to vote on real reform if the Murphy amendment passes first.

I urge my colleagues to vote for economy, efficiency, and job opportunity for those most in need. On Thursday, vote for the Stenholm-Stangeland-Valentine reform amendment and against the Murphy expansion amendment.

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Chairman, to wrap up the debate on this side, I yield 5

minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I take this opportunity to commend the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN], for his leadership in putting this bill through the committee and bringing it to the floor. It has been a difficult task at best, and I compliment him on his leadership and the work that he has done, and a special thanks, too, to the ranking member, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON], for his work and cooperation through those days.

Mr. Chairman, when the new Secretary of Defense took over, he sent over his own budget with a set of priorities, and, Mr. Chairman, I voted for that set of priorities because that is the first time in at least 8 years, probably more, that a secretary has prioritized important systems, whether we like them or not, and I think he is more on track than off track, and I support him, and he is to be commended for doing that.

Mr. Chairman, this is an uncertain world in which we live. I will speak for a few moments on an issue that will be the policy star of the debate in this coming week. This issue is that of the new Stealth B-2 bomber.

I, of course, have an amendment involving this issue, and I have been a strong support of its continuation. As a matter of fact, the committee funded some \$3.9 billion for its continuation.

Let me for just a moment set the stage as to where the B-2 issue is. The Secretary of Defense and the President sent over a request for a total of \$4.7 billion for the B-2, \$2 billion for research and development, 2.7 billion for procurement. The Committee on Armed Services cut that down to \$1.7 and \$2.2 billion, respectively for a total of \$3.9 billion with some restrictive-type language on meeting certain testing milestones.

Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment that is very similar to the Committee on Armed Services amendment, but it has some additional performance matrix language that requires the secretary to send to Congress the unclassified test results. People should know, America should know, Members of Congress should know how this is doing regarding these tests as it goes along. There are two amendments. They are the Synar amendment, which cuts and requires another vote at a later time, as I understand it, and the Kasich-Dellums-Rowland amendment in essence terminates the program.

Mr. Chairman, I speak in favor of my amendment, the Skelton amendment, as a reasonable one, and I think it is a strong one that will lead us to a

good position coming to the conference with the Senate.

Mr. Chairman, what leads me to conclude that the B-2 bomber would be a good investment for the security of our Nation is that a very good case can be made for reasons of technology, for arms control and for structure. The technical argument is the most profound one, much the way the advent of a submarine in the early part of this century fundamentally transformed warfare at sea, the advent of the Stealth bomber will transform air combat. Ships visible on the water surface became invisible under the water as submarines. As a matter of fact, just a handful of German submarines in the early years of the Second World War almost won the fight against Britain. It was not until 1943 that the Battle of the Atlantic was finally won. Vast resources had to be devoted to that fight both in men, and ships, and aircraft and new tactics to defend the convoys that were literally the lifeline for Great Britain's survival.

Mr. Chairman, in the last 20th century we have now entered the era of invisible aircraft, those that cannot be tracked by radar. Partial exploitation of Stealth technology was found in the SR-71 Blackbird surveillance aircraft, and some, and of course in the B-1B bomber. Further development of the technology occurred with the F-117 fighter and the advanced cruise missile.

Mr. Chairman, I take just a moment to thank the gentleman from Rhode Island for his very kind comments about the work that we did on the education panel report. I welcome him as the ranking member on our panel, and I look forward to working with him and making good things come to pass regarding the education of our military.

Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today as a member of the Armed Services Committee to make some general observations about H.R. 2461, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1990. The committee worked over the past 5 months and held in excess of 100 hearings on various defense issues. The process was delayed somewhat by President Bush submitting his revised defense budget in late April. During the Committee's two markups in June, the bill was refined and improved. This is not to say this measure cannot be further improved here on the floor of the House, and I am hopeful some additional changes will be made to further craft a more acceptable Defense bill.

It is important to focus on the total budget allocation for Defense which has been established at \$305.3 billion in budget authority. While there is some concern that this figure again reflects a negative growth in defense spending for what is now 5 consecutive years. We must also be mindful of the tremendous increases in the previous 5 years. That debate cannot be settled here today, however, we must be cognizant of some very real and ominous budget figures facing our Nation next

year. We are facing the threat imposed under Gramm-Rudman, by which Government spending will need to be reduced by more than 10 percent to reach the \$64 billion deficit target for fiscal year 1991. If we are serious about meeting our budgetary obligations, the Defense budget must reflect both the world threat posed by potential adversaries and the harsh fiscal realities our Nation faces. We cannot continue to spend enormous sums of money on weapons systems which have questionable utility or could prove more likely to provoke a continuation of senseless arms escalation. With this threatening budget target facing us, I urge my colleagues to think twice about some of the amendments being offered to this bill and make some tough choices about which programs we can or cannot afford.

One program which will receive early attention from this body is star wars. We have been given the opportunity to select from four budget levels to fund this dubious system. I would urge my colleagues to support the level proposed by Congressman DELLUMS. The \$1.3 billion amount is sufficient for a program which was intended to be basic research and not some crash program pushing for early deployment. When President Reagan first announced his grand designs for star wars in March 1983, the system was sold as an astro-dome to protect the American people from a nuclear assault. Many Americans found this new proposal interesting and worth looking into for feasibility. However, we now learn that original concept is no longer valid. The premise behind today's star wars is to protect our nuclear weapons and not protection of our citizens.

We also face the certainty of violating the 1972 ABM Treaty by continued testing and future deployment of the star wars system. At a time when our Nation is embarking on a vigorous course for arms control, does it really make sense to abrogate a worthwhile treaty already in existence? To stay abreast of the technology I support funding some research into star wars and therefore will urge my colleagues to support Congressman DELLUMS' amendment. Because the likely response to our deploying some star wars system will be many more ICBM's built by the Soviets, we will only see a more threatening world with further expenditures on nuclear warheads.

Another important area of the bill will center on the continuing controversy involving our ICBM forces. For nearly 30 years our ICBM forces have in fixed silos. Today, we have pursued a basing scheme which is unlikely to buy any real security for our forces and that is the rail mobile MX system. For the plan to succeed, the trains must be dispersed from the bases in sufficient time to avoid an incoming attack. What we do not have, is any assurance from our potential adversary about when or if a warning of massive ICBM attack will occur. Therefore, the vast sums we are asked to spend on rail mobile MX is not necessarily prudent spending. Given the hazards of allowing these garrisons to transverse rail lines near communities where our citizens live and work, shouldn't we decide against this basing scheme and save some valuable defense resources?

A critical decision must be made involving one of our most expensive weapons systems ever devised, the B-2 Stealth bomber. It has been proposed that \$70 billion be spent to procure 132 aircraft, which is roughly \$530 million per plane. For over 10 years this program was under the special access area of the Defense budget and only until this year did most Members of this body learn the true costs associated with this program and what the specific characteristics and mission of the plane were to be.

I questioned the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Welch, in a committee hearing 2 weeks ago about the plane's mission. General Welch responded to my inquiry that the plane would likely reach its target long after nuclear annihilation has occurred in both countries in the affirmative. Therefore, we do not need to strengthen our air breathing leg of the triad while we have sufficient assets in our new B-1 bomber, or our existing FB-111's and B-52's. Our manned and recallable bomber force is capable with some penetration capabilities and necessary stand-off cruise missiles to address the mission assigned to the B-2. We do not need the B-2 and substantial savings can occur through the adoption of Congressman KASICH's amendment.

There has been discussion framed around restructuring the B-2 program to help bring the costs in line. Unless the prime contractor of the aircraft sees fit to reduce the programs costs, there will not be any program restructuring that will result in cost savings to our constituents. The only thing delay will bring will be a higher per plane cost and the likelihood of reducing the planned 132 aircraft buy. So I say let us do now what we will eventually do—terminate the procurement funds for the B-2 and cease an expensive and unnecessary aircraft.

I cannot allow the opportunity to briefly discuss the proposed Cheney budget to pass. It has been characterized in some quarters as the "Good Government" Defense budget plan. I respectfully disagree with that assertion for a number of reasons. Yes, we need to terminate certain defense programs and Secretary Cheney made some decisions. The Armed Services Committee disagreed with his recommendations and brought forth a bill which meets this years budget targets. Yes, the outyear spending will need to be trimmed and as I pointed out earlier in my remarks further cuts will be necessary to meet Gramm-Rudman targets, however, it is the prerogative of this body to assert its collective judgment as to how the defense spending of our Nation is to be crafted.

Two programs terminated in the Cheney budget have had funding restored and I support those programs—the F-14 Tomcat fighter for the Navy and the V-22 Osprey for the Marine Corps. We must make decisions on which programs will need reductions in future years if we are to support these new programs. I believe we can find the necessary cost savings and insure our defense requirements are met.

If we are to maintain our existing carrier battlegroups, the backbone of our naval defense planning, we must insure there are sufficient aircraft to protect our forces. The work-

horse for naval aviation is the F-14. The replacement for this fighter is the new Navy advanced tactical fighter [N-ATF]. However, if past lessons can teach us anything, we can expect the N-ATF to be delayed and not meet existing delivery schedules. Therefore, I urge continued purchases of the F-14 to maintain needed naval fighter aircraft until the N-ATF is delivered.

I am very pleased that the Committee has recommended the procurement of 5 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Aegis destroyers. This program is the No. 1 shipbuilding priority of the Navy and we are facing a severe shortage of anti-air warfare [AAW] capable ships. Today, we are only at 64 percent of needed AAW capacity and the number will shrink to 50 percent with the expected retirements of the Adams and Farragut class destroyers. These vessels with over 30 years of useful service life are ready for retirement and need to be replaced. Only by maintaining the scheduled procurement rate of these important DDG-51's can we seriously address the AAW shortfall.

The amendment process will begin tomorrow and I am hopeful an improved version of the Defense bill can result. If we choose our Defense program priorities carefully, we can meet our national security obligations and address the budget shortages confronting our Nation. I urge my colleagues to carefully review the various amendments and seek to join me in refining and enhancing this Defense measure.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, as we begin the consideration of this year's defense authorization bill, I think it is important to ask ourselves what our priorities are with respect to arms control and disarmament. As one who has actively participated in past debates on this subject in this House, I suggest that our agenda should be as follows:

REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

The massive American nuclear buildup began in the Eisenhower years as a response to the massive conventional forces being maintained in Eastern Europe by the U.S.S.R. and its East bloc allies. The low cost of nuclear as opposed to conventional forces and the unwillingness of the United States to establish an ongoing peacetime draft made the nuclear buildup an attractive policy. If we are to move away from this "more bang for the buck" approach, as it was called, then reduction of conventional arms is critical. In this area, I believe the Soviets have clearly been the laggard. However, the economic problems facing the Soviet Union appear to be forcing the Soviets to take a new look at this issue.

Two additional observations should be made:

What is at issue is not just numbers of weapons but their nature and deployment. Reducing the forces in the European theater in such a fashion that they have less offensive potential is a critical element—that is, tanks portend an offense and thus destabilize the situation; anti-tank weapons stabilize it.

The current size of U.S. deployment in Europe reflects an era when the gross national product of NATO's European members was much smaller in relationship to that of the United States and the U.S.S.R. than it is today. Any conventional force reduction in Europe should involve acceptance by our

NATO partners that it is appropriate for the United States to reduce its proportional share of the remaining NATO defense burden.

OTHER INITIATIVES

While I believe that an agreement on conventional arms is critical to a major reduction in the burden of defense expenditures that the United States and the U.S.S.R. bear, I believe that other arms control efforts can also usefully be pursued at this time:

Nuclear weapons testing moratorium: I have always felt that the biggest threat of nuclear catastrophe comes not from problems between the Soviets and us, but because of the "n-country" problem, the problem that a Libya or some country of that sort is going to develop nuclear weapons. Progress toward a comprehensive test ban has always been regarded by the nonnuclear weapons states to be an absolute minimum condition for superpower compliance with Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which encourages weapons states to agree to negotiate good faith reductions of nuclear arsenals. If the Soviets and we will not comply with Article 6, we cannot expect the nonnuclear powers to comply with the other parts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

During consideration of last year's defense authorization bill, Congress enacted the Nuclear Test Ban Readiness Program within the Department of Energy to "assure that the United States is in a position to maintain the reliability, safety, and continued deterrent effect of its stockpile of existing nuclear weapons designs in the event that a low threshold or comprehensive test ban is negotiated and ratified within the framework agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union." This year I encourage my colleagues to build upon that program by supporting an amendment to require the Department of Energy to prepare a 5-year plan which will provide Congress with a year-by-year description of the costs and milestones for fully preparing the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile for future nuclear testing restrictions by 1995.

Plutonium production: During this Congress, more than 170 Members of the House have cosponsored the International Plutonium Control Act, a bill which urges the President to negotiate a mutual and verifiable ban with the Soviet Union on the United States-Soviet production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Soviet President Gorbachev is clearly interested in negotiating such a ban, and President Bush needs to seize the opportunity.

The International Plutonium Control Act amendment seeks to eliminate the asymmetry in nuclear materials production capabilities which currently favors the Soviet Union. The fact of the matter is that the United States has not produced highly enriched uranium for weapons since 1964. That same year, then-President Johnson decided to cut back on weapons-grade plutonium production and 10 U.S. production reactors were shut down. Our country has produced small amounts of weapons-grade plutonium over the last two decades, although in the last year all of our reactors have been shut down. We have a massive stockpile of roughly 100,000 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, which has a half-life of more than 20,000 years. The Soviet's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium is a

little more than ours. And in 10 or more plants, the Soviets continue to produce.

An agreement such as this would free up significant funds which can be used to clean up the extensive contamination caused by past production of nuclear warheads. Estimates are that such an agreement could save our country more than \$10 billion over the next 20 years.

A superpower agreement to cut off the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons is also in the interests of nonproliferation. Because the superpowers would be accepting some of the same standards as nonweapons nations who are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, such a ban would strengthen the NPT by making it less discriminating. Such an agreement puts additional political pressure on nations such as Pakistan and India to put their facilities which can produce nuclear explosive materials under international and/or bilateral inspection. Lack of such an agreement on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union can act to discourage compliance by nonweapons states with the NPT.

The United States needs to lead on this issue—to act rather than to react.

ASAT's and SDI: I have repeatedly called for immediate negotiations for a ban on weapons of any kind in space, and have urged the President to seek an immediate mutual moratorium on testing of ASAT's.

Further, I have worked in each of the last three Congresses to cut drastically the administration's request for SDI, and I have worked to assure that none of the SDI funds be used in a manner which would violate the ABM Treaty.

I am specifically concerned that most SDI weapons will invariably first be ASAT weapons and thus fail the Nitze test of not creating dangerous instability on the way to anti-missile capability. It is in both superpowers' interest to stick to an ASAT ban. Neither country can do without intelligence and communication satellites. If those systems are threatened by ASAT's, each country will spend more and more to superharden their satellite technologies. At this juncture, SDI fails the Nitze test. The Soviets clearly can create more decoys than we can detect and SDI's costly anti-missile capabilities will be wasted in their pursuit.

START: Since 1981, the United States and the Soviet Union have worked together to achieve significant mutual reductions of their strategic nuclear forces. I commend the administration for those efforts, and urge them to press ahead. While the superpowers remain far apart on a variety of issues, they have agreed on the basic shape that a START treaty will take. If we achieve a conventional force balance in Europe, then the vulnerabilities of a START agreement will be easier to address.

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, as we consider H.R. 2461, the Defense authorization bill, we will be making important judgments about how best to promote and protect our national security interests around the world. We will also be pursuing important judgments about whether or not we will be fiscally responsible in discharging that duty.

Last week, after much fanfare, the B-2 Stealth bomber made its first flight over the

Mojave Desert in California. This new aircraft boasts yet to be demonstrated ability to fly at low levels and avoid radar detection in delivering nuclear payloads deep within a target nation's territory. The basic price tag attached to this new aircraft is nearly \$600 million per plane, easily making it the most expensive aircraft ever built and the price tag will undoubtedly go higher in future years as so often happens with other military aircraft such as the B-1B which has risen in cost already by at least 30 percent. The Air Force and the Bush administration hope that the Congress will eventually approve the procurement of 132 of these planes over the life of the B-2 program. Already, \$23 billion has been expended on research and development. For fiscal year 1990, the administration is seeking an authorization of \$2.8 billion to acquire three additional B-2 aircraft.

The Air Force and the administration, because of the nature of the B-2 program, are seeking these funds even before this new aircraft has been thoroughly tested. It is common in the development of any new aircraft, and especially with the development of a highly specialized aircraft of a radical new design such as the B-2, to undergo extensive design modifications based upon the findings of many hours of in-flight tests. Computer simulations simply cannot duplicate all of the conditions which our pilots may encounter in flight with this aircraft. You wouldn't buy a new \$15,000 car without taking it out for a test drive. Yet the American taxpayer is being asked to pay yet billions of dollars more up front for a totally new aircraft that hasn't yet been thoroughly flight tested. It's a ludicrous, flawed decision-making process. There is not and shouldn't be a substitute for proceeding with an aggressive and extensive flight testing program before deciding whether or not Congress should commit additional enormous sums of money for the purchase of this aircraft.

Some have suggested that because of the undisclosed secret enormous capital investment which has already been made in the B-2 program that Congress has no choice but to proceed full-throttle. I would hope that Congress not abandon its prerogative to review and reconsider expenditures for weapons systems which have not been fully tested and which must be evaluated against the backdrop of an ever-changing strategic equation. Indeed, in the age of air, land, and sea-based nuclear missiles, one might even legitimately question the need for building a bomber that can penetrate traditional air defenses. It is worth noting, too, that the Pentagon is in the process of spending \$28 billion to acquire 100 B-1B bombers which are supposedly capable of penetrating Soviet airspace.

The fact is that the decision to build the B-2 is based on current air defense capability, not that which may be developed, and the current treaty methodology utilized in counting weapon systems and warheads. Either or both of these factors could change and the U.S. defense system would be saddled with a \$70 billion plus obsolete system. We can't afford this type of defense policy or decisionmaking.

Mr. Chairman, I am also troubled that President Bush and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have suggested that they might oppose any new

strategic arms control agreements with the Soviet Union unless Congress approves the administration's proposals for the B-2. It seems to me that it would be appropriate for the President and the Joint Chiefs to assess the specific proposals which might someday be on the negotiating table before prejudging them and deciding that they are unacceptable. This type of hyperbole concerning congressional decision making is inappropriate and not helpful in developing a sound national defense policy.

For these reasons, I intend to support the Dellums-Kasich-Rowland amendment to limit B-2 procurement to the 13 aircraft for which funding has previously been approved. Alternatively, I will also support the Aspin-Synar amendment to cut at least \$470 million from the bill's authorization for the B-2. This amendment would also require the Defense Department to restructure the stealth program and meet certain test and performance requirements before any additional aircraft are purchased.

U.S. policy concerning the strategic defense initiative [SDI], should consider the improving climate in United States-Soviet relations, the remaining technical obstacles in this program, and the severe budget constraints which we must face, and the constant change of deployment and utilization of the SDI program means that there is simply no justification for continuing SDI and providing the administration massive funding for SDI. I support the Dellums-Boxer amendment to limit SDI funding to \$1.3 billion for research only. Alternatively, I will support the Bennett-Ridge amendment to reduce SDI funding by at least \$700 million from the committee-approved level.

Mr. Chairman, the MX missile has been the subject of frequent consideration during recent annual debates on the Defense authorization bill. Several years ago, when Congress voted to proceed with development of the MX missile, Congress imposed a binding legislative cap of no more than 50 MX missiles. At that time, the MX missile was expected to be based in Minuteman silos. The Bush administration, however, is reconsidering the most appropriate basing mode for this missile. The previously approved cap, however, extends only to those missiles based in silos. I support the Mavroules amendment which applies the 50-missile cap to all basing modes, including any new rail-garrison basing mode. Reconsideration by the administration of a basing mode for the MX missile should not be used as a loophole for exceeding the congressional administration agreement previously enacted and intended to limit MX production to 50 missiles. While I had reservations concerning the MX development and deployment, the votes of Congress should uphold the basic structure of the agreement that they intend to offer.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to commend Mr. BROWN of California and Mr. COUGHLIN of Pennsylvania for their thoughtful amendment addressing the issue of antisatellite weapons [ASAT]. The Brown-Coughlin amendment expresses the sense of Congress in supporting the President's request to the Soviet Union to dismantle its ground-based ASAT weapons. The amendment also calls upon the President to seek a treaty with the Soviet Union at the earliest opportunity to strictly limit ASAT

weapons, including the right of on-site inspections. The Brown-Coughlin amendment recognizes the destabilizing and dangerous nature of ASAT weapons and seeks an effective means of controlling them in the future, and should receive a strong endorsement and vote of this House.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. SPRATT) having assumed the chair, Mr. DURBIN, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2461) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for military functions of the Department of Defense and to prescribe military personnel levels for such Department for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

PERMISSION TO MODIFY SKELTON AMENDMENT PRINTED IN PART 1 OF HOUSE REPORT 101-168 ON H.R. 2461, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1990

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that during consideration of the bill, H.R. 2461, pursuant to House Resolution 211 I may be permitted to offer the amendment numbered 12 in part 1 of House Report 101-168 in the modified form that I have placed at the desk.

The text of the amendment as modified is as follows:

Strike out "sections 111 and 112" in the paragraph at the beginning of the amendment and all that follows and insert in lieu thereof the following:

section 111 (page 20, line 9 through page 22, line 23) and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 111. LIMITATION ON PRODUCTION OF B-2 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BOMBER AIRCRAFT PROGRAM.

(a) REQUIRED INFORMATION.—Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1990 may not be obligated or expended for procurement (including advance procurement) for production aircraft under the B-2 Advanced Technology Bomber aircraft program until the certification referred to in subsection (b) and the report required by subsection (c) have been submitted to the congressional defense committees.

(b) CERTIFICATION.—The certification referred to in subsection (a) is a certification in writing by the Secretary of Defense to the congressional defense committees of the following:

(1) That the performance milestones (including initial flight testing) for the B-2 aircraft for fiscal year 1990 (as contained in the B-2 full performance matrix program established under section 121 of Public Law 100-180 and section 232 of Public Law 100-456) have been met and that any proposed waiver or modification to the B-2 performance matrix will be provided in writing in

advance to the congressional defense committees.

(2) That the cost reduction initiatives established for the B-2 program will be achieved (such certification to be submitted together with details of the savings to be realized).

(3) That the quality assurance practices and fiscal management controls of the prime contractor and major subcontractors associated with the B-2 program meet or exceed accepted United States Government standards.

(C) **REPORT ON COST, SCHEDULE, AND CAPABILITY.**—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report providing the following:

(1) An unclassified integrated B-2 program schedule that includes—

(A) the total cost of the B-2 program by fiscal year, including costs by fiscal year for research and development, procurement (including spares and modifications), military construction, operation and maintenance, and personnel, with all such costs to be expressed in both base year and then year dollars;

(B) the annual buy rate for the B-2 aircraft; and

(C) the flight test schedule and milestones for the B-2 program.

(2) A detailed mission statement and requirements for the B-2 aircraft, including the current and projected capability of the aircraft to conduct strategic relocatable target missions and conventional warfare operations.

(3) A detailed assessment of performance of the B-2 aircraft, together with a comparison of that performance with existing strategic penetrating bombers.

(4) A detailed assessment of the technical risks associated with the B-2 program, particularly those associated with the avionics systems and components of the aircraft.

(d) **UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF B-2 PERFORMANCE MATRIX.**—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an unclassified version of the B-2 full performance matrix program established under section 121 of Public Law 100-180 and section 232 of Public Law 100-456. Such report shall be submitted at the same time as the budget of the President for fiscal year 1991 is submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.

(e) **CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—For purposes of this section, the term "congressional defense committees" means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I will take this time to explain the issue and have the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] help explain the issue. I will not object to this motion.

□ 1850

I think this motion and the change in the amendment which the gentleman seeks is important in order to get the vote that I think the House of Representatives is expecting when we come to the B-2 issue on Wednesday.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, this correction merely makes in order what we actually intended. The original amendment was placed in without certain verbiage that would cause it to replace the Aspin amendment to which it is a substitute amendment.

Mr. ASPIN. Further reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, the purpose of this amendment is that in order for the Skelton amendment to be truly a way of substituting the language of the gentleman's amendment for my amendment in the voting tree that comes next Wednesday, it is important that this language be made in order; otherwise, the gentleman's amendment will just be an amendment to mine and we will have the core of my amendment. I think when most people are voting for the Skelton amendment, they are expecting to vote to substitute in effect the Skelton language for mine, and in order to do that we need this amendment.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

This has been discussed with me on this side. I understand it to be as the gentleman from Wisconsin has described it, and I have no objection.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WALKER) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. GINGRICH, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. KYL, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. DREIER of California, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. IRELAND, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. SOLOMON, for 30 minutes, today.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. DICKINSON, for 30 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SYNAR) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SKELTON, for 60 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at his own request) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. McCRERY, for 15 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at the request of Mr. MARTIN of New York) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. WELDON, for 5 minutes, on July 26.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. STENHOLM) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. MARTINEZ, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GAYDOS, for 60 minutes, on August 1.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WALKER) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. ROHRBACHER in two instances.

Mr. FISH.

Mr. DORNAN of California in two instances.

Mr. DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SYNAR) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. ANDERSON in 10 instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in 10 instances.

Mr. BROWN of California in 10 instances.

Mr. ANNUNZIO in six instances.

Mrs. PATTERSON.

Mr. ROYBAL.

Mr. STARK in three instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MARTIN of New York) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey.

Mr. BROOMFIELD.

Mr. DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS.

Mr. RITTER.

Mr. PORTER.

Mr. DEWINE.

Mr. CONTE.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. STENHOLM) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. ANDREWS.

Mr. FAZIO.

Mr. LaFALCE.

Mr. EVANS.

Mr. DONNELLY.

Mr. PEASE.

SENATE BILL REFERRED

A bill of the Senate of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 681. An act to require the Secretary of the Treasury to mint and issue coins in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the statehood of Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

Mr. ANNUNZIO, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled a bill of the House of the following title, which was thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 1485. An act to direct the sale of certain lands in Clark County, NV, to meet national defense and other needs; to authorize the sale of certain other lands in Clark County, NV; and for other purposes.

SENATE ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to enrolled joint resolutions of the Senate of the following titles:

S.J. Res. 85. Joint resolution to designate the week of July 24 to July 30, 1989, as the "National Week of Recognition and Remembrance for Those Who Served in the Korean War".

S.J. Res. 142. Joint resolution designating the week beginning July 23, 1989, as "Lyme Disease Awareness Week".

BILL PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. ANNUNZIO, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on the following date present to the President, for his approval, a bill of the House of the following title:

On July 21, 1989:

H.R. 310. An act to remove a restriction from a parcel of land in Roanoke, VA, in order for that land to be conveyed to the State of Virginia for use as a veterans nursing home.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 54 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Tuesday, July 25, 1989, at 9 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1497. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting notification of the Defense Mapping Agency's proposed letter(s) of offer and acceptance to the United Kingdom for defense articles (Transmittal No. 89-29), pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 118; to the Committee on Armed Services.

1498. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting notification of the Defense Mapping Agency's proposed letter(s) of offer and acceptance [LOA] to the United Kingdom for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 89-29), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1499. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, trans-

mitting notice of the Department of the Army's proposed letter(s) of offer and acceptance [LOA] to Israel for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 89-33), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1500. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting a copy of Transmittal No. 03-89, concerning a proposed memorandum of agreement [MOA] with the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, adding the Government of Norway to the AMRAAM/ASRAAM Program, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2767(f); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1501. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, transmitting notification of a proposed license for the export of defense articles or defense services sold commercially to the Republic of Korea (Transmittal No. MC-17-89), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(c); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1502. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, transmitting notification of a proposed license for the export of defense articles or defense services sold commercially to the Government of Egypt (Transmittal No. MC-19-89), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(c); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1503. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, transmitting copies of the original report of political contributions by Charles Warren Hostler, of California, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary-designate to the State of Bahrain; and for Mark Gregory Hambley, of Idaho, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary-designate to the State of Datar, and members of their families, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 3944(b)(2); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1504. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resource Management and Support, transmitting a copy of the fiscal year 1988 report on the actuarial status of the military retirement system, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 9503(a)(1)(B); to the Committee on Government Operations.

1505. A letter from the Plan Administrator, Farm Credit Services, transmitting the annual report for the Eighth Farm Credit District Savings Plan for the year ending December 31, 1988, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 9503(a)(1)(B); to the Committee on Government Operations.

1506. A letter from the Trust Committee of the Farm Credit Services, transmitting the annual retirement report for the year ending December 31, 1988, the employees of the association and banks of the Ninth Farm Credit District, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 9503(a)(1)(B); to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. HAWKINS: Committee on Education and Labor. H.R. 1661. A bill to amend title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to clarify the applicability of rules relating to fiduciary duties in relation to plan assets of terminated pension plans and to provide for an explicit exception to such rules for employer reversions meeting

certain requirements; with an amendment (Rept. 101-169). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BROOKS (for himself and Mr. EDWARDS of California):

H.R. 2978. A bill to amend section 700 of title 18, United States Code, to protect the physical integrity of the flag; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BENNETT:

H.R. 2979. A bill to amend titles 10, 14, and 37, United States Code, relating to the promotion, separation, and mandatory retirement of warrant officers of the Armed Forces, establish the grade of chief warrant officer, W-5, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. ROYBAL (for himself, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. DYMALLY, and Mr. ACKERMAN):

H.R. 2980. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to ensure, through a U.S. health program, access for all Americans to quality health care while containing the costs of the health care system, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. BERMAN (for himself, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. FRANK, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. GLICKMAN, and Mr. MILLER of California):

H.R. 2981. A bill to amend title 28, United States Code, to make additional exceptions to the immunity of the property of a foreign state from attachment or execution; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. EARLY (for himself and Mr. CALLAHAN):

H.R. 2982. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to provide additional protection for the flag of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT:

H.R. 2983. A bill to name the new Department of Veterans Affairs outpatient clinic in Mount Vernon, MO, as the "Gene Taylor Veterans' Outpatient Clinic"; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. ROE (for himself, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. HALL of Texas, and Mr. MORRISON of Washington):

H.R. 2984. A bill to require the establishment of a National Global Change Research Program aimed at understanding and responding to global change, including the cumulative effects of human activity on the environment, to require the initiation of discussions toward international protocols in global change research and assessment, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Science, Space, and Technology; Foreign Affairs; and Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. SCHUMER:

H.R. 2985 A bill to provide for special prisons as a sentencing option; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SIKORSKI (for himself and Mrs. MORELLA):

H.R. 2986. A bill to amend title 5, United States Code, to clarify provisions relating to the composition of any performance review board making recommendations concerning performance awards for career appointees in the Senior Executive Service; to the Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. SLATTERY (for himself and Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. ROBERTS, and Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas):

H.R. 2987. A bill to name the Department of Veterans Affairs medical center in Leavenworth, KS, as the "Dwight D. Eisenhower Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center"; to the Committee on Veterans Affairs.

By Mr. SMITH of New Jersey:

H.J. Res. 372. Joint resolution posthumously proclaiming Christopher Columbus to be an honorary citizen of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. YOUNG of Alaska (for himself and Mr. RANGEL):

H.J. Res. 373. Joint resolution to designate October 22 through October 29, 1989, as "National Red Ribbon Week"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. WOLPE (for himself, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mr. RANGEL, and Mr. MILLER of Washington):

H. Con. Res. 174. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress on multilateral sanctions against South Africa; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII,

209. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the Legislature of the State of Alaska, relative to funds for wildlife and sport fish restoration projects; to the Committee on Appropriations.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

Mr. McDADE introduced a bill (H.R. 2988) for the relief of Lucille White, Gerald J. White, Gary White, and Sara White, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 81: Mr. ECKART and Mr. MILLER of Washington.

H.R. 118: Mr. BUECHNER and Mr. INHOFE.

H.R. 379: Mr. TOWNS, Mr. FISH, Mr. McGRATH, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. MANTON, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. MOLINARI, and Mr. OWENS of New York.

H.R. 899: Mr. DERRICK.

H.R. 937: Mr. WHEAT, Mr. MFUME, Mr. RAY, Mr. GRAY, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. DIXON, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. HOYER, and Mr. PALLONE.

H.R. 939: Mr. TRAFICANT.

H.R. 956: Mr. HANCOCK.

H.R. 1059: Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland.

H.R. 1095: Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. HERTEL, and Mr. VANDER JAGT.

H.R. 1131: Mr. CHANDLER.

H.R. 1134: Mr. SANGMEISTER.

H.R. 1150: Mr. DERRICK.

H.R. 1159: Mr. BROWN of California.

H.R. 1193: Mr. CHAPMAN and Mr. DeFAZIO.

H.R. 1292: Mr. WALSH, Mr. HEFNER, and Mr. ECKART.

H.R. 1317: Mr. GALLO.

H.R. 1356: Mr. SWIFT.

H.R. 1371: Mr. DOWNEY and Mr. SMITH of Texas.

H.R. 1451: Mr. HYDE.

H.R. 1574: Mr. PACKARD and Mr. PEASE.

H.R. 1710: Mr. JACOBS, Mr. NEAL of North Carolina, Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut, and Mr. SPENCE.

H.R. 1730: Mr. MAVROULES and Mr. McDADE.

H.R. 2023: Mr. FAZIO and Mr. BALLENGER.

H.R. 2076: Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. SIKORSKI, Mr. EVANS, and Mr. GILMAN.

H.R. 2121: Mr. ARMEY, Mr. JONES of Georgia, Mr. BAKER, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. VALENTINE, and Mr. BUSTAMANTE.

H.R. 2192: Ms. SNOWE.

H.R. 2222: Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida.

H.R. 2265: Mr. TORRES, Mr. ACKERMAN, and Ms. PELOSI.

H.R. 2270: Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. BATES, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. JONTZ, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. HERTEL, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. SCHEUER, and Mr. SMITH of Florida.

H.R. 2336: Mr. THOMAS of California, Mr. McDADE, Mr. GOODLING, Mr. YATRON, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, and Mr. ATKINS.

H.R. 2403: Mr. DURBIN, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, and Mr. SPRATT.

H.R. 2445: Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. TALLON, and Mr. ECKART.

H.R. 2493: Mr. PETRI.

H.R. 2530: Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. LIPINSKI, and Mr. ACKERMAN.

H.R. 2560: Mr. RIDGE, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. McDERMOTT, Mrs. SCHROEDER, and Mr. HAYES of Illinois.

H.R. 2587: Mr. WELDON and Mr. THOMAS of Georgia.

H.R. 2631: Mr. STARK.

H.R. 2665: Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. FROST, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. MFUME, and Mr. DE LUGO.

H.R. 2667: Mr. DAVIS, Mr. WILSON, and Mr. ROGERS.

H.R. 2682: Mr. KOLBE.

H.R. 2690: Mr. BATES.

H.R. 2699: Mr. LANCASTER, Mr. CARDIN, and Mr. SLATTERY.

H.R. 2756: Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. CHAPMAN, Ms. PELOSI, and Mr. KAPTUR.

H.R. 2772: Mr. McDERMOTT and Mr. RANGEL.

H.R. 2796: Mr. JACOBS and Mr. WATKINS.

H.R. 2807: Mr. AKAKA, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. PAYNE of Virginia, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. LAFALCE, Mr. FROST, Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. ARMEY, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. BILBRAY, and Mr. BROOKS.

H.R. 2858: Mrs. ROUKEMA.

H.R. 2870: Mr. HERTEL, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. LANCASTER, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. RANGEL, and Mr. HAWKINS.

H.R. 2881: Mr. DYMALLY and Mrs. SAIKI.

H.R. 2896: Mr. SCHAEFER, Mr. CAMPBELL of Colorado, and Mrs. SCHROEDER.

H.J. Res. 81: Mr. SMITH of Mississippi.

H.J. Res. 164: Mr. SMITH of Texas, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. VISCLOSKEY, Mr. DE LA GARZA, and Mr. SHAW.

H.J. Res. 194: Mr. HYDE, Mr. MILLER of Ohio, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. CARPER, Mr. ROSE, Mr. BONIOR, Mr. HASTERT, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. SABO, Ms. OAKAR, Mr. KASICH, Mr. MILLER of

Washington, Mr. WATKINS, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. RHODES, Mr. BUECHNER, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. TANNER, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. PASHAYAN, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. GIBBONS, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. FORD of Michigan, Mr. STEARNS, Mr. QUILLEN, Mr. THOMAS of Wyoming, Mr. BILBRAY, and Mr. ASPIN.

H.J. Res. 217: Mr. AU COIN, Mr. ANTHONY, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. CARPER, Mr. PURSELL, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. MFUME, Mr. HEFNER, Mr. HALL of Ohio, Mr. HOYER, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. GALLO, Mr. SPENCE, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. FORD of Michigan, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. DENNY SMITH, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. SUNDQUIST, Mr. NAGLE, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. COOPER, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. BAKER, and Mr. BILBRAY.

H.J. Res. 231: Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mr. TAUZIN, Mr. THOMAS A. LUKE, Mr. WAGREN, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. YATES, Mr. BROWDER, Mr. HARRIS, Mr. UDALL, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. JENKINS, Mr. HOYER, Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland, Mr. WILSON, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. CARPER, Mr. BEILSON, Mr. RAY, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. McHUGH, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. MAVROULES, and Mr. VALENTINE.

H.J. Res. 241: Mr. COSTELLO, Mr. CLEMENT, Mr. APPEGATE, Mr. FRANK, Mr. SABO, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. CALLAHAN, Mr. DONNELLY, and Mr. KANJORSKI.

H.J. Res. 284: Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. CALLAHAN, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. CLEMENT, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. RAY, Mr. FASCELL, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. LEHMAN of California, Mr. UDALL, Mr. CARPER, Mr. GOODLING, Mr. VALENTINE, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. JONES of Georgia, Mr. CHAPMAN, and Mr. RAHALL.

H.J. Res. 290: Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. NATCHER, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. HAYES of Illinois, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. BROOKS, Mr. OLIN, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. McHUGH, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. LAFALCE, Mr. HANSEN, Mr. STALLINGS, Mr. POSHARD, Mr. MINETA, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. ESPY, and Mr. BUECHNER.

H.J. Res. 292: Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. GORDON, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. McDADE, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. BLAZ, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. FROST, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. HALL of Ohio, Mr. EARLY, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. DE LUGO, and Mr. OWENS of Utah.

H.J. Res. 300: Mr. BATES, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. HANSEN, and Mr. CAMPBELL of California.

H.J. Res. 309: Mrs. VUCANOVICH, Mr. PAYNE of Virginia, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. ARMEY, and Mr. CHAPMAN.

H.J. Res. 322: Mr. ARMEY.

H.J. Res. 327: Mr. McDADE, Mrs. KENNELLY, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. HERTEL, Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. AU COIN, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. BRENNAN, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. ESPY, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. HATCHER, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. FLIPPO, Mr. McNULTY, Mr. OWENS of Utah, Mr. LELAND, Mr. FALCONA, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. STUDDS, Mr. TALLON, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. HAYES of Louisiana, Mr. HOAGLAND, Mr. HYDE, and Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut.

H.J. Res. 337: Mr. PARKER, Mr. PAYNE of Virginia, and Mrs. VUCANOVICH.

